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The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those un-
paralleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did
they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans
of the United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singu-
lar felicity, tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood,
and without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of
the world. It is impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws
of humanity.1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical deprivations that the American Indians
suffered at the hands of the United States was the loss of their lands.
Within two centuries of the first European settlements in North Amer-
ica, the newcomers held title to almost every acre of the continent. At
the root of most land titles in America today sits a federal patent.
Government title, in turn, flows from "[t]he great case of Johnson v.
M[]Intosh,"2 which held that the United States has the exclusive right
to extinguish Indians' interests in their lands, either by purchase or
just war. Mntosh was consistent with a long and uninterrupted line of
statutes, regulations, and proclamations that barred private purchases
of land from the Indians.
Most discussion of MYntosh, and, more generally, of the larger
process of expropriating North America from the Indians, has focused
on normative questions about the relative evil or benevolence of the
invading Europeans. De Tocqueville, contrasting Spanish "atrocities"
with American legality and philanthropy, expressed the benevolent
view that, unsurprisingly, was quite common in early America. E. de
Vattel, a prominent eighteenth-century scholar of international law,
noted with favor the American practice of buying lands even where,
strictly speaking, the law did not require it:
[W]e can not but admire the moderation of the English Puritans who
were the first to settle in New England. Although they bore with them a
charter from their sovereign, they bought from the savages the lands
they wished to occupy. Their praiseworthy example was followed by
1 ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 355 (Phillips Bradley ed. &
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
2 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1954) (citingJohnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)). In the M'Intosh opinion itself, ChiefJustice
Marshall adverted to the "magnitude of the interest in [this] litigation." M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat) at 604. William McIntosh spelled and signed his last name with a "c"
instead of an apostrophe, yet the Supreme Court used an apostrophe.
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William Penn and the colony of Quakers that he conducted into Penn-
sylvania.'
Other commentators, while also maintaining that Europeans ex-
propriated with the best of intentions, at least tried to come to terms
with the undeniably detrimental effect on Indians. "No government
ever entertained more enlightened and benevolent intentions toward
a weaker people than did that of the United States toward the Indian,
but never in history, probably, has a more striking divergence between
intention and performance been witnessed."4
Despite this failure to translate intent into effective action, leading
scholars of this century have concurred with this sympathetic view.
Felix Cohen, the founder of American Indian law as a distinct and
scholarly field of study, noted that America paid for almost every
square foot of the nation. He thus argued that "[w]e are probably the
one great nation in the world that has consistently sought to deal with
an aboriginal population on fair and equitable terms. We have not
always succeeded in this effort but our deviations have not been typi-
cal."5 Francis Paul Prucha, a leading historian of relations between
the United States and the Indians, has argued that treaties and stat-
utes evidence a sincere desire to protect Indian rights.6 Another his-
torian, Don Russell, after debunking the myth that Indian massacres
played a significant role in expropriating the continent by exterminat-
ing its aboriginal inhabitants, argued that the United States behaved
with at least relative humanity. "Much of world history tells of the
movements of peoples that infringe on other peoples. Rarely have the
infringed upon been treated with more consideration and humane-
ness than was the American Indian."
7
The opposite view, that European laws and practices amounted to
a patently immoral land-grab, dates back at least to the years immedi-
S 8 E. DE VATFEI, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE,
APPIQU 5 A LA CONDUrIE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [LAw OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOvEREIGNS) 85-86 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Oceana
Publications, Inc. 1964) (1758).
4 MILO MILTON QUAIFE, CHICAGO AND THE OLD NORTHvEST, 1673-1835, at 179
(1913).
5 Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34 (1947).
6 See FRANCiS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POuCY IN THE FORiATIVE YEARS:
THE INDIAN TRADE & INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 248 (1962) ("For [the Indian
policy of the United States] we must turn to the treaties made with the Indians, which
uniformly guaranteed Indian rights... .").
Don Russell, How Many Indians Were Killed?, AM. W.july 1973, at 42, 63.
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ately following the decision in M'Intosh. AlthoughJustice Joseph Story
signed on to ChiefJustice Marshall's unanimous opinion in the case,
in a speech given five years later he argued that the case violated both
"natural law and moral right."8 A later monograph labeled the opin-
ion as "imperialism" and cast the result as facially immoral:
[A]bove all, [M'Intosh] involved a flat question of right and wrong. It
was a decision which seems to have altogether ignored property rights
which had solemnly vested .... We are then to inquire whether or not
the conscience of the world will today respond affirmatively to the
proposition that discovery and conquest alone give a title as against own-
ers and occupants of property... whether, in a word, that which is mor-
ally wrong can be legally and politically right.
A growing number of scholars, reexamining the historical record
from the Indian perspective, have cast M'Intosh and the larger process
of expropriating Indian lands in even darker terms. A particularly
bleak account of European treatment of the Indians observes that
those "reaching for illicit power customarily assume attitudes of great
moral rectitude to divert attention from the abandonment of their
own moral standards of behavior.... All conquest aristocracies have
followed such paths. It would be incredible if ours had not." o An-
other scholar, Vine Deloria, avers that "Indians have not accepted the
mythology of the American past which interprets American history as
a sanitized merging of diverse peoples to form a homogeneous union.
The... abuses of the past and present [are] too vivid, and the mem-
ory of freedom [is] too lasting.""
After a thorough study of the intellectual antecedents to the opin-
ion, a recent work classifies M'Intosh as part of a
discourse of conquest, which denies fundamental human rights and self-
determination to indigenous tribal peoples. ... [This discourse asserts]
the West's lawful power to impose its vision of truth on non-Western
peoples through a racist, colonizing rule of law.
.. [T]he United States acquired a continent "in perfect good faith"
that its wars and acts of genocide directed against Indian people ac-
corded with the rule of law.
8 R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURTJUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
OLD REPUBuC 213 (1985).
9 GEORGE BRYAN, THE IMPERIALISM OFJOHN MARSHALL A STUDY IN EXPEDIENCY i-
ii (1924).10 FANCISJENNINGS, TFE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE
CANT OF CONQUEST ix (1975).
" VINE DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (1974).
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... [The West's archaic, medievally derived legal discourse respect-
ing the American Indian is ultimately genocidal in both its practice and
its intent.
12
For both sides of this debate, law plays a central role. Those with a
dark view of the process of expropriation argue that European settlers
used (or perhaps more accurately, abused) laws either with specific
intent to take land and exterminate the aboriginal population, or with
deliberate indifference to these inevitable results of their policies.
Observers who view European actions as relatively benevolent insist
that legal rules softened the process of expropriation.
This Article makes no attempt to resolve this long-running and
well-known normative debate. Moreover, neither view is consistent
with even the most basic facts in the legal and historical record. Mas-
sacres, and even battles, were quite rare in the process of expropriat-
ing Indian lands-a fact difficult to harmonize with a theory of inten-
tional genocide. On the other hand, it is hard to reconcile a
benevolent view of the expropriation process with the end result-the
knowing and intentional expropriation of a continent accompanied
by the destruction of tribe after tribe.
This Article presents a view more consistent with the somewhat
schizophrenic legal and historical record. Drawing on law and eco-
nomics, it explains the process of expropriating Indian lands in terms
of minimizing the costs, broadly defined (for example, value of lives,
risks borne, and time spent on unproductive warfare), to the Euro-
pean colonizers. Simply put, customs and legal rules promulgated by
colonial and later American courts and legislatures promoted not
simply expropriation (right or wrong), but effcwient expropriation. The
thesis of this Article is that colonists established rules to minimize the
costs associated with dispossessing the natives. If it had been cheaper
to be more brutal, then Europeans would have been more brutal.
Such brutality, however, was not cheap at all.
Likewise, if it had been cheaper to show more humanity, the
Europeans would have exhibited more, such as extending Indians full
rights to sell (or keep) their land. Such a legal rule, however, would
have been far from cheap. Johnson v. M'Intosh was an essential part of
the regime of efficient expropriation because it ensured that Europe-
ans did not bid against each other to acquire Indian lands, thus keep-
22 ROBERT A. WILLIAMs JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT.
THE DIscOuRSES OF CONQUEST 325-26 (1990) (citation omitted).
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ing prices low.' The M'Intosh rule was neither the beginning nor the
end of the means by which Europeans obtained American soil at
minimal cost. Part II of this Article places the rule of M'Intosh in
broader context. It explains why wars of conquest were unappealing
and rare, and how disease and the destruction of the Indians' stocks
of wild game played a much larger role in efficient expropriation.1 4 It
then explains how legal rules channeled settlement to maximize the
effect of these "natural allies" and shows how the Europeans' greater
ability to maintain a united front yielded a set of tools for efficient ex-
propriation, from M'Intosh to powerful advantages in negotiation.'5
Despite some disagreements, this Article's law and economics in-
terpretation of American-Indian relations owes a significant intellec-
tual debt to recent articles by Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney,'1
and by Douglas Allen.17 Anderson and McChesney convincingly dem-
onstrate that the United States took few acres by direct force, arguing
that the price paid for Indian lands depended on what each side ex-
pected to happen in the event of conflict. This Article questions An-
derson and McChesney's dichotomy between taking lands by raid
(force) and by trade, suggesting instead that there was a continuum of
techniques between these two poles. The United States mixed and
matched techniques from both extremes in order to minimize the
cost of Indian lands. Allen argues that giving away land, or at least
subsidizing settlement, under the Homestead Acts and their precur-
sors, was a least-cost way of dealing with hostile Indians-settlers
formed a rough, ready, and cheap border militia.'8 This Article builds
on Allen's work by demonstrating the key role settlers played in weak-
ening Indian resistance by spreading disease and thinning game.
In addition to supplementing these earlier works, this Article ex-
amines other legal rules that enabled the cheap expropriation of In-
dian lands. These factors include government coordination of set-
is See discussion infra Part II.A (contrasting the efficiency interpretation of M'Intosh
with other explanations).
14 See discussion infra Part II.D (examining the role played by the Europeans'
"natural allies" in permitting them to efficiently expropriate Indian land).
15 See discussion infra Part .E (discussing how the Europeans' legal rules encour-
aged private actions that helped expropriate Indian land).16
Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of
Indian-WhiteRelations, 37J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994).
17 Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading & Property Rights; or, "How the West Was Really
Won, "34J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1991).
18 See id. at 2 (describing the benefits of the Homestead Act and rejecting argu-
ments that the Act was a mistake).
EXPROPRTATION OFAMERCANINDIAN LANDS
tiers' movements, legal rules that overcame a natural inertia in the
westward expansion (characterized by the desire to let others go first
and bear the costs of first settlement), the federal government's gen-
eral reluctance to distribute land through large land companies, and
perhaps most importantly, the competition-stifling rule of Johnson v.
M'Intosh.
Before tracing out this theory of efficient expropriation, however,
Part I presents a brief history of "Itihe great case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh,"19 There are two reasons for this digression. First, as a lead-
ing Supreme Court case, the background to M'Intosh is of interest in
and of itself. Part I presents material from a variety of sources that
neither historians nor legal scholars have examined. The record is
full of surprises, from the fact that the (victorious) defendants' pur-
chases may well have been illegal, to the likelihood that the case was
feigned."
The second reason for presenting the history of M'Intosh is that it
provides a nucleus of historical facts (for example, that disease had
decimated the Indian sellers of the lands in question), background
legal rules (including the long history of legislative strictures on pur-
chasing land from Indians), and archetypal characters (such as specu-
lating land companies of the early republic) that helps explain the
process of efficient expropriation. The legal rule of M'Intosh is but
one piece in the large puzzle of efficient expropriation of Indian land;
characters from every stage of the case's history provide insights into
the other pieces and how they all fit together.
I. THE HISTORY OFJOHNSON V. M'INTOSH
A. Land Title and Alienability in Early America
Generally, European colonists employed European real property
law to define their rights in American lands. Two complications,
however, created the need for additional rules. First, competing
European sovereigns had to establish rules to deal with conflicting
claims amongst themselves to American lands. Second, the European
colonizers had to decide what rights, if any, Indians had to their own
lands.
19 For a more detailed history of the case, see Eric Kades, The Great Feigned Case of
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & HIsT. REv. (forthcoming 2001).
20 See discussion infra Part L.C (providing historical background for the M'Intosh
litigation).
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The simultaneous British, French, Dutch, Spanish, and even Swed-
ish explorations and colonization of North America inevitably led to
land disputes.
[Als they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary,
in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each
other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regu-
lated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made,
against all other European governments, which title might be consum-
mated by possession.21
As with many rules of international law, competing nations often
disregarded this discovery rule when it did not suit their purposes, yet
the rule did serve to avoid at least some conflicts.
It is important to note that, strictly speaking, this discovery rule
applied only among European nations ("regulated as between them-
selves"). Some commentators have used the term "discovery rule" or
"discovery doctrine" to describe the rules that the various European
sovereigns established for defining Indian land rights,2 such as the
M'Intosh rule that the sovereign alone could purchase land from the
natives. Milner Ball cogently explains why this is inconsistent with
Marshall's approach:
The theory [of MTntosh] sets out two different relationships: one among
European claimants to the New World, the other between each of the
European claimants and the Indian inhabitants. As among the Europe-
ans, the doctrine of discovery obtained. As between European and In-
dian nations, each relationship was to be separately regulated.
21 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1222-24 (1980) ("[T]he doctrine of discovery permitted the
sovereign alone to extinguish Indian tide .... "). The statement can be corrected by
adding the italicized language: "the doctrine of discovery permitted the sovereign
alone to establish the rules that would govern how to extinguish Indian title."
Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 3, 24;
see also M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRTORy IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 29 (Negro Universities Press 1969) (1926) (noting that European
nations claimed that discovery rights provided dominion over Indian territory and pri-
ority of discovery determined which nation had ownership); Howard R. Berman, The
Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV.
637, 644-45 (1978) (defining the doctrine of discovery as the "organizing principle
through which the European nations articulated claims against each other"); J.Young-
blood Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75, 90
(1977) ("Discovery... was a distributional preference by which the Europeans agreed
to divide up entitlements to acquire tribal lands."); John Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the
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Thus, the discovery doctrine did not apply, at least directly, to Euro-
pean-Indian relations.
Confusion about this two-level doctrine-(1) the discovery rule
regulating inter-European disputes, and (2) rules regulating Euro-
pean-Indian disputes-may be due in part to the following dense pas-
sage in ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion:
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives,
and establishing settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Euro-
peans could interfere. It was a right which all asserted for themselves,
and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented.
24
Describing the "sole right of acquiring the soil" as a necessary re-
sult of the discovery rule is misleading. Marshall meant that a discov-
ering nation could exclude other nations under the first level, the in-
ter-European discovery rule. The discovery rule did not dictate which
rule each sovereign chose at the second level when defining fights vis-
a-vis the Indians. Thus, the quoted passage did not mean that each
sovereign had to bar its own citizens from making private purchases of
land from the Indians. This was merely the particular second-level
rule Marshall found that America and its predecessors adopted. In-
deed, contrary to the American rule explicated in M'Intosh, it appears
that France at times permitted its colonists to purchase lands directly
from the Indians.ts
Marshall's very next sentence makes clear the distinction between
the discovery rule as level one, and whatever rules each nation de-
cided to establish as level two: "Those relations which were to exist
Constitution and the MarshaU Cour4 17 REVUEJURIDIQUE THEMIS 403, 418 (1982-1983)
(discussing the significance of M'Intosh and the principle of discovery). Berman per-
ceptively notes the one linkage between the discovery doctrine and relations with the
tribes: "With the single exception of the right of alienability of land, the original, in-
deed aboriginal, sovereignty of the Indian nations is unimpaired by, and not included
in, the concept of discovery." Berman, sup-a, at 650.
24 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
2[A]t Cahokia [in French-governed Illinois, prior to 1763] there were several
cases of direct purchase by individuals from the Indians, [although] the practice was
not [common], for the representatives of the government granted land freely, without
formality, and without reservations. .. ." CLARENCE WALWORTH ALVORD, THE
ILLINOIS COUNTRY, 1673-1818, at 206 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1987) (1920). William
Murray, the principal field agent of the land companies that bought the tracts at issue
in M'ntosh, consulted French records, older Indian leaders, and French inhabitants
before negotiating with the tribes. His research showed that "the lands held for the
use of garrisons, or held by the inhabitants, originated from cessions on grants obtained
for a valuable consideration from the native Indians." Introduction to AN AccOUNT OF
THE PRocEEDNGs OF THE ILLiNOIS AND OuABAcHE LAND COMPANIEs 5 (Philadelphia,
William Duane 1803) [hereinafterAccouNT F PROCEEDINGS] (emphasis added).
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between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by them-
selves [(level two)]. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no
other power could interpose between them [(level one, the discovery
rule)] ."6
From the beginning, English government in the New World re-
fused to recognize the Indians as true title holders. Even during the
first years of colonization, when they were no military match for the
local tribes and indeed depended on their charity to survive, Virginia's
earliest settlers began to articulate a theoretical basis to deny Indian
title and thus expropriate tribal lands.
"Some affirm, and it is likely to be true, that these savages have no par-
ticular propriety in any part of parcel of that country, but only a general
residency there, as wild beasts in the forest; for they range and wander
up and down the country without any law or government, being led only
by their own lusts and sensuality. There is not meum and tuum [mine and
thine] amongst them. So that if the whole land should be taken from
them, there is not a man that can complain of any particular wrong done
unto him."2
In the eyes of the Puritans, hunter-gatherers were not really occu-
pants of their lands. "God had intended his land to be cultivated and
not to be left in the condition of 'that unmanned wild Countrey,
which they [the savages] range rather than inhabite.'"2 James
Monroe, as President, more than once voiced the same theme.
"[T]he hunter or savage state requires a greater extent of territory to
sustain it, than is compatible with the progress and just claims of civi-
lized life, and must yield to it."29 "[T]he earth was given to mankind
to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or
people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is
necessary for their own support and comfort."'o
Common settlers, unsurprisingly, agreed with these sentiments,
and invoked egalitarian, leveling arguments to explain why the land-
rich Indians should be compelled to share the wealth. For example,
squatters on Chickasaw land successfully protested eviction that would
26 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
27 WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 211 (quoting Robert Gray, a popular Puritan
preacher).
28 JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 80 (quoting 4 SAMUEL PURCHAS, HAKLUYrUS
POSTHUMUs ORPURcHAS HIS PILGRIMES 1814 (London, 1625)).
PRUcHA, supra note 6, at 227 (quoting Letter from PresidentJames Monroe to
AndrewJackson (Oct. 5, 1817)).
so 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897,
at 16 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
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"bring many women and children to a state of starvation mearly to
gratify a heathan nation Who have no better right to this land than we
have ourselves and they have by estemation nearly 100000 acres of
land to each man Of their nation."3'
A funny thing happened on the way to acquiring Indian lands. In
spite of these oft-repeated justifications for simply taking Indian lands,
colonists very early on began purchasing tracts instead of simply grab-
bing them (or trying to). This soon became official policy. The New
England Company instructed its colonists in 1629 that "[i]f any of the
Savages pretend Right of Inheritance to all or any Part of the land in
our Patent... purchase their claim in order to avoid the least Scruple
of Intrusion." 12 When the Crown began to exercise more direct over-
sight of the colonies in the 1660s, it reiterated this principle. There
was one instance in which outright expropriation was permissible:
"just" wars, that is, defensive wars.33 Conquest in New England, how-
ever, remained very much the exception. The bottom line is that
contrary to the common belief that the Indians were ruthlessly deprived
of their land, almost every part of (Massachusetts] that came to be inhab-
ited by the whites was purchased from the Indians, except the areas that
were either acquired by conquest or, like Salem and Boston, never
claimed by the Indians, because of depopulation by epidemics.ss
The pattern of European land acquisition in New England-pur-
chases punctuated by rare conquests-repeated itself across the rest of
the continent. The United States paid over $800 million for Indian
lands.35 According to Congress, the United States exercised the right
of conquest only once, and then half-heartedly.!
51 Petition to the President and Congress by Intruders on Chickasaw Lands (Sept. 5, 1810),
reprinted in 6 T1E TEITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNrTED STATES 106, 107 (Clarence Ed-
win Carter ed., 1938) [hereinafterTE=ORIlALPAPERS].
S2 JOEL N. ENO, TH PuRRiTANs AND THE INDIAN LANDS 1 (1906).
33 YA SUIDE KAwASHIMA, PURrrANJUSTICE AND THE INDIAN: WHiTE MAN'S LAW IN
MAsSACHUsETTs, 1630-1763, at 50 (1986).
Id. at 51. See infra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of the important role epidemics
played in breaking down Indian resistance to European colonization.
See Cohen, supra note 5, at 45-46 (implying that Indian land purchases were fair
to the extent that substantial federal funds were appropriated for purchases).
3 The Commissioner of Indian Aff-airs in 1872 stated that:
Except only in the case of the Indians in Minnesota, after the outbreak of
1862, the United States Government has never extinguished an Indian title as
by right of conquest; and in this latter case the Government provided the In-
dians another reservation, besides giving them the proceeds of the sales of the
lands vacated by them in Minnesota.
Id. at 37 n.20 (quoting Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1872).
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While Europeans recognized some Indian interest in land, they
never "granted" the tribes all the sticks in the common-law bundle of
property rights; in particular, colonists consistently narrowed or en-
tirely denied the Indians' power to sell land. First, while Indians for-
mally had the power to refuse to sell 37 in reality this was not an op-
tion.'s Second, European sovereigns asserted the right to sell Indian
land to their citizens before purchasing from the Indians. Such a pur-
chaser took tile "subject only to the Indian right of occupancy,"3 9 but
otherwise had a full fee interest. Combined with the exclusive right to
purchase Indian lands (or conquer the tribe), discussed in the follow-
ing subsection, this created a novel and peculiar "bifurcated title." Ul-
timate title resided with the European sovereign or its grantee, while
the Indian occupants retained "Indian title" until they sold, or were
otherwise relieved of their lands.
The facts of M'Intosh, discussed in Part I.C.1, present a conun-
drum that can arise under this bifurcated title regime: if the Indians
sold to Ywhile the Crown or the United States sold to X who owned
the land, X or ? Given the superiority that colonizers assigned to
their title, it comes as no surprise that X had title as against Y The
colonies, the British government, and the United States achieved this
result by the same rule. They barred anyone but themselves from
41purchasing lands from the Indians. While most of the property rules
discussed thus far involve European-Indian relations, this stricture was
a regulation made by colonists, directed at only colonists. That said,
this Article argues, in Part II.B, that the rule profoundly harmed the
Indians.
Cohen cites the Report as observing, however, that "[i]t is not to be denied that
wrong was often done in fact to tribes in the negotiation of treaties of cession. The
Indians were not infrequently overborne or deceived." Id. Part II infra discusses how
the United States was able to coerce and deceive the Indians, and why such an ap-
proach was more attractive than conquest.
37 See President Thomas Jefferson, Speech to Tribes (Apr. 22, 1808), quoted in
Dwight L. Smith, Indian Land Cessions in the Old Northwest, 1795-1809, at 213-14
(1949) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University (Bloomington)) (on file
with author and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) ("[I]n all these
things ... you have been free to do as you please, your lands are your own ... to keep
or sell as you please ... you are always free to say 'no,' and it will never disturb our
friendship for you.").
S See infra Part II.B (describing how U.S. policy made the Indians' option to sell
practically useless).39 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 573, 574 (1823).
40 The French apparently did not adopt such a rule and recognized private pur-
chases of Indian lands. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing France's
policy toward its settlers regarding land purchases).
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The universal and repeated enactment of laws barring purchases
of land by private citizens from the Indians attests to the importance
that Britain, its colonies, and later the United States attached to this
rule. In colonial New England, "[i] t is a reasonable generalization to
say that land purchases from Indians were a governmental monop-
oly."41 Massachusetts apparently adopted the first such official law in
1634 and repeatedly enacted similar measures.4 As late as 1760,
Massachusetts publicized the law and empowered local officials to en-
force it at colonial expense." No later than 1672, Connecticut's Gen-
eral Court enacted a similar measure.4 Almost every colony adopted
such measures as soon as they began purchasing significant amounts
of Indian land. Successive British and American governments
41 James Warren Springer, American Indians and 11w Law of Real Property in Colonial
New England 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 25, 35-36 (1986) (collecting cites to colonial stat-
utes barring private purchases of Indian lands).
42 See 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR & COMPANY OF THE MAssAcHUSETTS BAY IN
NEW ENGLAND 112 (photo. reprint 1968) (Nathaniel B. Shurteff ed., Boston, William
White 1853) (reprinting a law that prohibited purchasing land from the Indians with-
out the permission of the court).
43 See KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 53 (explaining that later versions included
harsh penalties for mere attempts to buy land directly from Indians, including fines
equal to double the value of the land or imprisonment for six months).
44 See 4 THE Acts AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
MAsSACHusETTS BAY: To WHICH ARE PREFIXED THE CHARTERS OF THE PROVINCE 369
(Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1890) [hereinafter ACTS AND RESOLVES] (re-
printing a 1760 law that authorized and empowered named state agents to prosecute
any ?ersons who purchased land from the Indians).
See THE EARLIEST LAWS OF THE NEW HAVEN AND CONNECTICUT COLONIES, 1639-
1673, at 112 (John D. Cushing ed., 1977) (reprinting a 1672 Colony of Connecticut law
prohibiting the purchase of land from the Indians).
46 See id.; 1 THE EARLISr PRINTED LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA, 1755-1770,
at 17-18 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) (reprinting a 1758 Act prohibiting Georgia citi-
zens from purchasing lands from and trading with the Indians without license); 4ACTS
AND RESOLVES, supra note 44, at 369 (reprinting a 1760 Act giving certain Massachu-
setts officials the right to prosecute all persons who have purchased, or purchase in the
future, lands from the Indians); 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES *396 (1873) (describing a
similar 1644 Maryland measure); ACTS AND LAWS OF NEV HAMPSHIRE, 1680-1726, at
162 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) (reprinting "An Act to Prevent and Make Void Clan-
destine and Illegal Purchases of Land from the Indians," passed in 1719); KENT'S
COMMENTARIES, supra, at *394-95 (describing a similar 1682 New Jersey statute);
KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra at *385 (describing New York's measures at preventing
illegal Indian land acquisition); 1 THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA,
1669-1751, at 38 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978) (reprinting a 1715 law prohibiting the
purchase of land from the Indians); 4 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM
1682 TO 1801, at 154-56 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., n.p., Clarence M.
Busch 1897) (reprinting "A Supplementary Act to an Act Against Buying Land of the
Natives," passed in 1729); THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 526 (Thomas
Cooper ed., 1836) (reprinting a 1739 statute making land conveyances from the Indi-
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adopted similar measures.
The longstanding rule against private purchases is important for
two reasons. First, it makes the holding of M'Intosh (reaffirming the
rule against private purchases from the Indians) seem predictable;
moreover, it lays the foundation for the novel argument that custom
forms the central ground for Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. Sec-
ond, the rule makes perfect sense as a tool of efficient expropriation
of Indian lands. Universal enactment and strict enforcement of the
M'Intosh rule support the least-cost expropriation thesis presented in
Part 11.4
ans to private persons void); 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAVS OF VIRGINIA 97 (William Wailer Hening ed., Richmond 1822) (1619) [here-
inafter STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA] (reprinting law on purchasing lands from
"natives").
47 SeeAct of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, § 12, 1 Stat. 743, 746 (invalidating any sale of land
by the Indians unless executed under treaty); Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 12, 1 Stat.
469, 472 (same); Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329, 330 (same); Act ofJuly 22,
1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (same); 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 264 (1783) (same); 25 id. at 602 (same); Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation
of 1763. Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of
Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329, 356-57 (1989) (explaining that the Proclamation of
1763 barred private purchase of Indian lands). These statutes illustrate the United
States's repeated barring of private purchases of Indian lands. Congress worded the
later statutes quite broadly, criminalizing the act of negotiating ("treating") with the
Indians for land, "directly or indirectly." 1 Stat. at 472; 1 Stat. at 330.
48 See infra Part I.C.4 (describing the custom-based rationale behind the M'Intosh
decision).
4 The long and uninterrupted pedigree of the rule against private purchases raises
a difficult question. Why did land speculators (such as the plaintiffs in M'Intosh) make
purchases in the face of a seemingly clear legal refusal to recognize title rooted in In-
dian deeds? Many speculators, including those whose purchases from the Indians
eventually precipitated the M'Intosh case, felt emboldened to engage in such transac-
tions based in part on the Camden-Yorke Opinion. The Camden-Yorke Opinion was a
peculiar legal opinion letter originally written by British Attorney General Charles
Pratt (who later became Lord Camden) and Solicitor General Charles Yorke that af-
firmed the right of individuals to buy land from rajahs in British India. A slightly al-
tered version, not limited to India (it is not clear if the original authors, or others,
made the alterations), found its way to America no later than 1773. SeeJack M. Sosin,
The Yorke-Camden Opinion and American Land Speculators, 85 PA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 38, 42-43 (1961) (describing historians' conflicting views on how this opin-
ion came into the hands of American colonists).
As the later actions of many of the speculators indicate, they may have planned
from day one to obtain ex post legislative action to except them from the laws that
would void their tides. The incredible size of their claims, often in the millions of
acres, provided a ready source of consideration with which to bribe legislators. Finally,
anticipation of political change may have motivated the marked increase in private
purchases from the Indians in the 1770s. The storm clouds of the impending Ameri-
can Revolution apparently led some speculators to believe that the British rule against
purchases from Indians might be trumped by other considerations. "Should a revolu-
tion occur, Henderson [head of the Transylvania Company and Daniel Boone's spon-
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B. The Purchases of the Illinois and the Wabash Land Companies
The plaintiffs in M'Intosh claimed lands under Indian deeds ob-
tained before the Revolutionary War by two closely related land ven-
tures, the Illinois Land Company and the Wabash Land Company.
The Illinois Company arose out of the Indian trading and troop provi-
sioning activities of a group of prominent Philadelphia merchants led
by David Franks and the Gratz brothers, Bernard and Michael. Their
partner and agent in Illinois, William Murray, successfully convinced
the merchants to branch out from trade into land speculation.!'
Murray arrived at the British fort in Kaskaskia (on the Mississippi
River, in southern Illinois) in June 1773." Despite warnings from lo-
cal British officials of the strictures against private purchases from the
Indians, Murray promptly began negotiations with the Illinois tribes.
Murray dealt with the shells that remained of the once great Illi-
nois tribes. Their population had fallen from around 10,500 in 1680
to 2500 in 1736 and to 500 in 1800, as they fell victim to European
diseases and Indian enemies on all sides. 2 Unable to prevent neigh-
boring tribes from encroaching on their extensive land, on July 5,
1773, the Kaskaskia, Peoria, and Cahokia tribes3 deeded two large
sor] reasoned, actual possession... would constitute a strength not otherwise attain-
able." OTiS K. RICE, FRONTIERKENTUcKY73 (1993).
See Anna Edith Marks, William Murray, Trader & Land Speculator in the Illinois
County, in 26 TRANSACTMONS OF THE ILINOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 188, 190-91
(1919) (describing Murray's interaction with the merchants).
51 Although the fort survives and is part of an Illinois state park, the Mississippi
River finally inundated the adjacent town of Kaskaskia in 1899. SeeJohn W. Weymouth
& William I. Woods, Combined Magnetic & Chemical Surveys of Forts Kaskaskia & de Char-
tres No. 1, Illinois, 18 HIsT. ARCHEOLOGY 20, 29 (1984) (describing how the Mississippi
River changed course and destroyed the town of Kaskaskia).
52 See EmilyJ. Blasingham, The Depopulation of the Illinois Indians, 3 ETHNOHIST. 361,
372 (1956) (describing settlement patterns and population estimates of Illinois Indians
based on historical records). See generally 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERCAN INDIANS
596-97, 674, 678-79 (William C. Sturtevant ed., 1978) (discussing reasons for the de-
cline of the Illinois Indian population). Blasingham indicates that the Illinois Indian
population may have been significantly higher before the 1660s, when reliable records
first became available. See Blasingham, supra, at 361-62. Blasingham attributes this
precipitous drop in population to warfare with other Indians, European endemic dis-
eases, the introduction of Christianity and thus monogamy, alcoholism, and the splin-
tering of the tribes. See id. at 373. More recent scholarship, discussed infra Part II.D.1,
pinpoints disease as perhaps the most important factor in decimating Indian popula-
tions. Smallpox appeared as early as 1701, and successive epidemics struck again in
1733, 1751, 1756, and 1762. SeeBlasingham, supra, at 383-84.
53 Less than 100 years earlier, the Illinois Confederation consisted of as many as
twelve distinct tribes, but the severe population decline led to a series of mergers and
extinctions that left only these three. See 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANs,
supra note 52, at 594, 673.
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tracts of land to Murray and the other twenty-one members of the Illi-
nois Company.54
Murray and his Philadelphia partners worried about obtaining of-
ficial recognition for the Illinois Company's deed. Unable to find po-
litical support in their own state for their purchase, the Pennsylvani-
ans of the Illinois Company turned to Lord Dunmore, Governor of
Virginia. Absent direct royal administration, Virginia claimed, and
was recognized to have, jurisdiction over Illinois by virtue of its colo-
nial charter. Murray visited Dunmore in April 1774. An aspiring land
speculator himself, the governor apparently agreed to throw his
weight behind the Illinois Land Company's claim in return for the
opportunity to participate in subsequent transactions. Murray was al-
ready talking of a second scheme by May.!
To satisfy the desires of the governor, Murray created the Wabash Land
Company, of which Lord Dunmore and several men from Maryland,
Philadelphia, and London became members....
His reward promised, Lord Dunmore wrote to Lord Dartmouth [Brit-
ish Secretary of State] a most cordial recommendation of the Illinois
Land Company....
... In a later letter Dunmore denied that he had any connection with
the Illinois Land Company, but he kept discreetly silent about the Wa-
bash Land Company.
Instead of negotiating a second purchase himself, Murray re-
cruited a prominent local Frenchman, Louis Viviat, as a partner and
an agent. Viviat treated with Piankashaw tribal leaders at Vincennes
(Port St. Vincent) and Vermillion, in present-day Indiana. The Pi-
ankashaws were one of six tribes classified as Miami Indians. Like the
Illinois tribes, the Miami suffered precipitous population declines af-
ter contact with Europeans; their numbers fell from 7500 in 1682 to
just over 2000 in 1736. .
54 See Map of Land Claims in Johnson v. MIntosh, supra p. 1067 (showing the land
purchased by the Illinois Company). Murray promptly recorded the deed at the Kas-
kaskia records office. See MEMORIAL OF THE UNITED ILLINOIS AND WABASH LAND
COM:PANIES TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES i-
ii, 11-15 (Baltimore, Robinson 1816) [hereinafter 1816 MEMORIAL] (providing
Murray's own account of the events and transactions of 1773).
55 See Marks, supra note 50, at 202 (describing a May 16th letter by Murray that dis-
cussed his new plan).
56 ALvORD, supra note 25, at 302, 303 n.35.
57 See 15 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 52, at 596-97, 688.
Population figures for the Piankashaw tribe alone are apparently unavailable.
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Viviat reached terms and executed a deed on behalf of the twenty
members of the Wabash Company,0 with the Piankashaw representa-
tives on October 18, 1775.! This deed also conveyed two large tracts,
both along the Wabash River. The first (northern) tract straddled the
Wabash between the Cat River and Point Coupee. The second
(southern) tract ran from the Ohio River up to the White River.60
Viviat apparently did not make efforts to include all the tribes with
colorable claims to the lands purchased. In particular, the Weas may
have had claims in the southern tract. In addition, there is evidence
that the Piankashaw negotiators did not have the support of their own
tribe in making the grant.62 These facts are at odds with the case
stated in M'Intosh, which represented both purchases as being made
from united, consenting tribes with exclusive Indian title.
63
In order to cure any defects in their title, the Illinois and Wabash
Companies did what so many other land speculators did in the early
republic: they lobbied the legislature. Lobbying in the early republic
was no prettier than lobbying today. In the Continental Congress,
land claims formed "the most complicated and embarrassing Subject
.... Infinite pains are taken by a certain sett of men vulgarly called
Land robbers [jobbers], or Land-Sharks to have it in their power to
engross the best lands."
In the early years of the American Revolution, the Companies
took two important steps to obtain legislative confirmation of their ti-
ties. First, they attracted influential, well-connected investors to bol-
ster their lobbying efforts. James Wilson, who later became one of the
primary architects of the Constitution and a Supreme Court Justice,
Wabash Company investors included Virginia Governor Lord Dunsmore and
Maryland Governor Thomas Johnson-predecessor in interest to the M'Inlosh plain-
tiffs, Joshua Johnson (his son) and Thomas Graham (his grandson). See Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 555, 561 (1823).
59 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54, at 16-24 (providing a copy of the deed).
60 See Map of Land Claims inJohnson v. M'Intos, supra p. 1067.
61 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54, at 23-24 (mentioning only Piankashaw chiefs
as signatories to the deed).
SeeRIcHARD WHrrE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN
THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, at 372 (1991) ("Their dalliance with Clark arose
at least partially from their need of support for a land sale they had earlier made to the
Wabash Company without the consent of the other Piankashaws or of the Weas.").
This illustrates the dangers of relying on facts, especially stipulated facts, in cases
that appear to be feigned or collusive. See infra Part I.C.1, which argues that the par-
ties wanted the case to be heard in the Supreme Court despite the lack of any contro-
versover their separate claims.
PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 64 (1968)
(quoting statement of Rep. David Howell of R.I.) (citation omitted).
200] 1083
1084 UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1065
was the central figure in the United Company's efforts by 1779.
Other prominent investors were Robert Morris, financier of the
American Revolution,6 and Dr. Thomas Walker, Thomas Jefferson's
guardian and "a dominant figure among Virginia's land speculators in
the later 1700s." 67 Second, the members of the Illinois Company and
the Wabash Company merged on March 13, 1779 in order to pool
their resources.6 Wilson became chairman of the newly founded
company on August 20, 1779.
The shareholders made tentative plans for their first settlements
in Illinois.6 They proposed to establish their first town at the conflu-
ence of the Wabash and Ohio rivers, in the second (southern) tract of
the Wabash Company's deed. The rather detailed plans included, in-
ter alia, the widths of streets and alleys (seventy feet and fifteen feet,
respectively); taxation based on acreage and improvements; large
chunks of free land and subsidies for the first five hundred settlers;
and the allocation of surveying costs between the Companies and the
settlers. The Companies reserved many town lots for themselves, pre-
sumably with the hope that values would appreciate rapidly, thus
permitting quick resale at a higher price.70
Murray had begun lobbying even before the Companies united.
While the British government had clearly rejected the land claims, the
happenstance of the American Revolution created a new opportunity
for vindicating the titles through the (newly sovereign) State of Vir-
ginia, whose colonial charter encompassed Illinois and the rest of the
Old Northwest-basically those lands north of the Ohio River and east
of the Mississippi. Thus, Murray presented a memorial outlining the
Wilson was an inveterate land speculator, investing in at least two other large
schemes: the (in)famous Yazoo lands and the Indiana Company. See GEORGE E.
LEWIS, THE INDIANA COMPANY, 1763-1798, at 253 (1941) (describing Wilson as a "great
speculator"); C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAw AND PoLmcs iN THE NEw REPUBuC 5
(1966) (noting that James Wilson was one of the prominent bankers of the Yazoo
companies); M. SAKOLS10, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 135 (1932) (noting
that~ames Wilson was a "large subscriber" to theYazoo deal).
Morris bought a share of the United Company for 8000 pounds on October 2,
1779. See Minutes of the United Illinois & Wabash Land Companies 46 (1778-1782)
(on reserve in the collection of the Historical Soc'y of Pa., Phila., call no. HSPL (PH:)
Am. 4096) [hereinafter Minutes of the United Companies].
67 THOMAs PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDs AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
60 (1937).
63 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 19 (resolving that the
Companies unite).
See id. at 23-25 (proposing the location where the town might be laid out).
0 For this plan to make financial sense, members must have believed that property
values would increase at a faster rate than other investments of comparable risk.
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Companies' land claims to the Virginia legislature in December
1778.
Virginia, however, refused to recognize the Companies' Indian
deeds. Indeed, the activities of the Illinois and Wabash Companies
led Virginia's legislature, in May 1779, to restate the ancient rule
against direct purchases from the Indians.7 Virginia's reasoning
could not have come as a surprise. "It was stated that no person had
ever had the right to purchase lands within the limits of Virginia from
the natives, except those persons authorized to make such purchases
for the use and benefit of the colony and later the state."
73
The fluid political situation, however, soon gave the United Com-
panies a new body to lobby: the American Continental Congress and
its successors. Between 1781 and 1796, Wilson drafted no fewer than
five memorials to the national legislature pleading the United Com-
panies' case.74 Their most frequent refrain was to offer large portions
of the Companies' tracts (varying from one quarter to three quarters)
to the United States in exchange for recognition of the Companies'
title in the remainder. In trying to sell Congress on such a compro-
mise, the United Companies repeatedly emphasized that, by relying
on their deeds, the nation could avoid paying the Illinois and Pianka-
shaw Indians anything for lands already sold. "[A] transfer of [the
Company's title] to the United States may be rendered effectual, to
preclude the necessity of a second purchase, and to bar all future claims
of the Indians to the lands in queston."75 Just in case Congress missed
the point, the Companies later reiterated it, with more emotion:
71 See Memorial of William Murray (Dec. 26, 1778), in ICALENDAR oFVIRGINIASTATE
PAPERS AND OTHER MANuscRIurs, 1652-1781, at 314 (Win. P. Palmer ed., Richmond
1875) ("Since ... the Public affairs of America have prevented the Company from set-
tling and improving the said Lands... the said Company think it necessary... to no-
tify the Governor, Council & Legislature of that State, of their Purchase .... .").
SeeALvoRD, supra note 25, at 341 (noting that "it was declared that the right of
preemption of all land within the limits of Virginia belonged to the commonwealth
alone") (citing STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 97).
7S LtVIS, supra note 65, at 220. Virginia's 1779 statute barring private land pur-
chases from the Indians replaced a similar provision that appears to have lapsed prior
to the United Companies' purchases. For the legal implications of this lapsed statute
in the M'Intosh case, see infra Part I.C.2.
74 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 82-84 (1781), 98-104
(1782), 105 (1790). The Company granted him an extra share for the first of these
memorials; no payment is recorded for the later ones.
75 MEMORIAL OF THE ILLINOIS AND OUBASH LAND COMPANIES 29 (Phila. 1796)
(hereinafter 1796 MEMORIAL]; see also MEMORIAL OF THE ILLINOIS AND WABASH LAND
COM:PANY 5 (Phila. 1797) [hereinafter 1797 MEMORIAL] (pushing the idea that the
United States could gain title to valuable land without paying any additional money).
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[W] e are persuaded that the government of the United States, would not
reject a valid title, to the great injury of many of their good citizens; and,
at a greater price, recur to the Indians for a new purchase, sinking in
their pockets (viz. the Indians) the large sums that have been paid and
expended by the first bonafide purchasers, who remain true and faithful
citizens of the United States.
76
Congress never found compromise attractive. From the very first
memorial in 1781, Congress rejected the Companies' claims based on
the ancient, omnipresent rules against private purchases of land from
the Indians: "the said purchase had been made, without the license of
the then government, or other public authority, contrary to the com-
mon and known usage, in such case established."7 The Companies
did win over a House committee in 1788, which reasoned that the na-
tion could step into the Companies' shoes, noting, "[h]owever im-
proper it may be in general to countenance private purchases from
the Indians... the United States will be ultimately benefited by an
exemption from the expense of purchasing the same Lands."78
Winning over a single House committee was as close as the United
Illinois and Wabash Companies would ever get to success. A Senate
committee found that the value of strictly enforcing the rule against
private purchases of Indian lands outweighed the benefits of waiving
the rule in this particular case. The Senate Committee rejected the
Companies' petition on the predictable grounds that "deeds obtained
by private persons from the Indians, without any antecedent authority
or subsequent confirmation from the government, could not vest in
the grantees ... a title to the lands."79
The Companies submitted memorials to Congress in 1802 and
1803 containing little, if any, new material; Congress again summarily
refused to recognize the claims.8° In 1804, the Companies also took a
stab at administrative relief in the territories by petitioning the com-
missioners adjudicating the morass of land claims at Vincennes.'
76 ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 69; see also 1797 MEMORIAL, supra
note 75, at 5-6.
" Id. at 57.
Report of Committee: The United Land Companies of the Illinois and Wabash (June 27,
1788), reprinted in 1 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 115-16 (1934).
ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 52.
80 See MEMORIAL OF THE ILLINOIS AND OUABACHE LAND COMPANIES, TO THE
HONOURABLE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (n.p. 1802) [hereinafter 1802
MEMORIAL] (providing the text of the United Companies' petition).
81 See, e.g., MEMORIAL OF THE ILUINOIS AND WABASH LAND COMPANIES TO THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVwES (1810) [hereinafter 1810 MEMORIAL], reprinted in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXEcUTIVE, OF THE
EXPROPRTATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
Clear directions from Washington, however, barred recognition of the
Companies' deeds for the same old reason: the United States would
never validate treaties made between the Indians and private per-
sons. 2 In 1805, the Secretary of the Treasury summed up the consen-
sus view of the Companies' claims: "[the Companies] have not the
shadow of a title to support their claim... I speak with perfect confi-
dence on that point, because I have read all the Memorials of the
Companies and never heard of a more frivolous claim."3 Two years
later the Secretary made it clear that the United States would have "no
hesitation" removing claimants under the Companies' deeds.
8
4
The Companies were dormant until 1810, when they submitted a
fresh memorial to Congress. Congress rejected the Memorial of 1810
on the same grounds that the British had rejected the Companies'
claims before the Revolution. The Companies' attempt to purchase
land directly from the Indians contradicted the then-governing Proc-
lamation of 1763, and the universal rule introduced "at a pretty early
day... regulating the intercourse with Indian tribes, which requires
the concomitant assent or subsequent sanction of the Government to
a conveyance of lands by Indians, in order to render it valid.' Ques-
tioning whether the earlier purchases allowed the United States to buy
the same Indian land more cheaply, the Committee found that even
so, "to recognize such unauthorized proceedings of individuals with
the Indians... would encroach upon the great system of policy so
wisely introduced to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes.
'8
The Companies resubmitted the 1810 Memorial with trivial additions
in 1816, but Congress never even bothered to respond.7 The Com-
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2 PUBLIC LANDS 108, 109 (D.C., Gales & Seaton,
1834) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS] (indicating that the purpose of the peti-
tion was to investigate land claims in Vincennes).
82 See 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 205-08, 311-12 (1939) (providing
letters that indicate the lack of importance associated with private transactions). See
generally 1 MESSAGES AND LETTERS OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON 102 (Logan Esarey
ed., 1922) (indicating the power of the government in approving land grants).
83 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to John Badollet, Register of Deeds at
Vincennes (Oct. 23, 1805), reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 312
(1939).
84 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to MichaelJones, Register of Deeds at
Kaskaskia (Mar. 28, 1807), reprinted in 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 445
(1939) (noting that "there will be no hesitation in removing persons" whose claims
arise "under the Wabash and Illinois Companies").
85 Report of the Committee on Public Lands (Jan. 10, 1811), reprinted in AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2 PUBLIC LANDS 253, 253. Congress cited the long list of
the colonial statutes against private land purchases discussed in Part IA.
86 Report of the Committee on Public Lands, supra note 85, at 253.
87 See 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 54.
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panies' next stop would be federal court.
Meanwhile, the United States was busily buying up Indian lands
closer and closer to the United Companies' claims. In 1803, William
Henry Harrison obtained all the lands described in the Illinois Com-
pany's deed, and more, in a huge 8.9 million acre cession from the Il-
linois tribes.e The cession specifically notes the tribes were "reduced
to a very small number.., unable to occupy the extensive tract of
country which of right belongs to them." 9 Neighboring Indians dis-
puted the title of such a "decimated and impotent tribe" to so vast a
territory, and "there was considerable doubt as to their rightful claim
to all the land they had ceded."" A recent account labeled the 1803
treaty with the Illinois tribes as "[t]he most notorious" of Harrison's
See Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 78-79 (describing the terms of the treaty);
PAYSONJACKSON TREAT, TIE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM, 1785-1820, at 404 (1910) (giving
acreage of the tract). For maps of this and the other cessions cited, see BUREAU OF
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, at PL CXXIV-XCCVI (1900),
reprinted in INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Charles C. Royce ed., 1971).
According to the Eighteenth Annual Report, only the Kaskaskia tribe signed this treaty.
See id. at 664. However, the official version published in Statutes at Large indicates
that, while the Illinois tribes had consolidated under the name Kaskaskia, leaders of all
the other Illinois tribes except the Peorias signed the treaty. SeeAct of Aug. 13, 1803, 7
Stat. 78, 79 (listing as signatories "Ocksinga a Mitchigamian" of the Sioux and "Kee-tin-
sa a Cahokian" of the Iriquois). The United States obtained a cession from the Peoria
and a reaffirmation of the earlier cession from the other Illinois tribes in September
1818. See Act of Sept. 25, 1818, 7 Stat. 181, 182 (providing that to effectuate the ces-
sion by the Peoria and to reaffirm the cessions by the other tribes, the Peoria, Kas-
kaskia, Mitchigamia, Cahokia, and Tamarois "do hereby relinquish, cede, and confirm,
to the United States, all the land included within the following boundaries"). The
Kickapoo tribe also had colorable claim to some of the lands ceded by the Illinois
tribes, and hence the United States purchased their interest in July 1819. See Act of
July 30, 1819, 7 Stat. 200, 200 (noting that the Kickapoo Tribe ceded "[aIll their land
the southeast side of the Wabash River").
In their 1810 Memorial to Congress, the United Companies correctly cited this
treaty, along with other major cessions overlapping the Wabash Company deeds dis-
cussed infra, as intersecting with their claims. See 1810 MEMORIAL, supra note 81, at
109. Felix Cohen asserted that the Treaty of Greenville, 7 Stat. 49 (1795), as amended,
Act ofJune 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 74, ceded the lands at issue in M'Intosh, but this appears
doubtful. The primary lands involved in that treaty were far to the east, and while it
did include a relatively small tract around Vincennes, Indiana, this tract appears to lie
between the two tracts described in the Wabash Company's deed. See Cohen, supra
note 5, at 47 n.43. Compare BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, supra, at CCXXVI, with
Map of Land Claims in Johnson v. M'Intos, supra p. 1067.
s9 Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 78 (Article I of treaty).
90 REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783-1812, at
146 (1992); see also TREAT, supra note 88, at 169 (discussing the fact that "a consider-
able cession had been secured from the Kaskaskias in 1803-but other tribes disputed
the regions").
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dealings with tribes that had only tenuous claims to lands ceded.9'
Harrison dealt with "the remnants of the Kaskaskias under Ducoigne,
a band that numbered, according to the United States, only 30 men,
women, and children in 1796 but that ceded [all of] southern Illinois
[and much of central Illinois] to the United States."92
In part because he had to deal with so many disjointed tribes,
Harrison acquired the lands described in the Wabash Company's
deed through a series of cessions. The United States apparently ac-
cepted the weakness of the Piankashaw's claim to all the lands sold to
the Wabash Company. In the fall of 1809, the United States acquired
2.8 million acres that included the first (northern) parcel in the
Companies' deed from five other tribes, without paying the Pianka-
shaws a cent.93 The Piankashaws were among the tribes ceding lands
included in the Wabash Company's second (southern) parcel.94 The
United States began surveying these lands, a necessary prerequisite to
91 WHrE, supra note 62, at 474 n.6.
92 Id.
93 Harrison initially signed a treaty with the Miamis (including Eel Rivers), Dela-
wares, and Pottawatamies on September 30, 1809. SeeAct of Sept. 30, 1809, 7 Stat. 113,
113 (noting the formation of a treaty "between the United States of America, and the
tribes of Indians called the Delawares, Putawatimies, Miamies and Eel River Miamies").
This treaty required the United States to obtain the approval of the Weas and the
Kickapoos. See id at 114-15 (noting that the treaty will have no effect unless the tribes
agree to it). Harrison obtained these tribes' approvals by the end of the year. See Act
of Dec. 9, 1809, 7 Stat. 117, 117 (noting that the Kickapoos agreed to the ninth article
of the treaty of September 80, 1809); Act of Oct. 26, 1809, 7 Stat. 116, 116 (noting the
Weas' consent to the treaty of September 30, 1809).
94 The Delaware tribe was the first to sell its rights to lands included in the second
(southern) Wabash Company tract, on August 18, 1804. See Act of Aug. 18, 1804, 7
Stat. 81, 81-82. This tract consisted of 1.9 million acres. See TREAT, supra note 88, at
404. Articles four and five of the treaty denied that the Piankashaws or the Miamis had
any right to the lands ceded. See Act of Aug. 18, 1804, 7 Stat. 81, 82 (noting that the
Delawares had "exhibited to the above-named commissioner of the United States suffi-
cient proof of their right to all the country which lies between the Ohio and White
river"). The United States nonetheless subsequently purchased whatever interests
these tribes might have had. SeeAct of Aug. 21, 1805, 7 Stat. 91, 91 (noting that the
Miamis "cede and relinquish to the United States forever, all that tract of country
which lies to the south of a line to be drawn from the north east corner of the tract
ceded by the treaty of Fort Wayne"); Act of Aug. 27, 1804, 7 Stat. 83, 83 ("The Pianke-
shaw tribe relinquishes, and cedes to the United States for ever, all that tract of country
which lies between the Ohio and Wabash rivers"). The Piankashaws, alone, ceded the
portion of the second (southern) Wabash Company west of the Wabash River on De-
cember 30, 1805. SeeAct of Dec. 80, 1805, 7 Stat. 100, 100-01 (noting the terms of the
treaty between the United States and the Piankashaw tribe). This tract consisted of 2.1
million acres. See TREAT, supra note 88, at 404 (listing the acres of numerous Indian
land cessions). Harrison negotiated both treaties.
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sale, almost immediately after finalizing the treaties. 95 Land offices
were opened in Vincennes, Indiana and Kaskaskia, Illinois in 1804.r,
C. The Litigation of Johnson v. M'Intosh
1. Prelude
In their first decade, officials at the Kaskaskia office devoted them-
selves almost exclusively to sorting out the tangle of preexisting
French, British, and early American claims over southern Illinois
lands.7 New business picked up when surveyors finished their work in
the district and Congress passed a "pre-emption" act giving occupiers
and improvers (squatters) the right to purchase their claims at the
statutory minimum price of two dollars an acre.98 Like most preemp-
tion acts, Congress limited individual claims to a single quarter section
(160 acres).99 Preemptioners purchased about 110,000 acres from
1814-1815.100 President Madison finally proclaimed open-market land
sales by auction on May 16,1816, and business boomed.""
95 SeeJoseph W. Ernst, With Compass and Chain: Federal Land Surveyors in the
Old Northwest, 1785-1816, at 251 (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University) (detailing a map of the Federal Surveys in Illinois, 1804-1815).
See MALCOLMJ. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFIcE BUSINESS 28-29 (1968) (provid-
ing a map of land districts and offices).
97 See Act of Feb. 12, 1812, 2 Stat. 677, 677-78 (reexamining existing claims and
permitting new claims in Kaskaskia district); Act of May 1, 1810, 2 Stat. 607, 607 (con-
firming claims approved by Kaskaskia commissioners made through 1809); Act of Mar.
3, 1807, 2 Stat. 446, 446-47 (confirming claims to land in Vincennes district); see also
SOLONJ. BucK, ILLINOIS IN 1818, at 53 (1917) (discussing the fact that the land office
had to deal with preexisting claims).
98 Act of Feb. 5, 1813, 2 Stat. 797, 797. "[E]very such person... shall be entitled to
a preference in becoming the purchaser from the United States of such tract of land at
private sale, at the same price .... " Id. Congress twice extended the time period for
preemptive claims in the Kaskaskia district. See Act of Apr. 27, 1816, 3 Stat. 307, 307
(noting a "further provision for settling claims to land in the territory of Illinois"); Act
of Feb. 27, 1815, 3 Stat. 218, 218 (extending Illinois land claims "upon the river Missis-
sippi").
99 SeeAct of Feb. 5, 1813, 2 Stat. 797, 797 (noting that "no more than one quarter
section of land shall be sold to any one individual").
100 This number is based on receipts for land sales in 1814 ($53,000) and 1815
($207,000), combined with the fact that all preemptioners, by statute, paid two dollars
an acre. See Arthur H. Cole, Cyclical and Sectional Vaiations in the Sale of Public Lands,
1816-1860, in THE PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
229, 234 (Vernon Carstensen ed., 1968) (providing a table of the receipts from public
land sales).
101 See 1 CIS Index to Pres. Exec. Orders & Proc. 98 (1986) (announcing the ex-
ecutive order for a public land sale at Kaskaskia). Receipts went from $207,000 in
1816, to $572,000 in 1817, and to $1,491,000 in 1818. SeeCole, supra note 100, at 234.
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This legal chronology raises questions about the purchases by the
defendant, William McIntosh, in Johnson v. M'Intosh.'02 He obtained
the lands at issue in the case (fifty-three tracts amounting to nearly
12,000 acres) on April 24, 1815,103 before the first public sale. The law
limited preemption claims to 160 acres, and it is extremely doubtful
that McIntosh had claims dating from British or French rule to over
11,000 acres scattered all over southern Illinois. How, then, did McIn-
tosh manage to get patents from the federal government to all this
land, at the statutory minimum price, before the government auc-
tioned it to the public?
There are two possibilities, both consistent with what little is
known of McIntosh. First, he may have engaged in a massive fraud,
claiming preemptive or colonial rights to acreage 100 times the per
person limit. More likely, and consonant with a large body of evi-
dence, is that McIntosh obtained these lands from preemptioners and
colonial claimants in return for the legal services he rendered to help
establish their claims. McIntosh served as the voice of French claim-
ants in southern Indiana and Illinois as early as 1803,1" and William
102 William McIntosh served as treasurer of the Indiana Territory circa 1804, and
like many other frontier officials, "jumped in at the very beginning of [his] residence
in the new territories to acquire [land] claims." GATES, supra note 64, at 92; see also
Letter from Michael Jones, Register of Land Office at Kaskaskia, to Albert Gallatin,
Secretary of the Treasury (May 18, 1804), reprinted in 7 TERRrroR1AL PAPERS, supra note
31, at 194 (1939) (noting that William McIntosh owned "vast quantities of real prop-
erty").
See District Court Records of Johnson v. M'Intosh, microformed on National Ar-
chives Microfilm Publications (Supreme Court Case Fies), Film M-214 (1792-1831),
Roll 56, Frame 410 [hereinafter District Court Records of M'Intosh] (describing Mcln-
tosh's acquisitions). The district court records of McIntosh's purchases match exactly
the patents issued to him as recorded in a database of all the United States patents is-
sued for land in Illinois. See State of Illinois Public Domain Land Tract Sales Archive (last
modified Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.sos.state.il.us/depts/archives/datajan.html>
(containing transaction data for public domain land sales in Illinois). The Supreme
Court dates the purchases three years later, in 1818, when the federal government is-
sued patents. SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 560 (1823). Such de-
lays between purchase and issuance of patent were common. See ROHRBOUGH, supra
note 96, at 175 (noting that "the delay in the issue of patents had become severe
enough to necessitate a circular to the land offices on the reasons for the delay"). The
Supreme Court's acreage count, 11,560 acres, based on the parties' stipulated facts,
appears to be off; the land records indicate McIntosh purchased 11,982.81 acres (44
quarter sections, one half section, six sections, a fractional section (521.21 acres) and a
fractional half section (260.6 acres)). According to the Illinois Public Domain Land
Tract Sales Archive database, McIntosh paid the statutory minimum of two dollars per
acre for all these parcels. See State of Illinois Public Domain Land Tract Sales Archive, supra.
104 See Letter from William McIntosh to the President (Jefferson] (Dec. 15, 1807),
repinted in 7 TERRrroRIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 503 (1939) (addressing Jefferson
"on behalf of the french Inhabitants of Vincennes"); Letter from William McIntosh to
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Henry Harrison, Governor of the territories, identified McIntosh as
one of "the principal councellors of the Kaskaskias Speculators."'05
The historical record of the plaintiffs in M'Intosh is thinner and
much less colorful. Thomas Johnson, an original investor in the Wa-
bash Company, and later a Supreme Court Justice, died on or about
November 1, 1819, and the plaintiffs, his son Joshua and grandson
Thomas Graham, were the primary beneficiaries in his will. Perhaps
more importantly for the commencement of the M'Intosh litigation,
the will made Robert Goodloe Harper executor of the estate.05
Harper apparently determined that Johnson owned shares and de-
cided to go to court in a final stab at giving a happy ending to the long
and sad story of the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies.
Looking for a federal patent holder to sue, as a test of the validity
of their claim under the Wabash Company's Indian deed, Johnson
and Graham, probably led by Harper, appeared to target McIntosh.
As one of the largest landholders in the Illinois and Indiana territo-
ries, McIntosh was a natural adversary, but he does not appear to have
been a real one. Mapping the United Companies' claims alongside
McIntosh's purchases, as enumerated in the district court records,
shows that the litigants' land claims did not overlap.' 7 Hence there
was no real "case or controversy," and M'Intosh, like another leading
early Supreme Court land case, Fletcher v. Peck, appears to have been a
sham. 08
the President (Jefferson] (Mar. 30, 1808), reprinted in 7 TERRrrORIAL PAPERS, supra
note 31, at 537 (1939); Memorial to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox County (Nov. 8,
1808), reprinted in 7 TERRIToRIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, 612-13 (1939) (including a
signature for Israel Rowland "by [William] McIntosh his agent"); Petition to Congress
by Inhabitants of Knox, St. Clair, and Randolph Counties (Oct. 22, 1803), reprinted in 7
TERRrToRIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 125, 128 (1939) (including William McIntosh
among the petitioners).
105 Letter from Governor Harrison to the Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin
(Aug. 29, 1809), reprinted in 7 TERRrrORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 669 (1939).
6 See Letter from Roger Taney to Robert Goodloe Harper (Dec. 4, 1819), in
Harper Papers, Legal Correspondence, 1797-1824 (on reserve in the Maryland Hist.
Soc'y Collection, Baltimore, Md., MS 1884, acc. no. 55,644) (describing the details of
the execution of Mr.Johnson's will).
107 See Map of Land Claims in Johnson v. M'Intos), supra p. 1067. For a detailed de-
scrition of the sources used to derive this map, see Kades, supra note 19 app.
See MAGRATH, supra note 65, at 54-55 (showing that Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810), resolving the Yazoo land case, was feigned); see also 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 147 (1926) (arguing that
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 171 (1796), was feigned). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled that federal courts have no jurisdiction in feigned cases since
there is no "case or controversy." See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because of the ab-
sence of a "case or controversy"); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250, 255 (1850)
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McIntosh did not contest a single fact alleged in the complaint,
jurisdictional or otherwise. Perhaps he participated in framing the
complaint, which became the stipulated facts of the case. Neither the
district court nor the Supreme Court questioned any of these facts.'0
Everyone involved, it seems, wanted a decision on the legal question
of the validity of private purchases from the Indians.
The plaintiffs' case thus commenced in the United States District
Court for Illinois in December 1820,1 in Vandalia, Illinois. The par-
ties apparently agreed to a bench trial, and the judge gave them leave
"to make a stated and agreed case of facts for the consideration of the
Court."" ' Without providing any substantive opinion, the court ren-
dered judgment for the defendant.112 As yet another piece of evidence
that both sides wanted a final answer to the question presented in the
case, McIntosh waived his right to force the plaintiffs to post an appeal
bond."3
The plaintiffs filed a writ of error "by consent" in the Supreme
Court on February 5, 1822, one more indication that McIntosh
wanted the case heard at the highest level despite his victory in district
court1 14 Unsurprisingly, Robert Goodloe Harper, along with Daniel
Webster, served as counsel for the plaintiffs. Argument spanned four
days, and only nine days later the Court affirmed the district court's
judgment for the defendant.1 5
2. Supreme Court Arguments and Holding
The bulk of Webster and Harper's reported argument for the
plaintiffs focused on narrow statutory issues. They claimed (1) that
banning the purchase of lands from a foreign sovereign was a legisla-
tive act beyond the power of the Crown acting without consent of Par-
liament, and thus that the Proclamation of 1763 was void; and (2) that
("[T]here must be an actual controversy, and adverse interests."). This case law, of
course, is based on Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. mI1, § 2, cl. 1
(limitingjudicial power to cases and controversies).
:0 SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543-71 (1823).
10 See District Court Records of M'Intosh, supra note 103, Frame 422.
I Id. Frame 347.
1 See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
11 SeeDistrict Court Records of Mntosh, supra note 103, Frames 420-21.
114 See Supreme Court February Term 1821 (docket sheets), microformed on National
Archives Microfilm Publications, Series 216, Roll 1, Frame 408. The Supreme Court
received the district court records almost a year before the plaintiff finally filed the writ
of error. See id.
11 The case was argued February 15 and 17-19, 1823; judgment was entered on
February 28, 1823. Seeid.
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colonial Virginia's 1662 statute banning such purchases had lapsed
(or been repealed), and that its reenactment in 1779, after the United
Companies' purchases, could not divest the Companies of vested
rights ex post. '
Chief Justice Marshall, in a brief detour toward the end of the
Court's unanimous opinion, summarily rejected both contentions.
Simply disagreeing with the plaintiffs' first point, he declared that the
Crown retained exclusive power to deal with "vacant lands," including
Indian lands, as it pleased. 17 Much more peculiar was Marshall's re-
sponse to the supposedly lapsed and tardily reenacted Virginia statute
banning private purchases. The only evidence that the statute of 1662
had been repealed, it seems, was a "marginal note opposite to the title
of the law, forbidding purchases from the Indians, in the revisals of
the Virginia statutes, stating that law [the 1662 statute] to be re-
pealed."" 8 Marshall did not argue that a marginal note beside a title
was insufficient evidence that the legislature had repealed the statute;
indeed, he explicitly refused to recognize that the 1779 law could
"countervail the testimony furnished by the marginal note.""9 He in-
stead found that the 1779 law could "safely be considered as an une-
quivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle
which had always been maintained, that the exclusive right to pur-
chase from the Indians resided in the government."1
20
This discussion will return momentarily to what Marshall meant by
"broad principle ... always... maintained." There is a more immedi-
ate question: why did Marshall not limit his opinion to these two
points? If either the Proclamation of 1763 or the Virginia colonial
statute of 1662 (or the "broad principle" behind it) were good law at
the time of the United Companies' purchases, then those purchases
were clearly illegal. A contemporary NewYork case rejected an Indian
121deed precisely on such narrow grounds. The main difference be-
116 See supra note 46 (citing, inter alia, a Virginia statute of 1662 barring private
purchases of Indian lands).
1 SeeJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595-96 (1823) ("[A]II vacant
lands are vested in the crown, as representing the nation; and the exclusive power to
grant them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a branch of the royal prerogative.").
Marshall distinguished the plaintiffs' primary supporting case, Campbell v. Hall, 1
Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (1774), as involving royal imposition of a tax Parlia-
ment, not the Crown, had the exclusive power to tax. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
at 597.
11 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585.
19 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 722-34 (N.Y. 1823) (refusing to recognize
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tween this approach and the broader rule Marshall enunciated is that
a more limited ruling would leave loopholes for future litigation-for
example, what if a colony had a lapsed statute and some speculators
made purchases before the Proclamation of 1763? Marshall thought
the stakes were important enough to warrant a universal rule barring
private purchases from the Indians.
Scholars have justly complained about the "tumbling logic" of
Marshall's opinion,' and its "conflicting and confusing potpourri of
arguments."' 2' Yet there is an underlying structure to the opinion,
and the arguments from Marshall's "conflicting and confusing pot-
pourri" can still be distilled and assessed, each in turn. It has already
become evident, for example, that the Proclamation of 1763 and the
colonial statutes were too narrow to support a more general holding.
Most other arguments in Marshall's opinion can be ignored as mere
dicta unnecessary to decide the case.
In order to find the true holding, the inquiry must start with the
question Marshall proposed to answer. Here, at least, in its very first
paragraph, the opinion is crystal clear: "the question is, whether [the
United Companies'] title can be recognised in the Courts of the
United States?"124 The key clause is the last one, "in the Courts of the
United States." Marshall used this phrase in the first paragraph of the
opinion and repeated it in the very last paragraph.'2 It at first seems
superfluous; what courts, other than the courts of the United States,
could possibly be relevant to the dispute?
The answer is Indian courts. Marshall laid out the two tiers gov-
erning rights in American lands: the discovery rule that regulated in-
ter-European claims, and "It]hose relations which were to exist be-
tween the discoverer and the natives."126 The Indians' rights to their
lands, defined in the second tier, "were, in no instance, entirely disre-
garded; but were, necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired."1
27
The discovery rule itself, Marshall noted, prevented the Indians from
selling to other sovereigns. Under colonial practice, however, the In-
an Indian grant based on an exhaustive analysis of the New York Constitution of 1777,
article 37, and a long line of colonial and state statutes forbidding land transactions
with Indians).
12 Henderson, supra note 23, at 87.
12 David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M'Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v.
United States, 19 AM. INDIANL. REV. 159, 166-67 (1994).
124 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
12S See id. at 604-05 ("[P]laintiffs do not exhibit a title which can be sustained in the
Courts of the United States ...
126 Id at 573.
17 Id. at 574.
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dians were not stripped of all rights; they retained what Marshall la-
beled the "Indian title of occupancy," which could be extinguished
only "by purchase or by conquest."
18
The plaintiffs, then, via their predecessor (a member of the Wa-
bash Company and then the United Companies), purchased this In-
dian title of occupancy. Since they purchased Indian title, Marshall
directed them to an Indian forum for a remedy.
[The plaintiffs hold] under [the Indians], by a title dependent on their
laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if [the Illinois
and Piankashaw tribes] choose to resume it, and make a different dispo-
sition of their land, the Courts of the United States cannot interpose for
the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands from the
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection,
and subject to their laws.12
Included in the Indians' title of occupancy was the power to sell
lands to the discovering sovereign that a tribe had previously conveyed
to someone else. Thus, as Milner Ball puts it, "[t]he plaintiffs' claim
to the land was defeated principally because the Indians themselves
had extinguished plaintiffs' interest [by the later sale to the United
States] ."1
Marshall, then, created a rather strange two-tiered land tenure sys-
tem: Indian title of occupancy applied before American purchase or
conquest, and the common law of the several states applied after. The
courts of the United States had no jurisdiction over claims based on
Indian title of occupancy. The dual land tenure system explains why
the plaintiffs lost the case: they purchased the Indian title of occu-
pancy, which the Indians could and did extinguish under the law of
the United States, by reselling to the United States.
3. Marshall's Version of Indian Title
What is less clear in M'Intosh is the precise contours of the Indian
title of occupancy. The most important question for the Indians,
given that they could sell full title only to the United States, was
whether they could refuse to sell. Marshall's black letter rule, that the
128 Id. at 587.
129 I. at 593. Marshall knew full well, of course, that there was no Indian court to
hear the plaintiffs' grievance. In the very next sentence, he observed, "[i]f they annul
the gant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding." IR.
Ball, supra note 23, at 26; see also Henderson, supra note 23, at 93-96 (discussing
tribal title and tribal tenurial systems, and their treatment in M'Intos).
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United States could divest the Indians of title only via purchase or
conquest, was consistent with earlier doctrine, discussed in Part I.A
The word "conquest" was subsequently limited to "defensive wars" or
those fought for some other 'just cause."' In addition to purchase
and just conquest, later cases held that the Indians could lose their ti-
tle of occupancy by abandonment.3 2 Outside of these elaborations,
the Supreme Court has never altered the rules established in M'Intosi
Formally, then, describing Indian title as amounting to "only a
tenancy at sufferance"'3 is misleading, since under M'Intosh the Indi-
ans could remain on their land and refuse to sell, as long as they re-
mained peaceful. Marshall specifically deemed them "rightful occu-
pants," the antithesis of tenants at sufferance, whom the law
distinguishes from trespassers only by the legality of their original en-
try. The opinion casts Indians as term-of-year tenants with full rights
to renew, rather than as tenants at sufferance subject to immediate
eviction. As a matter of realpolitik, however, the sufferance label may
have been accurate'34
As peculiar as Indian title seems in and of itself, even stranger is its
1 Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,545 (1832).
132 Abandonment explains Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 513 (1852), in which
the Court ruled that the holder under a federal patent could adversely possess against
the Indians, despite the failure of the government to extinguish Indian tide. See id. at
521-24. 'Without appealing to abandonment as the basis for extinguishing title, this
case would be inconsistent with M'Intosh, empowering a private citizen to do by occu-
pation what she could not do by purchase. The Court formally declared that aban-
donment can extinguish Indian title in Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434, 437-38
(1917) ("[Wlhen [the Indians' right of occupancy] was abandoned all legal right or
interest which both tribe and its members had in the territory came to an end.").
Arguably, Chief Justice Marshall alluded to abandonment in Myntosh. After de-
scribing Indian migrations caused by settlers thinning the game population, he noted
that "[t]he soil, to which the crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by its
ancient inhabitants, was parceled out according to the will of the sovereign power."
Mntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591 (emphasis added). The practical importance of
game-thinning in expropriating Indian lands is examined infra Part II.D.2.
3 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 386 (1993).
Later Supreme Court decisions have made Indian title more like tenancy at suf-
ferance. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955), the Court
held that tribes had no Fifth Amendment constitutional right to compensation for a tak-
ing of their title of occupancy. Payment is made at the pleasure of the government.
This case seems to contradict M'Intosh, since it permits extinguishment of Indian title
without purchase, just conquest, or abandonment. At bottom, however, it merely
shows that M'Intosh was not decided on constitutional grounds. It also makes sense
within Marshall's system of dual land tenure systems: there are no remedies in "the
Courts of the United State" for rights based on Indian tenure, whether held by the plain-
tiffs in M'Intosh or the Indians in Tee-Hit-Ton.
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coexistence with European title in Marshall's dual land tenure con-
struct. Real property was still the centerpiece of the common law in
1823, and few common law doctrines were as deeply established as the
principle that all titles were rooted in a unique sovereign, be it the
Crown, a state, or the federal government. Marshall himself appar-
ently found it most odd that, under this system of dual land tenure,
European sovereigns could convey titles before they had extinguished
Indian title. He devoted almost half of his opinionus to laying out the
historical record that "our whole country [has] been granted by the
crown while in the occupation of the Indians. "ls6 Why did Marshall
devote so much time to summarizing long historical practice? Why
did he emphasize that grants of European title before extinguishment
of Indian title were "understood by all," "exercised uniformly," and
extended "universal recognition" as legitimate?1
37
4. Legal Basis for the M'Intosh Rule: Custom
The answer is tied to the basis for the holding in M'Intosh- cus-
tom. Phrases like "understood by all," "exercised uniformly," and
"universal recognition" appeal to long-established practice, not to any
specific constitutional, statutory, or common law rule. "Common
practices, sanctioned by general usage, that cover ... similar situations
are what... (in accordance with long usage) [is meant] by cus-
toms."
1' 3
Basing customary law on a general, long-term statutoy usage is
admittedly unusual; it ordinarily arises via long private practice, inde-
pendent of formal rule creation by a public entity. While most cus-
tomary legal rules may have arisen from entirely unofficial acts, draw-
ing on old statutes for customary law is (perhaps surprisingly) quite
"3 See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574-88 (discussing the history of American
land ownership).
136 Id. at 579. One scholar has argued that this extended discussion was no more
than tracing the chain of the United States's title, complaining that the "Court spent
an extravagant amount of time in establishing the principle that the ultimate title to
land within the United States was held by the federal government as the successor-in-
interest to the discovery by England." Henderson, supra note 23, at 90. Marshall fo-
cused, however, on the fact that various grants were made while the Indians occupied
the lands, rather than on the legitimacy of each transfer. He adverts to grants made
.notwithstanding the occupancy of the natives," or "while in the occupation of the In-
dians," no less than nine times in the course of discussing the history of the dual land
tenure regime in America. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 577-88.
137 M'Intos, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, 588.
138 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and Histoy of Cus-
tom in theLaw of Tort, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1992).
2000] EXPROPRIATION OFAMERICANINDIANLANDS
consistent with the rationale behind English customary law. "The
theory of English law was that, if there had been a usage from time
immemorial..., it might fairly be presumed that it arose under an
act of Parliament or other public act of governing power, the best evi-
dence of which had perished."3 9
This theory-that custom evidenced ancient and lost legislative
will-dovetails well with Marshall's blithe response to the possibility
that the relevant Virginia colonial statute barring private purchases
had lapsed. He considered the later reenactment of a similar provi-
sion "as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the
broad principle which had always been maintained, that the exclusive
right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government."
140
Marshall seemed to say that the longstanding customary legislative
practice of barring private purchases of Indian title was so strong that
it overrode the "mere technicality" of a lapsed or repealed statute.
This is a powerful form of customary law, which is usually seen as
subordinate to statutory formalities.14' Marshall displayed a similarly
strong deference to custom in response to the plaintiffs' argument
that the enactment of the numerous statutes barring private pur-
chases1 2 showed that the background (common law) rule, absent such
statutes, was that such purchases were valid. He enlisted the very exis-
tence of these statutes to make the case for a customary rule of law.
"IT]he fact that such acts have been generally passed, is strong evi-
dence of the general opinion, that such purchases are opposed by the
139 Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (Conn. 1905). The Supreme Court had long
taken the same view.
[C]ustom. ... is always presumed to have been adopted with the consent of
those who may be affected by it. In England, and in the states of this Union
which have no written constitution, it is the supreme law; always deemed to
have had its origin in an act of a state legislature .... The court not only may,
but are [sic] bound to notice and respect general customs and usage, as the
law of the land, equally with the written law, and when clearly proved, they will
control the general law; this necessarily follows from its presumed origin-an
act of parliament or a legislative act.
United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 714 (1832) (emphasis added).
140 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585.
141 Marshall may have borrowed the idea of a customary basis for his opinion from
the defendants, who argued that the "uniform understanding and practice of Euro-
pean nations" rendered the plaintiffs' deeds void. Id. at 567. The roots of using cus-
tom as a ground for deciding cases may go back to the Continental Congress's reply to
the United Companies' first memorial to the federal government, which deemed pri-
vate purchases against "common and known usage." AccOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 25, at 57.
14 See discussion supra Part lA (explaining land, title, and alienability in early
America).
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soundest principles of wisdom and national policy."43 Universal, uni-
form, and longstanding legislation summed to a customary rule
greater than its statutory parts.
That said, Marshall did not even hint that Congress was powerless
to reverse his opinion by statute and to permit private citizens to buy
land directly from the Indians. That is, there is no evidence that
M'Intosh created a constitutional rule. A reading of M'Intosh, as decided
on customary grounds, is consistent with the general ability of parties
to contract around customary laws. "[C]ustom is best understood as set-
ting out the 'right' default provisions, not as creating a body of man-
datory terms."
Also consistent with a customary law reading of M'Intosh is the fact
that Marshall was not troubled that different rules might apply else-
where in the British Empire. In Britain, custom was usually local (ap-
plying only to a manor, village, parish, or similarly small group). On
precisely such parochial grounds, Marshall dismissed the relevance of
the Camden-Yorke opinion (approving private purchases of land in
India) that was relied on so heavily by the original members of the
United Companies. Without explaining why America should have a
different rule, Marshall merely noted that the opinion referred to
"'princes or governments,'" terms "usually applied to the East Indians,
but not to those of North America. We speak of their sachems, their
warriors, their chiefmen, their nations or tribes, not of their 'princes
or governments.'"45 Marshall admitted that the Camden-Yorke opin-
ion stood for the proposition that "the king's subjects carry with them
the common law, wherever they may form settlements."146 While the
common law generally permitted purchases of foreign lands, Mar-
shall's opinion implies that customary practice in America created an
exception to this rule. He argued that the system of dual land tenure
"adapted to the actual condition of the two people" was "indispensa-
ble to that system under which the country has been settled"-such an
essential practice, Marshall said, "cannot be rejected by courts ofjus-
tice."47 Not only was the custom of barring private purchases from
the Indians immune to legislative lapse, it was wholly beyond the
14. Mntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
14 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 87 n.6 (1992) [hereinafter
Epstein, Custom and Law].
145 MIntosh1 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 600.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 591-92.
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power of common law courts to alter.
Admittedly, early American courts rarely recognized custom as a
basis for law. Until a modem resurgence, "'custom' had almost no
authority in American law.""4 In reviewing cases involving rights of
public access to roads and waterways, however, Carol Rose found that
while courts usually rejected it as the basis for legal rights, custom
"provides powerful insights into the nature of 'inherently public
property."""' Courts have often declined to invoke custom explicitly
in their holdings, even when their reasoning in effect relies on it. In
International News Service v. Associated Press,5° for instance, the Court
discussed customary news industry practices at length to support its
recognition of property rights in news. Richard Epstein has argued
that "the easiest way to defend the result in [International News Service]
is to recognize the force of custom in the creation of the property
rights," even if the Court did not explicitly base its holding on industry
custom. 5' "[T]he INS decision and the cases following it reached re-
sults consistent with the custom of the news-gathering industry, al-
though they did not purport to derive their rules from custom."
5 2
So, too, in M'Intosh, Marshall never invokes the word "custom," yet
the passages from the opinion cited above show that custom is a re-
current theme that underlies the holding of the case. Given the long
and uninterrupted line of statutes in every colony, it was likely un-
thinkable to Marshall, the otherJustices, and most Americans that pri-
vate citizens could purchase land directly from the Indians. There ex-
148 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 711, 717 (1986) (footnote omitted). A number of Ameri-
can courts in the 1800s did recognize customary practices in the whaling industry. See
generally ROBERT C. ELUiCESON, ORDER WrIHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DisPurEs 191-206 (1991) (examining the practices of the New England whaling indus-
try in using custom to create rules establishing property rights). More recently, courts
in a number ofjurisdictions have accepted custom-based rights of the public to use
otherwise private beaches. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460
(Or. 1993) (finding no taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
based, in part, on the "common law of custom"); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,
Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974) ("If the recreational use of the sandy area adjacent
to mean high tide has been ancient, reasonable, without interruption and free from
dispute, such use, as a matter of custom, should not be interfered with by the owner.");
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (Haw. 1973) (arguing that the long-
standing public use of beaches "ripened into a customary right" consistent with favor-
ing such use as a matter of public policy).
149 Rose, supra note 148, at 722.
ISO 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
51 Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 106.
152 Id. at 124.
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ists abundant evidence that the customary norm behind the M'Intosh
rule was deeply recognized in American society.
In a leading antebellum treatise on constitutional law, Chancellor
Kent described the basis for Marshall's opinion in words that support
a customary reading:
[The M'Intosh rule] is established by numerous compacts, treaties, laws,
and ordinances, and founded on immemorial usage. The country has been
colonized and settled, and is now held by that title. It is the law of the
land, and no court of justice can permit the right to be disturbed by
speculative reasonings on abstract rights.153
Further support for inferring custom as the basis of Marshall's
holding comes by process of elimination: all other possibilities are ei-
ther explicitly contradicted by, or implicitly dissonant with, Marshall's
opinion. The discussion above highlighted Marshall's rejection of
both statutory and common law bases for the rule of M'Intosh. He
flatly rejected both natural and international law,1M defending the rule
against private purchases from Indians "[h]owever this restriction may
be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations."'55
From the discussion of the discovery rule, itself clearly a rule of inter-
national law, it was already clear that a different set of rules regulated
relations between Europeans and Indians.ss He declared that domes-
tic law (of unspecified source) must decide property cases:
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be
acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the
title to lands, especially, is and must be, admitted, to depend entirely on
the law of the nation in which they lie; it will be necessary, in pursuing
this inquiry, to examine, not simply those principles of abstract justice,
which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his crea-
ture man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the
rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged;
but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the
particular case, and given us as the rule for our decision.1
57
KENT'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 46, at *381 (emphasis added).
1 Marshall seemed to define international law, in large part, as a subspecies of
natural law. He rejected relying entirely on "principles of abstract justice, which the
Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations." M'Intosl, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
155 Id. at 591.
1 See id. at 573 ("Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and
the natives, were to be regulated by themselves.").
157 Id. at 572.
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In extensive, apologetic dicta, Marshall offered "excuse, if notjus-
tification, """ for refusing to extend intra-European civility, under the
guise of natural or international law, to the Indians. While natural
and international law usually required a conqueror to integrate mem-
bers of the defeated population into its own and extend them equal
property rights, Marshall claimed that an agricultural and industrial
society simply could not incorporate hunters like the Indians. He re-
fused to justify this less favorable treatment on the theory that "agri-
culturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract
principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to con-
tract their limits," deeming irrelevant such "speculative opin-
ions.., respecting the originaljustice of the [Europeans'] claim."'59
The reporter classified the case as "Constitutional Law" without
elaboration, and the index heading entitled "Constitutional Law"
makes no less than fifteen references to the caselW While it is possible
to imagine the M'Intosh plaintiffs invoking the Due Process Clause or
the Takings Clause, they do not mention either, and neither does the
Court. Marshall also did not cite the Constitution's grant of exclusive
jurisdiction over Indian affairs to Congress. In fact, there is not a sin-
gle reference to the United States Constitution.16' Finally, as previ-
ously discussed, Marshall never suggested that Congress was powerless
to reverse his opinion and to permit private citizens to purchase land
directly from the Indians. Thus, it is difficult to argue that M'Intosh is
a constitutional case, at least as the term is commonly used.' 62
II. EFFICIENT EXPROPRIATION
Part I traced the roots of M'Intosh in colonial land practices and
the acts of speculators that contradicted established (customary) prac-
tice. It then analyzed how Chief Justice Marshall upheld the long-
standing bar against private purchases of land from the Indians. Part
1Ss I& at 589.
159 Md at 588.
160 1& at 543, index at 31-32.
161 There are references to the (unwritten) British Constitution regarding the
Crown's power to bar private land purchases in the Proclamation of 1763, but this dis-
cussion was irrelevant to the holding. See id. at 594-97 (outlining the scope of authority
granted to the King of Great Britain in distributing parcels of land in colonial territo-
ries to his subjects).
162 Philip Frickey argues that MTntosh was a "quasi-constitutional" decision, mean-
ing that while it did not bar legislation to the contrary, it established a "clear statement
rule" requiring Congress to be explicit about any further erosion of Indian rights.
Frickey, supra note 133, at 385.
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II explains why colonial law uniformly and universally barred such
purchases and why Marshall made this statutory custom the law of the
land.
The rule of M'Intosh was part and parcel of a larger process: effi-
cient (cheap) European expropriation of Indian lands. Just as many
contract, tort, property, and other legal rules promote efficient behav-
ior,163 M'Intosh and a broad range of other colonial and early Ameri-
can laws created rewards and penalties that helped Europeans obtain
Indian lands as inexpensively as possible. It is important to stress that
the process minimized costs for European colonizers, not for the
colonizers and Indians together. This is in contrast with most efficient
legal rules that, ex ante at least, benefit all participants in a given activ-
ity.
European agricultural colonization undoubtedly presented the
possibility of enormous gains from trade. First, "a European immi-
grant required about two acres to provide for himself in the New
World, while Indians required up to a thousand times more." '"
Moreover, Europeans had a wide variety of manufactured goods
of great value to Indians in their traditional way of life, including
guns, metal tools, cooking utensils, and warmer clothing. Thomas Jef-
ferson drew the obvious conclusion from these basic economic facts:
"[The Indians are] very poor, and they want necessaries with which we
abound. We want lands with which they abound; and these natural
wants seem to offer fair ground of mutual supply."'63
The only question was, which side would garner the lion's share of
the gains from this trade? In a system of purely voluntary exchange,
without any coercion on either side, the European farmers might be
expected to buy off relatively small comers of Indian hunting grounds
for relatively large amounts of trade goods. American land would still
have been much cheaper for settlers than it was in heavily populated
Europe. The land-rich Indians, while preserving their way of life,
would have been glad to part with a modicum of their territory for
novel and useful manufactures. This would have been the "market"
(based on voluntary exchanges and thus arguably fair) division of the
gains from trade between land-rich and manufacturing-rich societies.
10 For efficiency explanations of a broad range of legal rules, see generally
RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
164 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 43 (citing STANLEY LEBERGOTT, THE
AMERIcANS: AN ECONOMIc REcoRD 15-16 (1984)).
165 17 THE WRrriNGs OF THOMASJEFFERSON 374-75 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907)
[hereinafter WRrIINGS OFJEFFERSON].
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This, of course, is not what happened. Instead, the United States
obtained virtually every acre of Indian land at astoundingly low prices.
This Article explains how the United States captured virtually all the
gains from trade with the Indians.
After briefly discussing why customary practices are often effi-
cient,'6 the Article explains how the M'Intosh rule facilitated low-cost
acquisition of Indian lands by stifling bidding by Americans for Indian
land and making the United States a monopsonistic buyer.6 7 The de-
cision, like the earlier colonial statutes, solved a collective action prob-
lem and left the Indians facing a single buyer assured of no competi-
tion.16e
The United States, however, was not formally a monopsonist. If
one tribe laid sole claim to a piece of land, then the advantage of be-
ing the only possible buyer was offset by the fact that there was only
one seller. The parties are then trapped in what is called a bilateral
monopoly, and the outcome of such bargaining games, where neither
side can obtain competing offers, is uncertain.
Still the United States had many techniques for ensuring its vic-
tory in these bargaining games. On one extreme, an examination of
the history of European-Indian negotiations reveals the willingness of
the Europeans to use threats, and, rarely, force, to obtain land at bar-
gain prices. While fighting was atypical due to its expense, it did set a
ceiling on what the United States had to pay.'6 The United States,
however, did not have to resort to violence or even threats to lower
the price of Indian lands. Its most powerful alternative was breathtak-
ingly simple: settlement on the frontier. Settlers killed relatively few
Indians in raids, massacres, skirmishes and the like. They killed many
more by spreading endemic diseases like smallpox.'70 Perhaps even
more importantly, by clearing forests for agriculture, introducing
European animals, and hunting at prodigious rates, they thinned the
game animals on which the Indians depended for food, clothing, and
other necessities.17 ' The colonies, and later the United States, passed
166 See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the evolution of efficient customary
rules).
167 A monopsonist, the converse of a monopolist, is the sole buyer in a market, in-
stead of the sole seller. SeeBLAcK'S LAw DICIoNARY 1023 (7th ed. 1999).
163 See discussion infra Part ILB (exploring European-Indian relations).
1 See discussion infra Part ILC (explaining the rarity of fighting).
170 See discussion infra Part ll.D.1 (explaining how depopulation by disease altered
the terms of trade between Europeans and Indians).
171 See discussion infra Part ll.D.2 (explaining how game-thinning altered the terms
of trade between Europeans and Indians).
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a wide variety of laws to facilitate this process by encouraging and pro-
tecting settlers, and even squatters.'" On the other hand, settlers who
precipitated hostilities made land acquisition more expensive, espe-
cially in terms of European lives; in response, the government at-
tempted, with limited success, to reign in these rogue frontiersmen. '73
This Part concludes by recharacterizing the process of efficient
expropriation as an implicit exercise of the power of eminent do-
174
main. European immigrants had, under European valuations, a
higher-valued use of the continent-intensive agriculture-but paid
the Indians the European-calculated value of the land for its old use:
hunting and light agriculture.
A. Custom and the Efficiency Interpretation ofM'Intosh
1. Evolution of Efficient Customary Rules
Before examining in detail how M'Intosh and other legal rules fa-
cilitated efficient expropriation of Indians lands, it is worth pausing to
consider how efficient customary rules arise in the first place.'75 The
rough and ready definition of an efficient rule is one that enables and
encourages parties to maximize theirjoint production of wealth . 7
Richard Epstein posits that customary rules are usually efficient
when they arise among parties with frequent interactions (so-called
repeat players) and the stakes in any individual case are small.' 7 In
such circumstances, participants in an activity realize that they will
gain in their numerous future dealings if they adopt an efficient rule
(by the very definition of efficiency); there is not enough at stake in
any one case to outweigh the sum of these expected future benefits.
1 See discussion infra Part II.E.1 (explaining efforts to attract and reward settlers
through the creation of legal rules).
See discussion infra Part II.E.2 (explaining the negative externalities of lawless
settlers, speculators, and traders).
174 See discussion infra Part II.G (discussing the analogy between eminent domain
and efficient conquest).
175 See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 81 (1977) (positing that common law courts have a powerful ten-
dency to adopt efficient rules). For possible shortcomings in this model, see POSNER,
supra note 163, at 614-15 (noting several objections to the theory that common law
courts have incentives to choose efficient rules).
176 See POSNER, supra note 163, at 12-17 (discussing different definitions of effi-
cienctq).
See Epstein, supra note 138, at 11 (discussing the conditions in which customs
emerge).
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Epstein further argues that when the context of a tort case indicates
that customary practice is likely efficient (repeat players in consensual
dealings, where the payoff at each interaction is relatively small), the
court should defer to "the practices formulated by those who have
powerful incentives to get things right."
Once custom is accepted as controlling, it is no longer necessary
for judges to guess what set of rules best accommodate the communi-
ties they serve. "That information is generated by trial and error from
below, and those practices that survive have good claim to being bene-
ficial (one could almost say efficient or wealth-maximizing) for the
community at large."79
Robert Ellickson has provided powerful historical examples and
contemporary empirical evidence that customary practices in rela-
tively close-knit groups are efficient, and that members of such groups
generally rely on their customs even when formal legal rules provide
seemingly more attractive rights and remedies.'0
Unlike "conventional" custom, the rule of M'Intosh arose not from
the everyday acts of European settlers, but instead from a long line of
colonial statutes, regulations, and executive orders. This statutory
source of custom explains why the rule against private purchases of
Indian lands was likely efficient for European colonizers: it was
rooted in democratic process. Assuming that democracy reflects the
will of the governed, the fact that legislatures and executive officials
from New Hampshire to Georgia adopted the same rule strongly sup-
ports the proposition that the rule reflected public desires. As the ac-
tivities of the United Companies show, there were strong incentives
for individual citizens to acquire choice lands directly from the Indi-
ans. From a societal point of view, however, such self-interested action
would drive up the price of Indian land for all settlers. As discussed at
length in Part II.B.1, the rule against such purchases might have
harmed individual Europeans, but it helped minimize the total price
paid for Indian lands. Settlers thus relied on legislation and regula-
178 1& at 24.
1 Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 86. For a similar analysis, see Robert
D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 443, 445 (1994)
(noting that "[t]he subject of this lecture is... enacting custom") [hereinafter Cooter,
Complex Economy], elaborated on in Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and te
New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INTL REV. L. & EcoN. 215, 216
(1994) (noting that "[wihen courts apply community standards, they find law, rather
than making it").
ISO See ELLICKSON, supra note 148, at 184-206 (giving examples of customary prac-
tices that have developed in whaling and cattle communities).
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tion to solve a classic collective action problem-one of the primary
efficiency gains derived from a government with coercive power.
Indians had no voice in the colonizers' governments, and thus it is
not surprising that they were not a factor in the social calculus that re-
sulted in the rule against private purchases of Indian lands. Both
courts adopting customary practices, and commentators praising
them, have been careful to point out that customary rules work well
only in small, close-knit communities, where the custom has no nega-
tive effect on outsiders.'8 1 Instead of facilitating free trade that would
have maximized the joint product of both societies, European settlers
adopted rules that maximized their own utility, regardless of Indian
welfare.
2. Contrasting Efficiency with Other Explanations of M'Intosh
While the monopsonistic M'Intosh rule imposed costs on the Indi-
ans, this effect and the intent behind it are not obvious. Thus, both
sides of the polarized debate on American-Indian relations, discussed
in the Introduction above, find support for their respective views in
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. As noted in the Introduction, nei-
ther side provides a story that squares with basic historical facts, and
M'Intosh is a case in point1
2
At one extreme, Marshall could have given the Indians a full loaf:
European title, with an absolute right to alienate to anyone. Begin-
ning with Felix Cohen, scholars offering a benevolent interpretation
of American Indian policy have described Marshall's opinion as a bril-
liant compromise between the political pressures to take Indian lands,
and the immorality of outright expropriation. According to Cohen,
Marshall "would accept neither horn of this dilemma .... [which] was
neatly solved by Chief Justice Marshall's doctrine that the Federal
1 See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (adopting, for example, whaling
custom as law, in part, because "[i]ts application must necessarily be extremely limited,
and can affect but a few persons"); Epstein, Custom and Law, supra note 144, at 126
(noting that custom "works well in narrow domains"). Cooter says that a custom of
cooperation among producers, resulting in a cartel, is clearly not entitled to judicial
deference.
[M] embers of a business cartel can benefit each other by keeping prices high.
From the viewpoint of the cartel, discounting the price is "cheating." How-
ever, discounting benefits people outside the cartel more than it harms the
members of it. Consequently, discounting is socially efficient, whereas the car-
tel is socially inefficient.
Cooter, Complex Economy, supra note 179, at 450 (emphasis added).
1V See supra text accompanying notes 1-12 (summarizing both sides of the debate).
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Government and the Indians both had exclusive title to the same land
at the same time."' More recent commentators, while casting later
Supreme Court decisions in a negative light, continue to view M'Intosh
as a defense of Indian rights in the face of political pressure.84 An un-
stated assumption of these commentators is that judges and legisla-
tures were willing to pay significantly more for Indian lands in order
to salve the nation's conscience.
At the other extreme, Marshall could have given the Indians no
loaf by declaring them truly tenants at sufferance subject to ejection at
the will of the United States. The fact that Marshall also rejected this
extreme position presents difficulties for those who portray American
Indian policy as intentionally genocidal. Robert Williams makes one
of the most forceful recent statements of this viewpoint, arguing that
the only reason Marshall left the Indians with any rights is that " [h]is
judicial task was merely to fill in the details and rationalize the fictions
by which Europeans legitimated the denial of the Indians' rights in
their acquisition of the Indians' America."18 Williams fails to explain
why Marshall, as a participant in grand theft of the continent, created
a dual land tenure system vesting some rights in the Indians.
Marshall's decision to give the Indians half a loaf (or perhaps
more accurately a quarter or an eighth of a loaf) thus presents diffi-
culties for both the benevolent and the malevolent interpretation of
the expropriation of America from the Indians. The remainder of
this Part argues that M'Intosh is best explained as one element of a cal-
culated, rational, unemotional effort to obtain Indian lands at the
least cost. This analysis rejects the kindness imputed to Marshall (and
the rest of the Justices who joined his unanimous opinion) by the be-
nevolent school, and the truculence imputed by the malevolent
school. The working assumption is that such a sweeping national pol-
icy to transfer wealth must be understood, at bottom, in terms of self-
ishness (economics), not benevolence or malevolence (morality or
lack thereof) .'8
18 Cohen, supra note 5, at 48-49.
18 See Wilkins, supra note 123, at 166-67 (stating that Marshall "cleverly reached a
political/legal compromise" that protected Indians from outright expropriation); see
also Henderson, supra note 23, at 105 (arguing that later Supreme Court cases under-
mined the nuanced and balanced approach of M'Intosh); Newton, supra note 22, at
1223 (indicating that M'Intosh represents "a brilliant compromise" by providing Indi-
ans with rights in the face of European rapacity).
18 WIIJAMs, supra note 12, at 312. For similarly dark readings of events leading
up to the M'Intosh decision, see id. at 185, 193-94, 196, 205, 207.
186 Whether selfishness itself is good or evil is another classic normative debate; this
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B. Governing European-Indian Relations: Presenting a United Front
1. United Front in Land Purchases
The international discovery rule, along with the national rule of
M'Intosh,1s7 created a two-tiered system to avoid competition for Indian
lands. The first tier, the discovery rule, not only minimized physical
conflict between European sovereigns, as emphasized by ChiefJustice
Marshall,s but also ensured that once a nation had staked its claim,
other nations would not meddle in affairs within the "discovered" re-
gion. 89
Other scholars have noted in passing that the second tier, barring
citizens of the discovering sovereign from making private purchases,
created a monopsony, but have not emphasized the importance of
this custom, enshrined in M'Intosh, to the process of efficient expro-
priation.1 90 It is undoubtedly true from an individual perspective that
Article focuses on the positive implications of economic (selfish) behavior.
187 Congress codified the rule against private purchases of Indian lands as part of
the Trade and Intercourse Acts, discussed infra Part I.E.2.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 (discussing the discovery doctrine).
189 While the discovery rule's attempt to minimize competition was efficient, at
least from the European perspective, it had other effects that may or may not have
minimized the cost of finding and expropriating aboriginal lands. The discovery rule
does seem to encourage a wasteful race to establish rights. Expeditions across the
oceans were costly propositions, yet countries may have incurred this and other ex-
penses in order to establish property rights; this is also a potential problem with pre-
emption (right to purchase based on settlement and improvements) and homestead-
ing (right to title, without any payment, based on settlement and improvements),
discussed infra Part I.E.1. For a vivid description of what seems an astoundingly waste-
ful race to establish rights among European nations, see THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRIcA, 1876-1912, at xxi-xxv (1991). An earlier attempt by the Pope
may have avoided competition, and such a wasteful race to establish rights, by assign-
ing title before discovery. "The [papal] bull of Alexander VI in 1493 which divided the
world between Spain and Portugal, for example, was principally designed to prevent an
unseemly and dangerous scramble among Christian nations for the spoils of the newly
discovered areas." Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispos-
sessing the Indians, in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY
15, 15 (James Morton Smith ed., W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1972) (1959).
190 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 56 (noting in passing that the
M'Intosh rule "made the United States a monopsonistic purchaser"); see alsoJennifer
Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
INDIAN EcONOmIm 5, 18 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992) (discussing how state cessions
to the federal government "facilitated the Continental Congress' continuance of the
policy of monopolizing land purchases from the Indians"). Another scholar notes that
the government's land monopsony was "bound up with issues of military security, di-
plomacy, and law enforcement." Springer, supra note 41, at 35. I will discuss what
Springer meant by security, diplomacy, and law enforcement infra Part II.E, but con-
spicuously absent from this list of issues is the primary effect of monopsony: reducing
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"the prohibition on private land sales probably prevented many mutu-
ally beneficial transactions from taking place."19 From an American
societal point of view, however, the rule of M'Intosh solved a collective
action problem and permitted the nation to avoid expensive bidding
wars for Indian lands.
To illustrate, consider a simplified version of a private acquisition
of Indian lands. Assume that there are two tracts for sale, and two po-
tential buyers. Both buyers face the following schedule of costs and
192revenues:
* cost of two cents an acre to buy if they cooperate and do not
bid against each other, but one dollar an acre if they bid
against each other; and
" revenue of three dollars an acre from reselling small lots to set-
tiers.
If the players cooperate (stick to an agreement to bid low), they each
agree to buy one tract. One assumes if they compete (either never
agree to both bid low, or both defect from such an agreement), they
likewise each obtain one tract. If one cooperates while the other
competes, the defecting competitor obtains both tracts. Based on
these numbers, the players' payoffs are determined by the interaction
of their decisions to cooperate or compete.
the price a buyer pays.
Roback, supra note 190, at 19.
19 These costs and revenues are loosely based on historical data. See infra text ac-
companying note 490 (describing how Indians typically received about two cents an
acre or less for land while the statutory minimum price charged for land was two dol-
lars an acre).
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Player 2
Cooperate Compete
S. Cooperate 298, 298 0, 400
Compete 400, 0 200, 200
(payoffs in cents: Player 1, Player 2)
Figure 1
This presents the players with the classic prisoners' dilemma.'9 3
Without some mechanism to enforce an agreement to cooperate,
both buyers are likely to defect and bid against each other for both
tracts. While this competition may have been optimal considering the
welfare of Indians as well as the Americans, this Article hypothesizes
that American laws sought to maximize only American welfare. If so,
this potential competition is disastrous for Americans, as the Indians
receive a substantial share of the value of their lands. If American
bidders cooperate, their net wealth increases by almost six dollars; any
degree of competition reduces this surplus by two dollars-money
that goes directly to the Indians. The United Companies, for in-
stance, faced no rivals for the lands they sought to purchase, but had
they earned fat profits, more competitors would inevitably have begun
bidding for Indian lands.
M'Intosh provided a neat solution to this dilemma by establishing
the United States as the sole purchasing entity. Not only did the hold-
ing solve the collective action problem, but it did so without imposing
any administrative costs on the government.1 94 Any private party so
rash as to violate the rule, like the United Companies, ended up with
an unmarketable title, and a subsequent purchaser from the United
193 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME T-EORY AND THE LAW 33-35 (1994) (ex-
plaining that the Prisoners' Dilemma focuses attention on collective action problems,
where the parties do best if they cooperate, but at the same time they lack mechanisms
to credibly and enforceably commit to cooperative behavior).
194 This stands in stark contrast to the extremely high expense, amounting to im-
possibility, of regulating many other acts of those on the frontier. Such prohibitive
costs often hindered the least-cost expropriation of Indian lands. See infra Part II.E.2
(discussing how actions of some frontiersmen, such as squatting on Indian lands, had
negative external effects that imposed costs on the rest of the nation).
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States, like William McIntosh, could file suit (or, as in M'Intosh, defend
against suit) to clear tide.'
Marshall does not mention creating a monopsony; as discussed in
Part II.1,judges often adopt customary practices as law without real-
izing their efficiency. At some level, however, the courts did realize
the importance of M'Intosh. The trial court, and then the Supreme
Court, decided a case that minimal investigation would have revealed
was feigned. Marshall's opinion for the unanimous Court chose the
broadest rule possible, laying down a national standard, instead of re-
lying on colonial or British law that the opinion itself declared valid.
Although Congress could have legislatively reversed the decision,
M'Intosh fostered collusion in the purchasing of Indian lands. There
are no records of subsequent litigation attempting to reverse the case,
and no records of subsequent private purchases from the Indians.
The opinion's focus on incentives going forward, rather than on
the fairness of events that had already transpired, is further evidence
that the courts grasped the efficiency motivation for the custom
against private purchases of Indian lands. Ironically, despite the det-
rimental effect of the case on Indian welfare, the real winners of
M'Intosh were the Illinois and Piankashaw Indians. The losing plain-
tiffs found the claims they inherited worthless. The victorious defen-
dant, William McIntosh, presumably paid the United States fair value
for the lands and derived little further benefit from the case.1'9 The
tribes, however, sold the lands twice: first in 1773 and in 1775 to the
Illinois and Wabash Companies, then from 1803 to 1809 to the United
States. The United Companies repeatedly beseeched Congress to
avoid double payment to these double grantors, but the legislature,
and then the Supreme Court, found this equitably sound argument
unconvincing.'9 8
As discussed above in Part I.C.3, Marshall told the plaintiffs that,
under the dual land tenure system, they must seek a remedy from the
195 The rule did impose negotiation and other transaction costs on the federal gov-
ernment, but as discussed infra Part I.B.2, the government appears to have had nego-
tiating advantages that were unavailable to any private party.
See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 598-600.
197 The decision did remove a small blotch from McIntosh's title, but given the
number of people buying lands based on United States patents that overlapped with
the United Companies' claims, their potential conflicting claim was not seen as much
of a threat. The author could find no evidence that land intersecting the Companies'
tracts sold at a discount compared to similar land elsewhere.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing the United Companies' ar-
guments against paying the tribes twice for the same land).
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Indians, under whom they held title. Marshall, however, virtually ad-
mitted that the Court would find no remedy since there was no Indian
forum. If he had been concerned with equity, Marshall could have
(1) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, (2) directed the United States to
refund McIntosh's money, and (3) instructed the United States to
pursue the Illinois and Piankashaw tribes for a remedy, perhaps taking
some of their western reservation lands. The United States govern-
ment alone was capable of disgorging the Indians' unjust gains from
selling the same lands twice. Instead, the holding of the case left the
double grantors with double proceeds, apparently a necessary evil in
reaffirming a custom that helped reduce the price Americans paid for
Indian lands.
M'Intosh, of course, was a fleeting and pyrrhic victory for two small
tribes. Indians generally realized that America's monopsony worked
to their detriment and tried to deny the existence of any such exclu-
sive right to purchase.
Brothers: You have talked, also, a great deal about pre-emption, and
your exclusive right to purchase Indian lands, as ceded to you by the
King, at the treaty of peace.
Brothers: We never made any agreement with the King, nor with any
other nation, that we would give to either the exclusive right of purchas-
ing our lands; and we declare to you, that we consider ourselves free to
make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever and to whomever we
please. If the white people, as you say, made a treaty that none of them
but the King should purchase of us, and that he has given that right to
the United States, it is an affair which concerns you and him, and not us;
we have never parted with such a power.199
These protestations could have no effect as long as the British re-
spected their treaty with the United States (preventing international
competition), and the United States in turn effectively refused to rec-
ognize Indian deeds obtained by its citizens (preventing intranational
competition). All the willingness in the world to sell to the highest
bidder is irrelevant if there is only one bidder. Indians selling land
after M'Intosh suffered much the same way consumers would in the
absence of antitrust laws. Just as a price-fixing agreement between
manufacturers A and B can harm consumer C despite the fact that C is
not a party to the deal, the customary agreement among Americans
not to bid against each other for Indian lands, embodied in M'Intosh,
19 Answer to Speech by the Commissioners (Aug. 16th, 1793), reprinted in AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 1 INDiAN AFFAIrS 356, 356 (1832).
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reduced Indian welfare by lowering the price Indians received for
their lands without requiring any consent from those harmed.
Refusing to recognize Indian deeds also helped clarify land ti-
200tles. It may have been expensive to mediate conflicts among Ameri-
cans running deep into the woods and obtaining potentially overlap-
ping deeds. Determining whether or not such deeds were
fraudulently obtained might have been difficult as well.2 1 Divergences
between the two cultures' understandings of land tenures may have
contributed to such difficulties. For example, the European emphasis
on absolute power to use and exclude forever was at odds with the In-
dians' frequent use of more limited usufructuary land rights). Yet
governments could have solved these difficulties by simply placing the
burden on private purchasers to prove that they obtained clearly-
demarcated lands in fair sales. To assure that the deeds obtained were
not fraudulent, the government could have required, for instance,
that all purchasers negotiate at federal posts, as Murray did in obtain-
ing the Illinois Company deed. Standard recording acts could have
resolved competing claims. Standard rules on unclear land descrip-
dons could have addressed problematic land descriptions in Indian
deeds. Alternatively, if the United States was not worried about paying
market price for Indian lands, but rather only about clarity of titles, it
could have appointed itself sole auctioneer of Indian lands. When-
ever the Indians decided to sell, agents of the United States would
then have conducted the sale fairly, made sure there were not conflict-
ing grants, deducted a portion of the proceeds for its administrative
expenses, and forwarded the remainder of the winning bids directly to
the Indians. Thus, while a federal monopsony did enhance clarity of
land titles, it did not seem to lie at the heart of the customary practice
upheld in MTntosh.
The colonists did not stumble at random onto the efficient cus-
tom adopted in M'Intosh. Colonial policymakers realized the advan-
tages of preventing competition for Indian lands, and they did not
stop at curbing individual land transactions: "From the earliest colo-
nial period, the English Crown adopted a policy of attempting to cen-
tralize and monopolize contact with the natives."2 2 As Chief Justice
Marshall noted later in another important Indian law case, "[tihe
2o See Telephone Interview with Professor Robert Ellickson, Yale Law School (Feb.
4, 1998).
201 SeeJENNINGS, supra note 10, at 130 (discussing "endless litigation over purchase
of fraudulent tides" in colonies before they banned private purchases).
Roback, supra note 190, at 11.
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whole intercourse between the United States and [Indian nations], is,
by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.""2 '
In addition to restraints on individuals, the historical record is re-
plete with arrangements designed to solve the collective action prob-
lem among colonies and later states-the "federalism" dimension of
presenting a united front. The land monopsony seems to have been
one of the central purposes of the United Colonies of New England,
an early American confederation formed in 1643. "Six of the eight
commissioners, two from each colony, had to authorize action, so op-
portunistic scrambling for Amerindian lands could be stalled by rival
colonies."2°4 A century later, the British barred private purchases of
lands in the Proclamation of 1763 in part to prevent competition in
the acquisition of Indian lands. In proposing national control over
Indian relations in the Articles of Confederation, Ben Franklin de-
clared that "[a]bove all else, rivalries between colonies in treating with
the Indians had to be avoided."2 5 The Articles, however, left the
States with complete control over the Indians within their borders.
This excessive division of power was one of the reasons the nation
adopted a new Constitution that clearly and unequivocally made the
national government master of all dealings with the tribes.0 Execu-
tive officials brooked no violation of these governmental preroga-
tives.
20 7
203 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
2M IAN K. STEELE, WARPATHS: INVASIONS OF NORTH AMERICA 95 (1994).
205 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITCAL ANOMALY 38 (1994).
206 Article IX of the Articles of Confederation gave the United States control only
over Indians in the territories outside the established states. See ART. OF CONFED. of
1781, art IX (granting the power to regulate "the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any
state within its own limits be not infringed or violated"). Note that even this arrange-
ment prevented competition among governments, since it vested exclusive power to
deal with a given tribe in either one state or in the national government. The Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of 1789 removed even this limited division of
power. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate com-
merce with Indian Tribes).
Despite this provision and a series of congressional acts regulating trade and inter-
course with the Indians, some eastern states continued their colonial practice of deal-
ing directly with the Indians. The federal government did not intervene. "These state
actions provided the fodder for the rash of eastern Indian land claims litigated in fed-
eral courts over the [1970s and 1980s]." Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763:
Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict over the Management of Indian Af-
fairs, 69 B.U.L. REV. 329, 372-73 (1989).
207 See, e.g., ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF THE
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The importance of presenting a united front suggests a differentS•• 203 209
interpretation of Cherokee Nation and Worcester which, together with
M'Intosh, comprise the "Marshall trilogy" on Indian law. Focusing on
sympathetic dicta, many scholars have suggested that these cases em-
bodied a sympathetic and fair-minded approach to dealing with the
Indians that later opinions overlooked.21 ' Frickey argues that, while
Marshall's M'Intosh opinion may have recognized unsavory colonialism
as to past events, when taken together with Cherokee Nation and Worces-
ter, Marshall attempted to soften colonialism with constitutional-style
rules that limited the ability of the other branches to exploit the Indi-
ans. Frickey reads the Marshall trilogy as an implicit message to the
other branches of government and the nation that they "should help
those poor Indians."
2 11
Whatever Marshall pontificated about in his extensive dicta, the
holdings of the two cases clearly served the purpose of maintaining a
united front in Indian relations. Cherokee Nation held that the Su-
preme Court did not have original jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by
Indians since Indian tribes were not the type of foreign "States" con-
templated in the Supreme Court's grant of original jurisdiction in the
Constitution. By deeming Indian tribes "domestic dependent na-
tions,"213 Marshall ensured that neither foreign powers nor any of the
several states would meddle in Indian affairs. In Worcester, the Court
AMERIcAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821, at 422 (Harper & Row 1977) (1817) (providing that
upon becoming governor of the chaotic Florida Territory in 1821, "Jackson arrested all
white men who treated with the Indians without proper authorization. One thing he
would not abide was a 'meddlesome' white man undercutting his policy."). Plaintiff
William McIntosh withdrew a suggestion that private citizens contact Indians about the
likelihood of hostilities, making it clear that he "did not intend to interfer[e] with the
poceedings [sic] of the Governor," who had exclusive power over Indian affairs. Letter
from James Johnson to Nathaniel Ewing (June, 1810), reprinted in 8 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 31,at 29 (1939).
203 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515.
210 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (noting that the American gov-
ernment paid for almost all of the land acquired from the Indians, even though the
law did not require it).
21, Frickey, supra note 133, at 424.
212 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Sub-
jects.").
213 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("[T]hose tribes which reside within the
acknowledged boundaries of the United States ... may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert
a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession, when
their right of possession ceases.").
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held, under the clear language of the Constitution (reversing the Ar-
ticles of Confederation), that the State of Georgia had no power to
deal directly with the tribes within its borders. By preserving a unitary
entity to deal with the Indians, Marshall's opinions helped the United
States continue to buy Indian land cheaply.
1 4
2. The Bargaining Game
While M'Intosh limited the number of bidders for Indian lands to
one legal entity, it would be rash to conclude that this created a mo-
nopsony. If a tribe had an exclusive claim to a piece of land, the value
of being a single buyer was counterbalanced by the existence of a sin-
gle seller: the United States then could not pit competing sellers
against each other.
Dealings of this sort, with only one party on each side of a poten-
tial transaction, are called "bilateral monopolies" or "bargaining
games." The basic schema is that the two parties are interested in
making a deal, and there exists a range of prices acceptable to both.
Marine salvage law contains a vivid example. Imagine that the good
ship Rescuer comes across the storm-damaged Distress. The Distress is
incapable of moving and carries a very valuable cargo, say, gold, worth
$1,000,000. No other ships are likely to happen by (thus ensuring that
this is indeed a bilateral monopoly). The expense to the Rescuer of as-
sisting the Distress, accounting for all costs and risks, is $10,000. Thus,
the Rescuer would be happy to perform the rescue services for any
higher amount. The Distress, facing a total loss, is better off paying
anything up to $1,000,000. If the parties are roughly aware of these
facts, there is much room for haggling, bluffing, and all the other fine
points of negotiating. The bottom line is that both sides know the
other side is better off agreeing to extreme terms than none at all.
2
15
There is no exact "solution" to such bargaining games. Unlike
"normal" markets where supply and demand, created by numerous
214 PresidentJackson's infamous refusal to enforce Marshall's decision against the
State of Georgia might appear to undermine the unifying, nationalist holding. How-
ever, Jackson's refusal to protect the Indians against the depredations of the Georgia
state government may only indicate that the nation approved of the State's policy, and
in effect relied on Georgia, as an agent, to further national policy. Marshall's decision
gave the federal government the power to prevent state actions that were inconsistent
with the national interest; Jackson merely chose not to exercise this power against
Geor a.
Bilateral monopolies are ubiquitous; other examples include workers and firms,
when workers have firm-specific skills; neighboring property owners negotiating an
easement; and relations among owners of a closely held corporation.
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competing sellers and buyers, dictate a Pareto-optimal price, any out-
come between $10,000 and $1,000,000 is plausible for the example in
the previous paragraph. The relative bargaining talents of the parties
will ultimately determine the outcome. There may, however, be other
factors such as time-pressure that affect the outcome. For instance, if
the Distress were sinking and it were a matter of life and limb, the Res-
cuerwould be likely to garner more favorable terms2
The next two Parts catalog a host of techniques the United States
used in this bargaining game to minimize the price it paid for Indian
lands. Parts II.B.2.a.b discuss the techniques in decreasing order of
acceptability under contract law and voluntary exchange, starting with
bluffing, surely a legal practice, and ending with physical intimidation
and threats, surely grounds for rescinding contracts at common law.
2 17
Part II.B.2.c discusses why the United States's superior unity and gov-
ernance translated into this catalog of bargaining advantages over the
Indians. Finally, Part II.B.2.d argues that the strange mix of bargain-
ing techniques--some of which were consistent with voluntary ex-
change, while others not-fits the hypothesis of efficient conquest
well.
a. Bargaining "Tricks" Colorably Consistent with Contract Law
A common negotiating technique is to pound a fist on the table
and storm out of the room, declaring a (false) intention never to re-
turn, in the hope that the other side, realizing a bad deal is better
than no deal, will cave in. This is undoubtedly a legally accepted prac-
tice in voluntary negotiations. The United States frequently employed
such bluffs to gain an advantage in bargaining to purchase Indian
lands. For example, in 1786 the United States implied it would attack
the Shawnees if they refused to the proffered terms, despite the Secre-
tary of War's later admission that the nation was "utterly unable to
maintain an Indian war with any dignity or prospect of success."
18
Perhaps the most potent ploy for gaining the upper hand in nego-
tiations with Indians was exploiting divisions, both among the several
tribes and within each tribe. European colonial powers had long used
216 See DAvID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 551 (1990) (dis-
cussing bargaining in a bilateral monopoly).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 174-76 (1987).
218 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 54 (quoting statement of Henry Knox, Secretary of
War). I will discuss the use of threats below in Part II.B.2.b; here the focus is on bluff-
ing-making representations that the United States was capable of prosecuting a war
when in fact it could not.
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such divide and conquer techniques to forcibly take Indian lands.
"[T]he [Spanish] conquistadors, efficient killing machines though
they were, did not conquer Mexico and Peru unaided. Native allies
were indispensable. In a sense, Spanish armed conquest was a judo
trick by which Europeans, assisted by the pox and the plague, used the
Indians' own strength to overthrow them."2'9
The United States repeatedly exploited fissures among and within
tribes to obtain land cheaply, usually without resorting to force. From
the first days of the Republic, Congress counseled its Indian agents to
"deal with each Indian tribe or nation as separately as possible"2° and
"insisted that the tribes were to be kept separated so that negotiations
would be easier. " 22 Desperate to prevent the Indians from uniting
and refusing to sell lands, Secretary of War Knox successfully cleaved
the powerful Iroquois from such an alliance "by remedying their
complaints" about, inter alia, American land claims and encroaching
settlers.
The United States preyed mainly on two sources of disunity
among the Indians. First, the United States fanned the flames of
longstanding animosities between various groups. For instance, Gen-
eral St. Clair purposefully negotiated separately with the Six Nations
and the Great Lakes tribes because there was "ajealousy that subsisted
between them, which [he] was not willing to lessen by appearing to
consider them as one people"-St. Clair even thought, if need be, he
could "set them at deadly variance."2 The United States at times paid
little in hard cash for land, instead offering to protect weak tribes
against strong enemy neighbors or co-tenants. This tactic helped re-
duce the amount William Henry Harrison agreed to pay to the Kas-
kaskias for the lands in southern Illinois that they had previously con-
veyed to the Illinois Company. 24
29W JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 33.
20 Charles Judah Bayard, The Development of the Public Land Policy, 1783-1820,
with Special Reference to Indiana 48 (1956) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Indiana (Bloomington)) (on file with author).
22 Id. at 85-86.
Robert F. Berkhofer, Barrier to Settlement: British Indian Polioy in the Old Northwest,
1783-1794, in Ti FRONTIER IN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 249, 270 (David M. Ellis ed.,
1969).
22 Letter from Governor St. Clair to the President (May 2, 1789), in 2 THE ST.
CLAIR PAPERS: TH LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ARTHUR ST. CLAIR 111, 113 (William
Henr Smith ed., 1882).
See WRITNGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 165, at 375 (noting that the Kaskaskias
"are now but a few families, exposed to numerous enemies, and unable to defend
themselves, and would cede lands in exchange for protection").
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Second, the United States manipulated the conflicting and un-
clear tribal claims in order to buy land cheaply. "Frontier authorities
often found it expedient to bargain with one nation for lands claimed
or actually occupied by another.'2 Even in cases in which all sides
agreed that a number of tribes held land in effect as co-tenants, the
United States was able to drive a wedge between the owners. William
Henry Harrison was a master of this technique.
Harrison played the divided villagers against each other, getting substan-
tial cessions. Because villages often contained members of several tribes
and because different tribal groups shared common areas, one group
rarely had exclusive claim to the land. If Harrison induced representa-
tives of one group to make a cession, then others had to follow or else
risk getting no payments at all for the land.... [C]hiefs signed from fear
that if they refused, chiefs of other villages would gladly make the ces-
sions in their stead.z
Harrison employed the same technique to obtain the Pianka-
shaws' interest in the lands they had previously conveyed to the Wa-
bash Company.
The cession of 1804 in southwestern Indiana from the Delaware and Pi-
ankishaw was obtained by [divide and conquer]. Both tribes claimed the
area but would not consider releasing their title. Delaware acquiescence
was first obtained. The Piankishaw, realizing the tenuousness of their
claim, and fearing the loss of additional annuities and goods that might
otherwise accrue from a cession on their part gave consent less than a
fortnight later in a separate treaty. 22
There was no end to the theories that the British, and later the
Americans, conjured up to place title in the hands of a tribe that was
willing to sell, and sell cheaply. For instance, after the Proclamation
of 1763 and Pontiac's Uprising:
[T]he British partially resurrected the old doctrine of Iroquois owner-
ship of the lands along the Ohio River [based on conquest]. This
2 JACK M. SOSIN, THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER, 1763-1783, at 84 (1967). In a
somewhat comical example of what must have been a specious claim, PresidentJeffer-
son told William Henry Harrison that he had "heard there was still one Peoria man
living, and that a compensation, making him easy for life, should be given him, and his
conveyance of the country [referring to a large tract in central Illinois] by a regular
deed be obtained." MOSES DAWSON, A HIsTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE CIvIL &
MIUTARY SERVICES OF MAJOR-GENERALWItnIAM H. HARRISON 112 (1824).
26 WHITE, supra note 62, at 474, 496. The Kaskaskias' 1803 cession was a notorious
example of such practice. See id at 474 n.6 (noting that although the Kaskaskia tribe at
the time numbered only 30 men, women, and children, they ceded southern Illinois to
the United States).
227 Smith, supra note 37, at 245.
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opened up the possibility of the Iroquois, ceding away the land of their
"dependents," as they had before.22
Another argument held that "the French had reached Illinois
country before the Illinois [tribes] themselves had... and thus had
prior claim to the land that had, by right of conquest, descended to
the British king. "2
Sometimes the United States did not even rely on preexisting divi-
sions or muddled claims; it merely isolated resistant tribes by making
deals with their neighbors. During his negotiations with the southern
tribes in the aftermath of the War of 1812, AndrewJackson "decided
to treat the Indians separately. By dividing the tribes he believed he
could weaken their resistance to his demands. He began with the
Cherokees because he anticipated 'much difficulty' with the Chicka-
saws .... An initial success with the Cherokees, therefore, would
strengthen his negotiating stance with the Chickasaws."WO
The "divide and conquer" strategy eroded the price Indians re-
ceived for their lands in two ways. First, by introducing competition
among sellers, especially co-claiming tribes, the United States was able
to convert a bilateral monopoly into something more akin to a mo-
nopsony.23 ' It might seem that tribes with co-tenancy interests who did
not sell simply could have remained on the land. Given the United
States's policy of making some payment to almost any tribe with even
a colorable claim, the fact that one co-tenant received a payment
would not seem to diminish the right of the other co-tenant to occupy
the land. 2  The United States, however, usually paid less to late-
228 WHITE, supra note 62, at 308. It is unclear whether or not the Indians recog-
nized title by conquest amongst themselves. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (noting that Algonquian Indians in Illinois and surrounding
regions rejected Iroquois claim to title by conquest); WHrrE, supra note 62, at 150-55
(describing Iroquois claims to Illinois land based on conquest). Perhaps more telling
is the fact that British officials did not believe in it.
General Gage thought [the] myth of Iroquois conquest had been useful enough in
negotiations with the French, but he did not believe that the Iroquois could negotiate
away Shawnee lands on the basis of such a conquest. "If we are to search for truth and
examine her to the Bottom, I dont [sic] imagine we shall find that any conquered Na-
tion ever formaly [sic] ceded their Country to their Conquerors, or that the latter even
required it." Id. at 352 (quoting correspondence of General Gage). The Shawnees
disputed the right of the Iroquois to cede their land. See id. at 354 (describing the
Shawnees' attempt to oppose the treaty by which the Iroquois had ceded their land to
the British).
229 WHrTE, supra note 62, at 308.
M REMINI, supra note 207, at 328.
231 See supra note 167 (defining monopsonist).
2"[The tribes] are extremely watchful and jealous of each other lest some advan-
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settling tribes. Moreover, as explained in Part II.D.2 below, once set-
tiers approached Indian lands, their activities reduced the stock of
hunting prey dramatically and rendered the land of little value to the
tribes. Accordingly, tribes were pressured into early sales of land to
the United States.
The United States employed a version of "divide and conquer"
within tribes as well as among them. "If there was not unanimity
within a tribe itself, assent would be obtained from those chiefs who
were willing, thus giving the United States a wedge and also weaken-
ing the tribal resistance."m General St. Clair failed to purchase any
lands in Indiana or Illinois since he could not identify any leaders with
sufficient certainty. His successor William Henry Harrison, however,
"seldom troubled himself about either the justice of the claims of the
contracting party or the representative character of the chiefs, if sig-
natures to a treaty could be obtained."2
Sowing division among the other side in negotiations is generally
permissible under the common law of contracts. In labor talks, a firm
bargaining with many employees may try and to lure some back in the
hopes of undermining the strike. Symmetrically, a union striking
against multiple employers may make a deal with one employer in the
hopes that others will follow. Harrison's method of exploiting intra-
tribal division by striking deals with any member who would sign,
while valid as a matter of contract law, may have violated principles of
agency law: there appears no plausible basis for imputing to unem-
powered chiefs (agents) the authority to bind their tribes (principals).
Bribery, a similar trick that exploited divergent incentives among
tribe members, is also consistent with voluntary exchange. However,
bribery is beyond the range of acceptable tactics under the common
law of agency. Indian leaders time and again proved to be disloyal
tage should be obtained in which they do not all participate." Letter from William
Henry Harrison to Secretary of War Dearborn, Feb. 26, 1802, in DAWSON, supra note
225, at 19.
Smith, supra note 37, at 245-46.
ALvoRD, supra note 25, at 416. General St. Clair "had been ordered to purchase
cessions from the Indians, but on his first visit he was unable to discover any nation
with a clear title to the southern lands of Illinois." I& William Henry Harrison, who
negotiated all the major treaties discussed in this subsection, had no such compunc-
tion, "showing a readiness to enter into negotiations with any faction or isolated band
of Indians who would consentto a relinquishment of land titles." I&.
2 Under the duty of loyalty as defined by the common law of agency, agents must
"act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with the agency,"
and "an agent who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him
on behalf of the principal is under a duty to give such profit to the principal."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oFAGENcy§§ 387-88 (1958). Thus an agent (such as a chief)
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agents to their principals (tribe members), and the United States did
not seem to show any aversion to taking advantage of this breach of
duty. For example, President Jefferson advised Harrison to bribe
chiefs in purchasing Illinois and Indiana lands, and Harrison did so
effectively.5 5 The United States resorted to bribing virtually all the
tribes from which it bought lands; "such methods of obtaining Indian
agreement had become the rule rather than the exception. " 7
b. Fraud, Overawing, and Threats
In addition to bribery, the United States consciously engaged in
"ruse, subterfuge, circumvention, and outright fraud to achieve
through chicanery, under the cloak of voluntary cooperation, a con-
tinued stream of land cessions."s The Indians were, of course, aware
of such tricks. "The Americans were, the Shawnees argued, inevitably
'deceitful in their dealings with ... the Indians.' Their promises of
benevolence were their most potent weapons."2 9 Outright fraud, of
course, cannot form the basis for enforceable contract rights under
Anglo-American law.
The United States also tried to overawe Indians in order to obtain
their lands more cheaply.
Almost from the day whites arrived in the New World... [Europeans]
shipped Indians back to Europe to impress them with the extent of white
technology and population, then returned them "with the expectation
that upon their return they would spread the gospel of European supe-
riority throughout their native villages." Whites frequently demonstrated
representing a principal (such as a tribe) who takes a bribe has not acted solely for the
principal's benefit and is obligated to remit the bribe to the principal.
M SeeWRITINGS OFJEFEERSON, supra note 165, at 376 (stating that "it would be easy
to solicit and bring over by presents every individual of mature age"); Smith, supra note
37, at 246 ("After receiving a special annuity in the preliminary negotiations for the
Treaty ofJune 7, 1803, Little Turtle, who had until then opposed any cession, became
inclined to favor one.").
237 Ho sMAN, supra note 90, at 140; see also id. at 125 (finding that Cherokees were
"'brought to reason'... by the bribery of one or two influential chiefs"); id. at 140
(predicting that "moderate presents to some of the most influential Characters, will be
deemed sufficient" to obtain an easement to build a road); REMINI, supra note 207, at
329, 330 (documenting several occasions on whichJackson resorted to bribery in order
to obtain land). Jackson emphasized the importance of covering up such transactions:
"Secrecy is necessary, or the influence of the chiefs would be destroyed." Id. at 330.
233 MicHAEL D. GREEN, TH PoLITIcs OF INDIAN REMOVAL: CREEK GOVERNMENT &
SOCIE YIN CRisis 50 (1982).
239 WHrrE, supra note 62, at 459 (citation omitted).
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their technology peacefully to impress Indians with the pointlessness of
240
war.
While some techniques for impressing the tribes contained only
the hint of a threat, more commonly, the United States and it prede-
cessors overawed the Indians with direct displays of military might.
[While the posts were small, and the number of troops that could be
squeezed from the civilian-minded and economy-conscious Congress was
always inadequate.... Indian agents... who carried on the relations be-
tween the government and the Indians always did it under the shadow of
241the authority and protection of a nearby military garrison.
Furthermore, the United States recognized that "[a] display of
force or demonstrations of potential military strength were effective
persuaders at conferences and negotiations either bringing awe, re-
spect, fear, or a realization of futility to the Indians."24
While impressing a bargaining foe with economic might may be
legally permissible (for example, in a merger proposition made by a
large competitor to a smaller one), employing armed agents to sug-
gest that physical harm is the alternative to striking a deal makes a
strong case for duress. The United States, however, often went be-
yond mere displays of force and employed direct intimidation and
overt threats when "negotiating" land cessions. Although it was only a
bluff, the Shawnee in 1786 were "warned that the United States in-
tended to hold firm to its conditions and that refusal of the terms
would mean war. 'The destruction of your women and children[,] or
their future happiness ... depends on your present choice. Peace or
war is in your power.
' 24
In negotiating with the Choctaws at Doak's Stand in 1820,Jackson
found the Indians generally opposed either to ceding or exchanging any
land. The few Choctaws who favored a treaty were compelled to be si-
lent, and every chief threatened with death if he consented to sell or ex-
change an acre .... [After long and tough negotiations] Jackson re-
sorted to threats . . . .He warned them of the loss of American
friendship; he promised to wage war against them and destroy the
240 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 58-59 (quotingJAMB AXTELL, ArrER
COLUMBUS: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOHISTORYOF COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 140 (1988)).
241 PRUcHA, supra note 6, at 62.
242 Smith, supra note 37, at 246.
24 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 52 (quoting 2 THE OLDEN TIM 523-24 (Neville B.
Craig ed., Kraus Reprint Co. 1976) (1848)).
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Nation; finally he shouted his determination to remove them whether
they liked it or not.244
President Monroe agreed that "if the Indians did not voluntarily
submit to the civilizing programs, compulsion would have to be re-
sorted to."
245
Tribes wanted what any bargainer wants: a fair price. During
Harrison's 1809 negotiations in Indiana, one tribe, the Miami, initially
adamantly refused to sell any land, declaring that they must end "'the
encroachments of the whites who were eternally purchasing their
lands for less than the real value of them'" and vowed to sell only "'for the
price that it sells among[lst yourselves [the Americans]. ",46 The Mi-
ami were simply trying to obtain a portion of the gains from trade with
the Americans. Harrison predictably replied with a veiled threat: he
would "extinguish the council fire" if the Miami would not agree to
the substance of his terms.247
Threats, of course, are antithetical to the voluntary exchange that
supposedly legitimized American purchases of Indian lands. They
undermine the essence of lawful negotiation: the right of both sides
to simply leave the room, refuse to cut a deal, and retain whatever
property rights they possessed ex ante. "The pressure [on Indians to
cede lands] was such that it made a farce of the oft-repeated assertion
that the Indians were equally free to sell or refuse to sell."248 One of
the reasons given for a proposed military expedition against the Pi-
ankashaw and other Wabash tribes was
"their refusing to treat with the United States when invited thereto."
The Indians were fighting to resist pressure on their lands, and treaties
with the American government almost invariably resulted in the confir-
mation of cessions or demands for new ones; yet when the Indians re-
fused to negotiate, this was used as a reason for a military expedition.
Though Knox had asserted that the Indians held the right of soil and
could choose whether or not to sell their lands, this concept of free
choice broke down under the pressure of the frontier advance. 
49
244 REMINI, supra note 207, at 393-95 (internal quotations omitted).
245 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 154.
246 Smith, supra note 37, at 226 (quotingJOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS 13, 18 (J.L.
Heinemann ed., 1910) (1809)) (emphasis added).
247 Id. at 227 (citingJOURNAL. OF THE PROC.EDINGS, supra note 246, at 19).
248 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 126. See supra Part L.A for declarations of the Indi-
ans' right to refuse to sell their lands.
49 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 86 (quoting Letter from Secretary of War Knox to
Governor St. Clair (Sept. 12, 1790), reprinted inAMEPJCAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81,
1 INDIANAFFARS 100 (1832) (footnote omitted)).
EXPROPRIATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
In similarly candid moments, other American officials admitted
that the Indians had no free choice. James Gadsden wrote of the 1823
treaty with the Seminoles that
[i]t is not necessary to disguise the fact... that the treaty effected was in
a degree a treaty of imposition-The Indians would never have voluntar-
ily assented to the terms had they not believed that we had both the
power & disposition to compel obedience. 
°
United States officials often couched their threats in polite, cir-
cumspect language. Harrison, for instance, adverted to "extinguish-
ing the council fire" instead of a more direct threat to declare war.25
When the Creeks initially refused to permit the United States to build
a road through their lands, Secretary of War Eustis stated his wish that
the tribe would not "compel the Government to the use of means
which it is desirous to avoid. "s 2 Furthermore, threats were not polite
topics of public conversation: while charges of rape, theft, and fraud
swirled among political rivals in the territorial press without evoking
legal response, Harrison successfully sued William McIntosh for pub-
licly questioning the fairness of the future President's dealings with
the Indians.253 This episode, and the elliptical threats cited, show that
American officials were uncomfortable with bargaining techniques
that violated their own rules of voluntary exchange.
c. Why the Indians Could Not Use Tricks and Threats
The Indians had long realized that their disunity enabled the
Europeans to obtain their lands cheaply via the aforementioned tech-
niques. A founder of Plymouth Colony described with fear the pre-
science of one of the neighboring tribes:
[Tihe Pequots, especially in the winter before [the Pequot war of 1637],
sought to make peace with the Narragansetts, and used very pernicious
arguments to move them thereunto: as that the English were strangers
2M Letter from James Gadsen to the Secretary of War (Sept. 29, 1823), reprinted in
22 "rMmRirAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at752 (1956).
21 See supra text accompanying note 247 (discussing Harrison's veiled threat in re-
sponse to an Indian tribe's attempt to gain a fair price for their land).
252 HORPSMAN, supra note 90, at 163 (internal quotation omitted).
20 See DAWSON, supra note 225, at 175 ("Against this [McIntosh] suit was brought
by the Governor, in the supreme court of the territory, for having asserted that he had
cheated the Indians, in the last treaty which had been made with them at Fort
Wayne.").
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and began to overspread their country, and would deprive them thereof
in time, if they were suffered to grow and increase.Z
The Pequots' attempts failed to unite the tribes against the colo-
nial advance, as did a string of other minor and major efforts, includ-
ing Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763 and Tecumseh and the Prophet's
movement from about 1808 to 1812.
Why did these movements fail? Why could the Indians not unify
in the face of a growing threat to their lands and their livelihoods?
Why could they not employ any of the negotiating ploys that worked
so well for the Americans? At the most general level, Indian society's
lack of the Europeans' well-developed division of labor explains why
the Indians could not mimic the negotiating ploys of their European
counterparts. While Americans have perennially held legislators, ex-
ecutives, and bureaucrats in low esteem, it was the lack of just such a
governing class that hindered Indian unity. The Indians simply could
not afford to feed and clothe more than a few individuals who would
hone their skills at mediating differences and administering a large,
complex alliance u5
An advanced division of labor also helps to explain the Americans'
advantage at the negotiating table. There is no evidence that the In-
dians were inherently worse bargainers than Americans. The Indians
were not unable, for example, to master the art of bluffing-they sim-
ply had far fewer opportunities to practice their skills. While leading
chiefs might negotiate two or three major treaties with the United
States during their lifetime, men like William Henry Harrison, An-
drew Jackson, Lewis Cass, and others were career treaty makers who
presided over two or three treaties a yearfor a decade or more.m
The Americans' superior division of labor further explains why
specific bargaining ploys worked for them but not for the Indians.
With far more professional bureaucrats available to study the tribes,
make and preserve records, and advise their superiors, the United
4 Wai.LAM BRADFoRD, OF PLYMorTH PLANTATION: 1620-1647, at 294 (Samuel
Eliot Morison ed., 1952).M SeeJARED DIAMOND, GUNs, GERMs, AND STEEIL THE FATES OF HuMAN SOcIETfis
78-80 (1997) (attributing the Spaniards' conquest of the Incan Empire in part to
Spain's "centralized political organization" and the Incan's inability to disseminate in-
formation around the Empire regarding the Europeans' hostile intentions).
2M Harrison negotiated 13 treaties from 1803 to 1815. See 7 Stats. 76, 77, 79, 82, 84,
87, 92, 101, 115, 116, 117, 119, 132. Jackson negotiated six from 1814 to 1820. See 7
Stats. 122, 149, 152, 160, 194, 213. Cass treated with tribes no fewer than 22 times from
1814 to 1832. See7 Stats. 119, 167, 170, 180, 181, 185, 187, 189, 192, 205, 206, 207, 221,
275, 292, 297, 302, 305, 306, 316, 319, 368.
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States undoubtedly enjoyed a tremendous informational advantage
over the Indians. This made bluffing much more difficult, because
the United States had a better gauge on Indian troop levels and loca-
tion, stores of ammunition, alliances or feuds, and similar data crucial
to negotiations. It was like a poker game where one side gets to peer
into the hand of the other. Successful bluffing, in poker as in politics,
requires hiding information.
"Divide and conquer" could not work for the Indians because the
United States had an effective governing structure filled with officials
who prevented factional feuds from erupting into permanent and se-
rious divisions. While tribes on occasion detected disloyal leaders and
punished them quite harshly,57 in general the Indians lacked effective
means to deal with this agency problem. The Indians' informational
disadvantage played a role here as well; American negotiators kept
bribes to Indian chiefs, for the most part, secret. In contrast,
American officials would have likely detected bribes taken by their col-
leagues and punished them for treason.
d. The Americans' Use of Both Acceptable Tricks and Unacceptable Threats
Great disparity between the economies of two societies does not
necessarily imply that trade between the two is unfair or involuntary.
Indeed, in appraising the land acquisition process described thus far,
Felix Cohen found that it fit the model of voluntary exchange:
Granted that the Federal Government bought the country from the In-
dians, the question may still be raised whether the Indians received any-
thing like a fair price for what they sold. The only fair answer to that
question is that except in a very few cases where military duress was pres-
ent the price paid for the land was one that satisfied the Indians.2
No less an authority than the Supreme Court, however, has de-
clared that Cohen's view is facile error. "Every American schoolboy
knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their
27 For example, when in 1824 the Creeks' anointed leaders refused to cede their
Georgia lands, United States negotiators bribed a Creek faction led by William McIn-
tosh (no known relation to the plaintiff in Johnson v. M'Intosh) to cede the lands in-
stead. The tribe executed McIntosh for treason, but the signed treaty gave the United
States leverage and the rightful leaders soon thereafter agreed to sell. See PRUCHA, su-
pra note 205, at 148-51 (detailing how the United States Senate managed to remove
the Creek Indians from their home territory in Georgia).
258 See PEmINI, supra note 207, at 830 (noting that Andrew Jackson considered
keeping bribes secret to be necessary, "or the influence of the chiefs would be de-
stroyed").
Cohen, supra note 5, at 38.
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ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded mil-
lions of acres by treaty... it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land."6 '
While a preponderance of the evidence presented in this Part
weighs against Cohen's benign view of the voluntary nature of land
sales, this Part contains limited support for Cohen's view as well. This
Article proposes that this strange mix is best explained as a facet of
the nation's effort to acquire Indian lands at the least possible ex-
pense. Voluntary transactions are cheaper than involuntary ones
since credible threats are expensive, so the United States first tried
bluffing and all the other negotiating tricks consistent with voluntary
exchange. When these tactics failed, the United States moved on to
threats-threats that it hoped would convince the Indians to cede
land without actually fighting.
Contemporary leaders voiced precisely this view of the treaty-
making process. Georgia's governor declared in 1830, in the midst of
expelling the Cherokees from the state, that "treaties were expedients
by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were induced with-
out bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right to possess
by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his
formation-be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue
it. " 261 Congress expressed almost exactly the same perspective, pro-
claiming that paying Indians for land was "but the substitute which
humanity and expediency have imposed, in place of the sword, in arriv-
ing at the actual enjoyment of property claimed by the right of discov-
ery, and sanctioned by the natural superiority allowed to the claims of
civilized communities over those of savage tribes."262 After canvassing
the treaty-making process during the nation's first three decades, his-
torian Reginald Horsman concurred with these assessments, noting,
"[f]or white negotiators, treaty language was merely a means of ob-
taining land with the least conflict and expense, and a means of de-
flecting Indian resistance until the next, inevitable cessions were nec-
essary."
26 1
The use of these bargaining tricks shows that the United States did
not face a stark choice between "raid" or "trade" in obtaining Indian
260 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955).
261 1 FRANCIs PAUL PRucHA, THE GREAT FATHER. THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANs 196 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
22 Id. (emphasis added).
20 HoRsMAN, supra note 90, at x.
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lands-this is a false dichotomy. 26 Rather, the United States pursued
a middle course. It engaged in trade of a sort with the Indians-trade
laced with bluffs, fraud, overawing, and threats that enabled the
United States to obtain land cheaply. The next Part explains why
these tactics lead to more efficient expropriation than raiding (open
warfare).
C. Explaining the Rarity of Fighting:
The Deadweight Loss of Fighting
Treaty making is supposed to be simply a form of bargaining;
coupled with the above testimonials to its role in least-cost acquisition
of Indian lands, the process seems tailor-made for economic analysis.
Yet something seems wrong with this picture: how can economics ap-
ply to the use of intimidation, threats, coercion, and warfare? Eco-
nomics traditionally models voluntary exchange, with a sovereign to
guard against and provide remedies for theft, fraud, breaches of con-
tract, careless injuries, and the like.2t There was no such higher force
in European-Indian relations, and, thus, for example, the Americans
could get away with negotiating ploys that unquestionably would have
been intolerable between two merchants in Philadelphia.
Economics can help us understand human relations even when
not all dealings fit the classic model of voluntariness. This Article
draws on whatJack Hirshleifer has labeled "muscular economics," or "the
dark side of the force-to wit, crime, war, and politics,'26 to explain In-
dian-white relations. While conventional economics analyzes coopera-
tive activity (in the words of Vilfredo Pareto, "the production or trans-
formation of economic goods"267), muscular economics deals with the
264 These terms are taken from the title of Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16,
at 39.
265 "[T]he mainline Marshallian [neoclassical economic] tradition has ... almost
entirely overlooked what I will call the dark side of t1w force-to wit, crime, war, and poli-
tics." Jack Hirshleifer, TheDark Side of the Force 32 ECON. INQUIRY 1,2 (1994).
People can satisfy their desires in two main ways: by production (for self-use, or
for mutually beneficial trade with other parties), or else by conflict (i.e., by ac-
tual or threatened theft, robbery, confiscation, or litigation). Despite its evi-
dent importance, only recently has a systematic economics of struggle and
conflict begun to emerge.
Jack Hirshleifer, The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
130, 130 (1991). For a wide range of articles in this vein, see TiE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CONFiIC' AND APPROPRIATION (Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas eds.,
1996).
266 Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 2.
267 1&
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other way to obtain (if not create) wealth: expropriation of that which
others possess, via "crime, war, and politics."2' Muscular economics
can help us understand a host of important questions about the ex-
propriation of Indian lands. This subsection explains a phenomenon
of particular relevance to the thesis of this Article: why fighting was
the exception, rather than the rule, in American-Indian relations, and
why, despite a significant military advantage, the United States pur-
sued a host of non-military strategies to obtain Indian lands cheaply.
The remainder of Part II explores these non-military methods of ex-
propriation.
While it is accepted wisdom that there was a "time-honored...
practice of waging war on the Indians in order to force a land ces-
sion,"2  the historical record shows that fighting was the exception
rather than the rule in Indian-white relations. New England colonists
waged only two wars during their first century, the era when they ob-
tained most Indian lands in the region. Virginians, too, fought only a
few small-scale wars in the process of expropriating Indian lands east
of the mountains. The United States cleared the old Northwest (to-
day, the Midwest) by fighting three battles: two crushing defeats, fol-
lowed by Anthony Wayne's modest victory at Fallen Timbers in 1794.
While there was a "time-honored practice" of threatening the Indians,270
rarely did these threats lead to conflict. "The claims of the historical
school maintaining that Indian-white relations in this country were
from start to finish determined by violence thus appear erroneous."271
This is consistent with the predictions of muscular economics. As
long as potential opponents are well informed of each other's
strengths, reach similar conclusions about the outcome of conflict,
and can negotiate relatively easily, fighting should never occur. There
are two steps to the argument underlying this assertion. First, under
the assumption of full information and shared expectations, both
sides know in advance the likely result of combat (which side likely
will win, and how decisive a victory it likely will achieve). Second, con-
flict wastes all sorts of resources: human lives, labor that could have
been used more productively, existing capital and productive capacity,
and destroyed property. These are what economists call deadweight
losses: they inure to the benefit of neither side, and are simply
268 1&
269 WIIAMS, supra note 12, at 274.
270 See supra Part lI.B.2.b (exploring the use of threats in American-Indian rela-
tions).
271 Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 57.
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wasted.7 The large deadweight losses that result from warfare pres-
ent combatants, in effect, with a species of gains from trade (i.e., the
gains from peace). If they can strike a deal and avoid war, there will
be a bigger pot of wealth and both sides can have more.
Warfare, then, is in some sense a market failure that occurs when
one of the assumptions made in the previous paragraph does not
hold. For instance, if one side underestimates the abilities of its op-
ponent, it may refuse a compromise that is rational. Thus, "conflict is
in large part an educational process. Struggle tends to occur when one
or both of the parties is over opmistic."2 Such over-optimism may
arise from a host of sources, many of which were present in American-
Indian relations, including lack of information about the other side's
strength and changing weapons technology.274 Whatever the cause of
the over-optimism, the historical record shows that one or two colo-
nial or American victories were sufficient to convince Indians in a
given region that the costs of war exceeded the benefits.2 5 The Euro-
pean tactic of overawing the Indians with demonstrations of their
technology, population, and military might was an attempt to educate
the Indians about the futility of resistance without incurring the high
272 For a definition and illustration of deadweight loss, see WALTER NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIcTHEoRY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 429-30 (3d ed. 1985).
M Jack Hirshleifer, The Economic Approach to Conflict, in ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM:
THE ECONOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICs 335, 340 (Gerard
Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987).
274 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 48-50, 53 (noting the effects of
"information assymetry").
27 See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (discussing how successful wars
against Indians in New England ended the tribes' resistance to colonizers). Another
"market failure" that may have led to conflict between Europeans and Indians was the
difficulty of negotiation. For example, certain tribes had no clear leaders, or had lead-
ers who could not hold their warriors to the bargains they entered, making effective
negotiation problematic. See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 62-63 (detail-
ing the difficulty Europeans had negotiating land treaties with the nomadic and politi-
cally unstructured Western Indian tribes).
Beyond such market failures, basic characteristics of societies also determine
whether they can reach peaceful accommodation or will square off in battle. For in-
stance, cooperation is more likely when production between the two sides is comple-
mentary and they can produce more wealth by combining their talents than they could
if they remained isolated. See Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 4 (citing Solomon William
Polachek, Conflict and Trade, 24J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (1980)) (noting that "nations
that trade more fight less")). This may explain, for example, why the French had more
peaceful relations with the Indians than the British. The primary economic activity of
the French was fur trading, and the Indians, as by far the more skilled trappers, were a
key part of this industry. The British, on the other hand, engaged in fairly large-scale
agriculture, a use inconsistent with the Indians' heavy reliance on hunting and gather-
ing in uncleared forests.
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276
deadweight costs of warfare.
This in no way implies that the relative strengths of the parties do
not matter-strength determines likely losses from battle in terms of
all the costs of warfare discussed above (life, productive labor, etc.),
and gains from expropriating the land or other contested assets.
When the two sides then sit down at the negotiating table, neither will
accept less than they could achieve by fighting. Thus, the predicted
outcome of conflict sets a floor as to what each side will accept in
compromise; these floors set the rough terms of trade within which bar-
gains will fall.277 Given that conflict entails inevitable waste, there is
room for both sides to compromise and walk away with more than
these floors. This room for compromise is simply the gains from trade
discussed above.
John Umbeck presented powerful support for this model of mus-
cular economics in a study of the rules developed by miners to assign
claims during the California gold rush.m Despite the presence of
thousands of armed miners in remote areas, bereft of any official
authority, violence with its attendant deadweight losses was extraordi-
narily rare.2" Moreover, given the fact that guns equalized everyone's
ability to use force, Umbeck expected to find, and did find, that the
miners' legal rules allocated roughly equal-valued tracts to all com-
280
ers.
Such equality prevailed during the early era of European contact
with the Indians. In the first decades of the New England settlements,
"the Indians were not weak, dependent groups of people that needed
protection but powerful equals whom the early settlers had to deal
with as independent nations. 2 11 Under these conditions, the colonists
276 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the bargaining game between Americans and
Indians and the tactics Americans used to prevent fighting).
277 See Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 46 (using phrase "terms of trade"
in this context of two opposing sides considering warfare to resolve a dispute).
278 SeeJohn Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distri-
bution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38 (1981) (explaining how threat of force
influenced the allocation of property rights among miners in the California gold
rush). See generally JOHN R. UMBEc, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: WrrH
APPLICATION TO THE CAUFORNIA GOLD RUSH 50 (1981) (describing the origin and
development of private property rights and using the California gold rush as a para-
digmatic illustration).
See Umbeck, supra note 278, at 49-50 ("Most of the miners carried guns, yet the
reports of violence during the early period are remarkably scarce.").
280 See id. at 54-56 ("[T]he land within [certain] districts appears to have been
roughly homogeneous with respect to [many] characteristics. ..
81 KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 3.
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could not intimidate the tribes, (for example, into selling land below a
voluntarily determined price). This parity disappeared after a few
successful wars against the tribes.2
A similar story played out in the Great Lakes tribes' successive re-
lationships with the French, British, and Americans. In a rich, de-
tailed panorama, Richard White demonstrates how rough military par-
ity forced the tribes and the early waves of colonizers to seek a "middle
ground" and accommodate each other. "The middle ground de-
pended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force.
The middle ground grew according to the need of people to find a
means, other than force, to gain the cooperation or consent of for-
eignersns This delicate balance could not survive America's growing
might. "The real crisis and the final dissolution of this world came
when Indians ceased to have the power to force whites onto the mid-
dle ground. Then the desire of whites to dictate the terms of accom-
modation could be given its head."2 "
Despite the colonists' growing military advantages, it is important
to emphasize that the Indians remained formidable adversaries capa-
ble of inflicting serious harm, economically as well as in terms of life
and limb!" While growing European might continually moved the
muscular economic terms of trade in America's favor, the cost of
fighting the Indians never became anything near trivial. Colonial and
American leaders were well aware of the high expense of Indian wars
and avoided them assiduously.2m American threats to fight rather
than negotiate were thus generally not credible.
The Indians' strength during the first century of contact was
manifest; they repeatedly turned back Spanish incursions in Florida
despite the conquistadors' "supposed advantages of steel swords,
crossbows, muskets, armor, horses, war dogs, and a crusading warrior
mentality."287 Even after colonists built towns, learned to feed them-
28. SeeSTEELE, supra note 204, at 80-110 (documenting that King Philip's War effec-
tive ended New England tribes' resistance to colonizers).
WHITE, supra note 62, at 52.
284 Id. at xv.
8 There is perhaps no better example of the continuing seriousness of the Indian
threat, despite American might, than the massacre of Custer and his men at Little Big
Horn in 1876. The Sioux decimated an elite, battle-hardened calvary unit.
While the polity's concern for the lives of (non-voting, non-wealthy, non-
influential) frontier settlers may seem doubtful, it is important to remember that the
greatest source of national wealth for the United States was its extensive western lands.
To realize the lands' value, the nation needed to attract settlers; the more dangerous
the frontier, the more difficult (i.e., expensive) it would be to lure them.
287 STE E, supra note 204, at 19. Florida "had proved to be nothing but a drain on
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selves, and established organized governments with militias, Indian
wars threatened their very existence. Over half of Plymouth Colony's
towns were destroyed or damaged in King Philip's War in 1676, and
one in twelve of Plymouth's adult males died in the fighting.2s
White incursions continued, yet the Indians were not yet cowed by
European might. During Pontiac's Uprising, a disorganized, sponta-
neous set of attacks in 1763, the Great Lakes Indians killed no less
than 2000 whites, in addition to taking most forts in the region and
besieging the large installation at Fort Pitt.289 "Small triumphs came at
the risk of ambush and catastrophic defeat... [and the] cost of wag-
ing the Indian wars [was high].""' In short, Indian wars were expen-
sive, risky, and unrewarding even in victory.
American leaders were well aware of the sizeable costs of Indian
wars. ChiefJustice Marshall, in a rough cost-benefit analysis, declared
the tribes "too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable
enemies, requir[ing] that means should be adopted for the preserva-
tion of peace.""' Only months after the nation won its independence,
Washington advised Congress that:
[P1olicy and economy point very strongly to the expediency of being
upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing their
Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of
their Country .... [T]here is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War
but the Soil they live on and this can be had by purchase at less expense,
and without... bloodshed ....
292
the resources of Spain." JohnJ. TePaske, Spanish Indian Policy & the Struggle for Empire
in the Southeast, 1513-1776, at 25, 27, in CONTEST FOR EMPIRE 1500-1775 (John B. Elliot
ed., 1975). The Spanish had more success with peaceful settlements centered around
reliious missions. See id. at 30.
See STEELE, supra note 204, at 107-08 (describing King Philip's War). Other
costs were equally high: "eight thousand head of Cattle great and small, killed, and
many thousand bushels of wheat, pease, and other grain burnt." JENNINGS, supra note
10, at 324.
289 See SOSIN, supra note 225, at 6-7 (describing Indian attacks prompted by
Pontiac's Uprising and claiming that "[m]ore than 2000 [frontier settlers] were
killed"); STEELE, supra note 204, at 241 ("An estimated two thousand American traders
and settlers were killed or taken captive [by supporters of Pontiac].").
2W WHITE, supra note 62, at 290.
291 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 596-97 (1823).
292 Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to James
Duane, Chairman of the Committee of Congress to Confer with the Commander in
Chief (Sept. 7, 1783), in 27 THE WRrTNGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 133, 140 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1938) [hereinafterWRrIINGS OF WASINGTON].
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Washington repeated this caution about the expense of Indian
wars in subsequent State of the Union addresses. 3 Other leaders
agreed. In 1790, Secretary of War Knox counseled Congress that "[a]
comparative view of the expenses of a hostile or conciliatory system
towards the Indians will evince the infinite economy of the latter over
the former."2 4 He urged Congress against asserting any right of con-
quest over the Indians because of the Indians' alliance with the de-
feated British. "To establish claims by the principle of conquest would
mean continuous warfare."25 Realists in Congress concurred and
"recommended some compensation for Indian claims rather than risk
another Indian war and the tremendous expense it would bring."
16
Pelatiah Webster summed up the common wisdom: "[Niobody ever
yet gained any thing by an Indian war. Their spoils are of no value; but
their revenge and depredations are terrible. It is much cheaper to purchase their
lands, than to dispossess them byforce....
Consciously paying for Indian lands to avoid costly warfare un-
dermines benevolent interpretations of American policy, yet scholars
continue to defend the morality of the nation's land purchases. For
example, Cohen argues that while "it was only natural that the first
settlers... who were for many decades outnumbered by the Indi-
ans... should have adopted the prudent procedure of buying lands,"
the nation's continued willingness to buy, instead of grab, Indian
lands evidenced high moral character.
What is significant... is that at the end of the 18th Century when our
population east of the Mississippi was at least 20 times as great as the In-
dian population in the same region and when our army of Revolutionary
veterans might have been used to break down Indian claims to land
ownership and reduce the Indians to serfdom or landlessness, we took
293 See George Washington, Fourth Annual Message (Nov. 6, 1792), in GEORGE
WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 480-81 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988) ("An earnest desire... to
arrest the progress of expense ... has led to strenuous efforts.. . ."); Sixth Annual
Message (Nov. 19, 1794), in WAsHINGTON, supra, at 492, 497 (commenting on the "ex-
traordinary expense and waste" of the militia); Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 8,
1795), in WASHINGTON, supra, at 499, 500 (commenting on the "further expense" of
continuing conflict with the Indians).
24 Report of -Secretary of War Knox to Congress (Jan. 4, 1790), repinted in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 1 INDiAN AFFAIRs 59-61 (1832).
25 PRUcHA, supra note 261, at 49.
29 Id. at 43.
297 PELATIAH WEBSTER, POLITICAL ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF
MONEY, PUBLIC FINANCES, AND OTHER SUBJECrs 495 (1791).
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seriously our national proclamation that all men are created equal and
undertook to respect [Indian] property rights .... 29
The historical record, however, indicates that it would have been quite
expensive to physically oust the Indians.2
The economic analysis of this Part complements history in un-
dermining the view that the United States pursued a conscious war of
annihilation against the Indians. M'Intosh itself, granting the Indians
limited rights and refusing to root titles in unjust wars, is inconsistent
with genocidal policy. Simply put, exterminating the Indians with di-
rect violence would have been quite costly, and yet would have yielded
few if any benefits beyond those obtained from the policy of expropri-
ating Indian lands as cheaply as possible.
The historical data support this Article's thesis that least-cost con-
quest explains most colonial and American laws and policies for deal-
ing with the Indians. When Marshall declined to authorize offensive
wars of conquest in M'Intosh, he simply made the law congruent with
the practicalities of dealing with the tribes. Simply put, outright con-
quest and annihilation were not efficient ways of expropriating Indian
lands. Like any prudent cost minimizer, the United States considered
the whole range of methods to obtain Indian lands cheaply.
Hirshleifer makes this point colorfully. He labels productive (coop-
erative, mutually voluntary exchange) activity "the way of Coase,"30 and
expropriative activity (coerced, involuntary exchange) "the way of Ma-
chiavelli,39 1 and posits that "decision-makers will strike an optimal
balance between the way of Coase and the way of Machiavelli-be-
tween the production combined with mutually advantageous ex-
change, and the dark-side way of confiscation, exploitation, and con-
flict."3 2 American officials did not face a binary choice between "raid
or trade"--Machiavelli or Coase-but rather a continuum of strategies
incorporating techniques from both approaches to maximizing bene-
fits and minimizing costs.
C9 Cohen, supra note 5, at 4041.
299 See HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 86-89 (describing expeditions led by generals
Harmar (1790) and St. Clair (1791) that suffered crushing defeats at the hands of the
northern tribes).
3W In honor of Ronald Coase, most famous for arguing that, as long as it is rela-
tively easy to bargain, parties will choose least-cost methods to deal with inconsistent
activities. See generally R.H. Coase, TeProblem of Social CosA 3J.L. &ECON. 1 (1960).
301 In honor of Niccolo Machiavelli, prominent student of political intrigue. See
generally NICCOLO MAC-IAVE.U, THE PRINCE (Angelo M. Codevilla trans. & ed., 1997)
(outlining pragmatic and ruthless avenues to power).
W2 Hirshleifer, supra note 265, at 3.
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Conflict (Machiavelli) took the United States only so far. The In-
dians' ability to inflict significant losses in warfare meant that despite
the inevitability of European victory, threats to take Indian land by
force were not entirely credible. The United States, though starting
from a position of strength, was still locked in a bargaining game with
the Indians to divide the surplus that arose from a peactful (Coasean)
transfer of lands. Even with the favorable terms of trade based on su-
perior might, the Indians remained formidable foes. There was, then,
lots of room between the minima each side would accept, based on
avoiding the deadweight loss of actually fighting. To illustrate this
concept, and the remainder of this Part, consider the following simpli-
fied version of the negotiating game between the United States and
the Indians:
* if the two sides can avoid conflict, the gains from trade are ten;
" each side has two negotiating stances: tough or conciliatory;
" if both sides negotiate in a tough manner, conflict results; the
United States wins but pays a high price, while the Indians lose
in addition to paying a high price;
* if even one side is conciliatory, the parties reach a compromise;
* a party acting tough in negotiations, while the opposition is
conciliatory, obtains a larger share of the gains from trade.
The following table encapsulates the choices facing the parties
under these assumptions:
Indians
Tough Conciliatory
Tough 2,0 9,1
D Conciliatory 3, 7 5,5
(payoffs: U.S., Indians)
Figure 2
Note that fighting occurs only when both sides take a tough nego-
tiating stance, and if fighting occurs the deadweight losses consume
eighty percent of the gains from trade. In the other three cases, the
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parties will realize all the gains from trade; the only question is how
the parties will divide the spoils. The lower left and upper right en-
tries (one side tough, the other conciliatory) reflect the assumption
that even when conciliatory, neither side will take less in negotiations
than it will receive in the event of fighting. These two outcomes, the
minimal amount acceptable to each side, set the terms of trade between
the parties in this model of muscular economics. The lower right
payoffs (both sides conciliatory) must fall somewhere between the
lower left and the upper right.
As a first cut at solving this game, there are two strategy combina-
tions that are stable: the lower left and the upper right 3 If one side
could somehow convince the other that they intended to stick to a
tough bargaining stance, the other side's rational response is concilia-
ton (to avoid a costly war). The problem is forming a credible com-
mitment to such a strategy; each side knows that threats to engage in
warfare are irrational as long as a proffered compromise leaves the
threatening party with more than it receives after combat (two for the
United States; zero for the Indians). Thus (3,7) and (9,1) are plausi-
ble outcomes of this game, as is any pair in-between, for example
(4,6), (5,5), (6,4), and so on.
This wide range of possible outcomes is the defining characteristic
of the negotiating games discussed above and explains why, despite an
overwhelming military advantage, it was still worthwhile for the United
States to engage in all sorts of negotiating ploys to maximize its share
of the "gains from trade" while avoiding the waste of conflict. Bluff-
ing, "divide and conquer," and other ploys enabled the United States
to negotiate an outcome much closer to (9,1) than to (3,7). In addi-
tion to its bargaining advantages, the United States also had the ability
to effectively change the numbers in this game by spreading disease
among the Indians and thinning the game on which they relied. The
following Part explores these potent additions to the techniques used
by the United States to obtain Indian lands cheaply.
303 For both of these strategy combinations, neither party has incentives to change
its "move." Game theorists call such stable strategy combinations "Nash equilibria." See
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED EcoNoMisTs 8-9 (1992) (describing
Nash equilibria and explaining that each party's "predicted strategy must be that
[party's] best response to the predicted strategies of the other [parties]"-thus, imper-
fect information about the other party discourages each party from choosing its pre-
dicted move).
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D. Altering the Terms of Trade: NaturalAllies
Tfie Europeans' most powerful methods of altering the basic
terms of trade did not involve human action-warlike or otherwise-
but rather other life forms small and large brought across the ocean.
Microbes decimated Indian populations, reducing if not eliminating
their ability to defend their lands. European crops and domestic
animals displaced the forests and game animals that constituted an
important part of the Indians' food supply, rendering lands in the
neighborhood of settlement of little value to the tribes. This Part de-
tails the workings of disease and game-thinning; Part II.E shows how
legal rules maximized the effect of these natural allies by encouraging
and channeling settlement, and minimized potentially costly side-
effects the settlers might cause for their neighbors and the nation.
This Part will also try to determine whether legal rules that enhanced
these natural allies are best classified as Coasean, as Machiavellian, or,
like some of the negotiating ploys discussed above in Part II.B.2, as fal-
ling in a gray area between the two.
1. Depopulation by Disease
The pre-contact Indian population of North America was any-
where from one to eighteen million.3 Nowhere near even one hun-
dred thousand Indians died as the direct result of European vio-
lence s05 Even accepting lowest estimates and assuming that the
Indian population plateaued, the obvious question is, what killed all
the Indians?
Beyond peradventure, the answer is microbes. "The most potent
W4 "Current United States history textbooks illustratejust how far from settled [the
issue of Indian population] is: their estimates of aboriginal population in 1492 vary
from one to twelve million." John D. Daniels, The Indian Population of North America in
1492, 49 WM. & MARY Q. 298, 298 (1992); see also id. at 315 (citing Henry F. Dobyns's
estimate of aboriginal Indian populations circa 1492). Daniels cites estimates of up to
eighteen million, apparently not mentioned in the textbooks. Daniels's article, a care-
ful canvas of the literature, catalogs no less than 11 methods of estimating the early
Indian populations, from pure guesstimates, to count multiples (for example, taking
European reports on the number of warriors and multiplying by three to derive Indian
population), to determining carrying capacity (that is, assume population expanded to
use all food sources present and exploitable with the Indians' technology). See id. at
304-09 (describing the 11 methods within three broad groupings). Given the paucity
of data, more precise estimates appear impossible.
W5 See Russell, supra note 7, at 46-47 (estimating a total of 5172 Indian deaths due
to European violence-1172 from "massacres," 3000 from fights with the U.S. Army,
and 1000 from killings by civilians).
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weapon in the invasion of North America was not the gun, the horse,
the Bible, or European 'civilization.' It was pestilence, feared by all
and understood by none, that carried off untold tens of thousands...
,,306 "Of all the many organisms Europeans carried to America [in-
cluding themselves], none of them were more devastating to the Indi-
ans than the Old World diseases ....,,37 Smallpox and other eruptive
fevers were weapons "more effective, of greater range, of surer aim
than any rifle or poison gas ever devised. "SOs
In Europe, large numbers of domesticated animals relatively simi-
lar to humans (such as cows and pigs) created an environment in
which a host of microbes jumped the species barrier, mutated, and
became endemic. 9 While such diseases may have been initially devas-
tating, centuries of natural selection during which only those who sur-
vived, evidencing some resistance, produced offspring continuously
reduced the mortality rate among Europeans. Diseases such as small-
pox and measles reached an endemic equilibrium in Europe: large
populations created a continuous flow of children hosts for these mi-
crobes. Most of these children survived and were likely to produce
their own children who could also weather the diseases. 310
American Indians did not domesticate any animals except for
dogs, and hence did not accumulate any such microbes. Their rela-
tively sparse populations did not contain a large enough supply of
fresh, nonresistant children to maintain endemic diseases. The impli-
cations of this asymmetry were enormous. The Indians were immu-
nologically defenseless against European endemic diseases.1 1 Unlike
the Europeans, Indians at the time of contact had not benefited from
generations of natural selection-based resistance to the diseases;
therefore, the microbes routinely decimated Indian villages in
weeks. 
12
3W STEELE, supra note 204, at 22.
307 WIIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE
ECOLOGY OF NEw ENGLAND 85 (1983).
Sos COLONEL P.M. ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE
CONQUEST OF AMERICA 81 (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947).
s DIAMOND, supra note 255, at 195-214 (describing the link between livestock and
disease).
See generally id. at 201 ("[H]uman populations repeatedly exposed to a particu-
lar pathogen have come to consist of a higher proportion of individuals with those
genes for resistance-just because unfortunate individuals without the genes were less
likely to survive to pass their genes on to babies.").
See id. at 202-11 (discussing the spread of diseases and the effect of European
diseases on Indians).
312 For the same reason that they lacked defenses against European microbes (lack
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European colonists carried deadly microbes wherever they went.
Virginia colonists noticed epidemics as early as 1585, and by 1608, a
Jamestown settler reported a "strange mortalitie" affecting "a great
part of the [Indians]" in the Chesapeake Bay area.313 Smallpox may
have reached New England before the first permanent settlements;1
at any rate, within ten years of the Pilgrims' arrival in 1617, devastating
epidemics struck. "Mortality rates in initial onslaughts were rarely less
than eighty or ninety percent, and it was not unheard of for an entire
village to be wiped out. ... A long process of depopulation set in, ac-
companied by massive social and economic disorganization."
315
of large domestic animals, sparse population), Indians did not have the "offense" of
their own set of endemic microbes to infect Europeans. The only microbe that may
have originated in the New World and become epidemic among Europeans was syphi-
lis. See ARNO KARLEN, MAN & MICROBES: DIsEASE AND PLAGUES IN HISTORY AND
MODERN TIMES 121-28 (1995) (describing the possibility that syphilis arose in the New
World).
This is not to say that the Europeans faced no microbial barriers to settlement.
Malaria, for instance, was common along the Mississippi River in southern Illinois, ad-
joining the Illinois Company's southern tract, and this impeded settlement until
swamps were drained. See 1 CLARENCE WALWORTH ALVORD, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY IN
BRTISH POLITICS: A STUDY OF THE TRADE, LAND SPECULATION, AND EXPERIMENTS IN
IMPERIALISM CULMINATING N THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 416 (1959) (noting that the
prevalence of malaria had made Illinois an unhealthful place to live); ALBERT T.
VOLWILER, GEORGE CROGHAN AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, 1741-1782, at 198
(1926) (describing malaria as the "curse of Illinois"). William Murray, a field agent of
the United Companies, contracted the disease. See Marks, supra note 50, at 196 (not-
ing that William Murray, a trader and land speculator in Illinois, was stricken with ma-
laria fever). Infection and mortality rates for malaria, however, were minuscule com-
pared to those for smallpox and other endemic European diseases.
JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 23.
According to one original settler, Massachusetts colonists found large tracts of
land deserted, reportedly due to a "great mortality, which fell in all these parts about
three years before the coming of the English, wherein thousands of [Indians] died."
BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 87.
There is a heated debate among current scholars, however, about exactly when
European diseases reached the New England tribes. See Dean R. Snow & Kim M. Lan-
phear, European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First
Epidemics, 35 ETHNOHIST. 15, 17-24 (1988) (arguing that epidemics did not strike the
Northeast until the seventeenth century); see also Dean R. Snow & William A. Starna,
Sixteenth-Centuy Depopulation: A Viewfrom the Mohawk Valley, 91 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
142 (1989) (reaffirming that epidemics did not strike until after 1600).
315 CRONON, supra note 307, at 86. Cronon estimates that the Indian population of
New England fell from 70,000 in 1600 to less than 12,000 by 1675. "In some areas, the
decline was even more dramatic: New Hampshire and Vermont were virtually depopu-
lated as the western Abenaki declined from perhaps 10,000 to fewer than 500." Id. at
89. For a detailed history of the spread of smallpox and other epidemic diseases
among Indians, seeJOHN DuFky, EPIDEMICS IN COLONAL AMERICA 244 (1953) (discuss-
ing the impact of smallpox on the Indians during the colonial period); ANN F.
RAMENOFSKxy, VECrORS OF DEATH 171 (1987) (describing a study concluding that dis-
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After these initial devastating epidemics, the surviving Indians
were immune. Their children, however, were not always so lucky.
While being the product of one generation of natural selection for
immunity to the disease raised their odds of survival slightly, they re-
mained much more vulnerable than their European counterparts."'
Thus, in the early 1630s, about a generation after the epidemics of
1617, another outbreak decimated the Massachusetts Indians1
Whether infecting tribes for the first time or striking later generations,
microbes marched west in lock step with settlers. Smallpox ravaged
the Pequot of Connecticut in 1638318 soon after the British established
a trading post nearby; it hit the easternmost tribe of the Five Na-
tions-the Mohawk-a few years later, 19 and reached the westernmost
members of that confederation-the Seneca-by the 1660s.3 ° During
the 1690s, epidemics similarly marched west on the southern fron-
tier.32  As mentioned earlier in Part I.B, these epidemics reached the
Illinois region around 1680 and decimated the tribes from whom the
Illinois and Wabash Companies purchased their lands. Future gen-
erations of the Illinois and Wabash tribes remained susceptible to epi-
demics; in 1793, negotiations with the Wabash tribes had to be can-
celed "because many of the principal Wabash chiefs had died of
ease was "the most important single factor in the demographic catastrophe of Native
Americans"); and E. WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX
ON THE DEsTINE OF THE AMERINDIAN 13 (1945) (describing the disastrous impact the
arrival of smallpox had on the Indian population).
1 SeeHENRYF. DOByNs, THEIR NUMBERBECOME THINNED 14 (1983).
317 The colonists interpreted the epidemics' much greater impact on the Indians as
divine intervention. "About [1631] the Indians began to be quarrelsome about [colo-
nists' encroachments], but God ended the Controversy by sending the Small-pox
amongst the Indians ... Whole Towns of them were swept away, in some of them not
so much as one Soul escaping the Destruction." INCREASE MATHER, EARLYHISTORY OF
NEW ENGLAND 110 (1864 ed. private printing) (1677); see also BRADFORD, supra note
254, at 271 ("The chief sachem himself now died and almost all his friends and kin-
dred. But by the marvelous goodness and providence of God, not one of the English
was so much as sick or in the least measure tainted with this disease....").
318 See STEELE, supra note 204, at 89 ("The Pequot, thought to have numbered
some thirteen thousand, were reduced to a mere three thousand.").
319 See id. at 115 ("The Mohawk were suddenly devastated by the massive smallpox
epidemic that struck all the Five Nations and the New England Algonquions in
1633 .... Of a population of some eighty-one hundred, only two thousand Mohawk
survived this initial epidemic.").
320 See id. at 117 ("Being farther inland, [the Seneca] had suffered less than the
Mohawk in the [small pox] epidemics of the 1630s, though theywould be harder hit in
the 1660s.").
321 See id. at 153 ("[C]ontact with the English brought epidemic disease; the Creek
[a southern Indian confederacy] population fell by 40 percent to nine thousand dur-
ing the 1690s.").
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smallpox."'22
While Europeans practiced the ancient art of inoculation and de-
veloped a smallpox vaccine in 179 6,73 they possessed limited knowl-
edge of infectious diseases. It is improbable that they attempted to
employ biological warfare and almost certain that such efforts would
have failed. In a widely-cited letter, British General Amherst asked a
subordinate whether it "[c] ould... be contrived to send the Small Pox
among those disaffected tribes of Indians," and proposed spreading
smallpox via blankets planted with pustules from soldiers with the dis-
ease. 24 No historical evidence indicates that the British attempted
this, 325 and while possible, it is very difficult for smallpox residing in
blankets to spread.
Although the Europeans could not control their microbial allies,
the Indians, suffering again from radically imperfect information, may
have thought otherwise. Squanto, a New England Indian who coop-
erated with the settlers, convinced his fellow Indians that the colonists
"kept the plague buried in the ground, and could send it amongst
whom they would, which did much terrify the Indians. 26 The Wa-
bash tribes in 1800 worried "that the United States intended to de-
stroy them by means of the small pox, which was to be communicated
to them by the goods which they received from [the Europeans]."
2 7
Thus even though disease was a serendipitous ally, Indian overestima-
tion of European power to employ disease as a weapon may have tilted
the already favorable terms of trade even further in the colonists' fa-
vor.
A different kind of disease played a similar role in weakening
tribal resistance to bargain-basement offers for their lands: alcohol-
ism. Just as they had no genetic defenses against smallpox, so too In-
dians had never been exposed to fermented beverages and were
S22 PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 91.
323 Inoculation, practiced around the world for centuries, involves inserting infec-
tious material underneath the skin; for some diseases this results in a weak case of the
illness, thereby conferring immunity. SeeDUFF', supra note 315, at 24. EdwardJenner
derived the first vaccination, for smallpox, in 1796. See i. at 26-42.
324 2 FRANCIS PARKMAN, CONSPIRACY OF PONTIAC AND THE INDIAN WAR AFTER THE
CONQUEST OF CANADA 44 (1929).
32 See Bernhard Knollenberg, General AmIh et and Germ Warfare, 41 MISS. VALLEY
HIsT. REV. 489, 494 (1954) (rejecting earlier historical analyses and concluding that
while Amherst and others may have had the intent to spread smallpox, "execution of
the intent is not supported even by circumstantial evidence").
32 BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 99.
327 DAwsON, supra note 225, at 14-15 (quoting Letter from Major-General William
Henry Harrison, to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn (Feb. 19, 1802)).
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equally defenseless to alcohol addiction.
Alcohol held a special place in the history of tribal disintegration....
Without the startling finality of smallpox, it set in train the process of
lingering devastation that not only wore on the physical health of the na-
tives but attacked the very coherence of their social order. In epidemic
force it ravaged tribe after tribe until the drunken, reprobate Indian be-
came a fixture in American folklore."'
While the colonies and later the nation passed numerous laws to
regulate or ban the liquor trade, these proved no more effective than
the laws that attempted to regulate the sale of weapons to the tribes.
The Europeans never devoted significant resources to stemming the
flow of liquor to the Indians, and they continually worried about the
adverse economic consequences of barring trade of a good in such
high demand.32
2. Game-Thinning
Even with the advantages of Indian alcoholism, vulnerability to
disease, and inferior military technology, the Spanish, as noted by de
Tocqueville, were "unable to exterminate the Indian race by those
unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor
did they succeed even in wholly depriving it of its rights.'030 The
Americans, despite resorting less often to atrocities, did manage to
deprive the Indians of their rights, virtually exterminating them. The
difference between the two colonial methods was simple: the Ameri-
cans engaged in widespread agricultural settlement; the Spanish gen-
erally did not. As a result, "[s]ettlers, who ultimately would prove to
be the most effective conquerors of North America, were by far the
weakest of the ... elements" in Spain's invasion of the New World.33'
Chief Justice Marshall adverted to the most important harmful ef-
fect of such settlement in the M'Intosh opinion itself: "As the white
population advanced, that of the Indians necessarily receded. The
country in the immediate neighborhood of agriculturists became unfit
for them. The game fled into thicker and more unbroken forests, and
the Indians followed."5 2 Although many eastern tribes engaged in
328 BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF ExTINCnON: JEFFERSONIAN PHILANTHROPY
AND THE A N INDIAN 232 (1973).
329 See PRU cHA, supra note 6, at 102-38 (describing the often ineffective attempts to
control the trade of whiskey to the Indians).
330 DE TOCQUEvILLE, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
351 STEELE, supra note 204, at 29-30.
332 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590-91 (1823).
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small-scale agriculture, raising corn, beans, and squash, they still de-
pended on the hunt for a significant portion of their diet (as well as
for clothing, tools, and other essentials). Chancellor Kent, writing
only a decade after the opinion, presciently forecast the result of the
settlers' systematic clearing of Indian game habitats: "[T]he Indians
of this continent appear to be destined, at no very distant period of
time, to disappear with those vast forests which once covered the
country, and the existence of which seems essential to their own."M
Agriculture and husbandry reduced wild animal populations in
three ways. First and foremost, clearing land for planting reduced
forested habitat acre for acre. Second, Europeans themselves hunted
game at a prodigious rate, often only for skins. m Third, European
domestic livestock, the product of natural selection in crowded envi-
ronments, successfully competed against the wild animals of the New
World.rn Cronon summed up these effects on the once abundant
deer population of New England: "Deer were threatened by changes
in their habitat, augmented numbers of hunters, and competition
from domestic livestock."m
The effect on game in New England was rapid and severe. "Mas-
sachusetts enforced its first closed season on [deer] hunting in 1694,
and in 1718 all hunting of them was forbidden for a closed term of
three years. By the 1740s, a series of 'deer reeves'-early game war-
33 KENT'S CoMMENTARIEs, supra note 46, at *400.
Sm In 1801, William Henry Harrison noted that Kentuckians crossed the Ohio
every fall to hunt deer, bear, and buffalo in the Indiana Territory (still Indian land at
the time). "One white hunter will destroy more game than five of the common Indi-
ans-the latter generally contenting himself with a sufficiency for present subsis-
tance-while the other eager after game hunt for the skin of the animal alone." Letter
from William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, to Henry Dearborn,
Secretary of War (July 15, 1801), in MESSAGES & LETTERS OF WILIAm HENRY
HARRISON, supra note 82, at 27. "The Shawnee complained in 1802 that 'at present
they kill more than we do[.] They would be angry if we were to kill a cow or a hog of
theirs, the little game that remains is very dear to us.'" SHEEHAN, supra note 328, at
222.
Contributing to the destruction of game stocks, Indians began to kill greater num-
bers of deer and other large herbivores and take only their valuable hides. "They no
longer killed primarily for sustenance.... [T] his new prodigality left the forest strewn
with skinned carcasses fed upon by packs of wolves." Id.
"Old World livestock, which had evolved in what seemingly had been a rougher
league than that of the New World, often outfought, outran, or at least outreproduced
American predators." ALFRED W. CROSBY, GERMS, SEEDS & ANIMALS: STUDIES IN
ECOLOGICALHISTORY 10 (1994). "[T]he advancing European frontier from New Eng-
land to the Gulf of Mexico was preceded into Indian territory by an avant-garde of
semiwild herds of hogs and cattle...." Id. at 33.
3M CRONON, supra note 307, at 101.
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dens-were regulating the deer hunt, but to little avail."03 7 By 1672,
wild turkey and other game birds were virtually extinct.3m Local tribes
felt the squeeze less than forty years after the Pilgrims arrived.
[O]ur fathers had plenty of deer and skins, our plains were full of deer,
as also our woods, and of turkies, and our coves full of fish and fowl. But
these English having gotten our land, they with scythes cut down the
grass, and with axes fell the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass,
and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved.
3 9
In a little over a century and a half, the process was complete.
The Mohegan Indians, in a 1789 petition for charity from the Con-
necticut legislature, lamented that "in Times past, our Fore-Fathers
lived in Peace, Love, and great harmony, and had everything in Great
plenty.... But alas, it is not so now, all our Fishing, Hunting and
Fowling is entirely gone. ,
340
New England in 1800 was far different from the land the earliest Euro-
pean visitors had described.... Large areas particularly of southern New
England were now devoid of animals which had once been common:
beaver, deer, bear, turkey, wolf, and others had vanished. In their place
were hordes of European grazing animals .... ,34
Destruction of game stocks had little adverse impact on the settlers
who relied on domestic, not wild, animals for food and byproducts.
The same story played itself out on other frontiers. In 1796,
George Washington reminded the "beloved" Cherokee "that the game
with which your woods once abounded, are growing scarce. "M In
1820, Andrew Jackson cited the total absence of game in counseling
the Choctaws to remove to lands west of the Mississippi.m In the 1809
537 Id. A leader of Plymouth Plantation, discussing events preceding the First
Thanksgiving, noted how in the colonists' first autumn they "began to come in store of
fowl, as winter approached, of which this place did abound when they came first (but
afterward decreased by degrees)." BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 90.
ss CRONON, supra note 307, at 100 (quotingJohnjosselyn as stating, "tis very rare
to meet with a wild turkie in the woods").
339 STEELE, supra note 204, at 94 (quoting Miantonomi, Chief of the Narragansett,
Speech at Montauk (1642)).
340 CRONON, supra note 307, at 107 (citing Harry Quaduaquid & Robert Ashpo,
Statement to the Most Honourable Assembly of the State of Connecticut (May 14,
1789)).
341 Id. at 159.
sL President George Washington, Talk to the Cherokee Nation (Aug. 29, 1796),
reprinted in GEORGE WASEINGTON: A COLLECION 645 (William B. Allen ed., 1988).
s4s See Rx.2ttNI, supra note 207, at 394 (contrasting land "abounding in game of all
kinds" west of the Mississippi with the land east of the Mississippi where "game is de-
stroyed").
EXPROPRIATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
negotiations with the Piankashaws for lands overlapping the United
Companies' claims as the frontier moved westward from Ohio,
Harrison reminded the Indians that "[t]here was but little game left
on the proposed tracts.'4 The adverse effect of the decimation of
Great Plains buffalo on western tribes is well-documented4
5
From the nation's foundation, American leaders relied on the ef-
fect of European agriculture and husbandry on Indian game animals
to shape policy. In an extremely influential letter, General Schuyler
advised Congress to avoid expensive wars and to instead wait for na-
ture to take its course.
[Als our settlements approach their country, they must, from the scarcity
of game, which that approach will induce to, retire farther back, and
dispose of their lands, unless they dwindle comparatively to nothing, as
all savages have done, who gain their sustenance by the chase, when
compelled to live in the vicinity of civilized people, and thus leave us the
country without the expence of a purchase, trifling as that will probablybe.'
6 r
Washington whole-heartedly concurred, emphasizing the econ-
omy of letting settlers instead of soldiers dislodge the Indians.
[T]he Indians as has been observed in Genl Schuylers Letter will ever re-
treat as our Settlements advance upon them and they will be as ready to
sell, as we are to buy; That it is the cheapest as well as the least distressing
way of dealing with them, none who are acquainted with the Nature of
Indian warfare, and has ever been at the trouble of estimating the ex-
pence of one, and comparing it with the cost of purchasing their Lands,
will hesitate to acknowledge.
This view became orthodoxy among policymakers. In 1789, the
Secretary of War, who was responsible for Indian affairs, "reasoned
that as the settlers advanced toward the line between the whites and
redmen's hunting grounds, the game upon which the natives relied so
Smith, supra note 37, at 225.
See generally PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 182 (1987) ("[T]he Plains Indian way of life
rested on the abundance of buffalo; the hide trade was the most direct way to make
them a 'dying race.'").
M Letter from General Schuyler to Congress (July 29, 1783), in 3 PAPERS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, microformed on Nat'l Archives Film M-247, Fiche
173, at 593, 603:153 (National Archives Microfilm Publ.).
47 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in WnrnINGS
OF WASmNGTON, supra note 292, at 136 (emphasis added). In the same letter, Wash-
ington similarly argued that "the gradual extension of our Settlements will as certainly
cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho' they differ in
shape." Id. at 140.
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heavily retreated. The result was to be that new purchases could then
be made for small considerations."" 8
Even the disastrous defeats of Generals Harmar and St. Clair in
the early 1790s did not shake the Administration's belief that, come
what may, settlers would inevitably push the Indians off their lands.
When they promised to respect the Illinois and Wabash tribes' rights
in their land,
[n] either Knox nor Washington had any real reason to think they were
risking much by giving a guarantee of Indian land, for both of them had
already expressed the view that a boundary line would never prove per-
manent as white settlement pressed up to the boundary. The Indians
would either be exterminated, retire, or would easily yield land which
was no longer useful to them. 
9
They hoped for, and received, a military victory by General Wayne
at Fallen Timbers in 1794, but they apparently did not view this as
necessary to continued expropriation of Indian lands.
Game-thinning rendered lands less valuable to the tribes and thus
made them simultaneously less willing to fight for the land and more
willing to sell it cheaply. The Indians "most chearfull" acceded to a re-
quested cession to indemnify victims of wartime depredations since
the land in question "was now of no use to them, for Hunting
Ground." 0 By contrast, the Shawnees fought so ferociously for Ken-
tucky, as noted in M'Intosh, because "they often hunted [there] and
they did not intend to have their supply of game disturbed."15 1
Based on this economic consideration, the pace of the westward
expansion of settlements set the pace for land purchases, for it was
unnecessary and expensive to buy the still-valuable virgin forests the
Indians valued highly.
The purchase will be as easy made at any future period as at this time.
Indians having no ideas of wealth, and their numbers always lessening in
the neighbourhood of our Settlements, their claims for compensation
will likewise be diminished; and besides that, fewer will remain to be
M Bayard, supra note 220, at 49.
49 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 95.
&W ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 31, (quoting letter from George Croghan, Deputy
Agent to Col. WilliamJohnson, to Benjamin Franklin (Dec. 12, 1765)).
351 Id. at 98. In M'Tntosh, Marshall reflected on Kentucky as "a country, every acre
of which was then claimed and possessed by Indians, who maintained their title with as
much persevering courage as was ever manifested by any people." Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 586 (1823).
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gratified, the game will be greatly reduced, and lands destitute of game
will, by hunters, be lightly esteemed.
Similarly, the Indian agent at Fort Wayne in 1809 advised against
pressure tactics to gain further cessions. He assured his superiors
"that Indian lands would be easily obtainable at the proper time when
they were no longer needed as hunting grounds. In the past, this
condition had coincided with the needs of the espanding [sic] white
settlements."353
3. Understanding the Economic Impact of Game-Thinning
While the effect of disease on the terms of trade between Ameri-
cans and the tribes is clear,"54 the effect of game-thinning requires fur-
ther explication via an analogy. Consider two neighbors, a farmer and
an industrialist who wishes to acquire the farmer's land. The farmer's
land is uniquely valuable to the industrialist as part of a planned ex-
pansion. These parties are in a bilateral monopoly, like the ships Dis-
tress and Rescuer in the earlier hypothetical or the United States and
the Indian tribes.1 Assume that the industrialist is willing to pay up
to $200,000 for the farm, while the farmer will settle for nothing less
than $100,000. The parties will then fight over the division of gains,
since any price between these two extremes leaves both better off.
Now add a twist: the industrialist's everyday acts decrease the
value of the land to the fanner (for example, smoke partially blocks
the sun, stunts crop growth, and adversely affects animal health). The
farmer will then be willing to sell out for less, say $50,000. This does
not guarantee that the industrialist will get the property for $50,000 or
even for less than $100,000-if the farmer knows that the industrialist
is willing to pay $200,000 and is an adept bargainer, she may get a
price near the top of the range and garner most of the gains from
trade. All else equal, however, the industrialist is likely to get the land
for less if she can reduce its value to the farmer. The range of mutu-
ally beneficially outcomes has expanded by fifty percent, and every
point in the expansion favors the industrialist.
5 HORSmAN, supra note 90, at 100, (quoting Letter from Col. Timothy Pickering
to Rufus King, Congressman from Massachusetts (June 1, 1785), in 1 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUs KING 105 (Charles R. King ed., 1894)).
Bayard, supra note 220, at 277.
35 Reductions in the Indian populations eroded their ability to inflict military
losses and thus strengthened the United States's bargaining position.
35 See supra Part lI.B.2 (illustrating bilateral monopolies using an example from
marine salvage).
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The common law of nuisance provides a remedy for such negative
externalities, allowing the farmer either to bar the industrialist's
smoke-spewing or at least to collect damages.5 The distinction be-
tween injunctive relief and damages is usually important in nuisance
cases: injunctive relief forces a polluter with a higher-value activity to
bargain with others and perhaps share some of the surplus, while lim-
iting plaintiffs to damages in effect allows a polluter to condemn a
neighbor's use and enjoyment at the market value of the neighbor's357
use. When the polluter wants title to the neighbors' land, however,
even damages prevent the polluter from improving her bargaining
position by the effects her activity has on her neighbor. Properly cal-
culated, damages will make the farmer whole again, and thus she will
drop her suit against the industrialist and sell her the property only
for $100,000 or more.
A similar analysis applies if one replaces the farmer with the Indi-
ans, the industrialist with the United States, and smoke with the game-
thinning that resulted from approaching settlement. By devaluing the
Indians' hunting grounds, the United States significantly increased
the range of favorable outcomes in its bargaining game with the Indi-
ans, and hence the odds of buying Indian lands cheaply. The Indians,
of course, had no nuisance-like remedy for the negative external ef-
fect that neighboring settlements had on the land they retained.
Game-thinning reduced the value of land to the tribes and thus tilted
the odds yet further in favor of the United States in the process of
bargaining for Indian land. While settlement and the game-thinning
that necessarily followed are not classical expropriating acts like some
of the bargaining techniques discussed above in Part II.B.2, they fall in
a gray area between expropriation and voluntary exchange. The
United States obtained land more cheaply based in part on negative
external effects that the nation would not have tolerated among its
own citizens.
M It is assumed here that the harm to the farmer arises as a necessary side effect of
productive activity by the industrialist. If the industrialist engaged in acts otherwise
legal, solely for the purpose of harming her neighbor, the common law would provide
the farmer powerful remedies against such unproductive (indeed, counterproductive)
activity. See generally POSNER, supra note 163, § 6.15 ("Intentional Torts") (characteriz-
ing intentional torts that resemble common law crimes as coerced or forced transfers
of wealth leading to economic waste and arguing that legal policy should be and has
been more willing to award punitive damages in such cases).
357 The classic discussion contrasting damages (liability rules) and injunctions
(property rules) is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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E. Altering the Terms of Trade: Legal Rules to Attract
Settlers and Deal with Externalities
1. Attracting and Rewarding Settlers
a. The Economics of Attracting and Rewarding Settlers
To the extent the federal government discouraged, or at least did
not actively encourage, settlement on the frontier, it would be difficult
to charge the nation with engaging in quasi-expropriative acts against
the Indians. The United States, however, was not passive. The gov-
ernment enacted laws that encouraged settlement on the distant,
dangerous frontier. The need for settlers was obvious. Via the discov-
ery doctrine, the MYntosh rule, and the ability to extinguish Indian
claims cheaply, the United States had claims to virtually limitless acres.
Yet frontier land, unlike a prime address in Manhattan today or gold
since recorded history, had no established market; it was valuable only
to the extent that the nation could attract buyers.
At first blush, it seems unclear why America needed legal incen-
tives to spur land purchases. There was a large pool of potential buy-
ers, both domestic and foreign,m and combined with the millions of
acres available, it would seem conditions were ripe for an active mar-
ket to emerge, with price adjusting to equilibrate the costs and bene-
fits of moving to the frontier. There were, however, two prominent
market failures that would have led to inefficiently low amounts of
frontier settlement in the absence of some sort of governmental inter-
vention.
First, settlers were better off coordinating their migrations (for
stronger defense, more concentrated spreading of disease, and thin-
ning game), but had difficulty doing so on a large scale privately. In
addition to helping coordinate activity, the government helped deal
with what is known as a network externality.35 9 Just as one of the main
M See generaUy SOSIN, supra note 225, at 23 ("Early marriage was the rule; and the
birthrate among women of child-bearing age was exceptionally high in colonial Amer-
ica. In many colonies the population doubled every generation."). In addition, the
desire to attract land purchasers played a role in the colonies' and the nation's open-
door immigration policies. SeeE. WMHLARD MILLER & RUBYM. MILER, UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3-4 (1996) (tracing the development of U.S.
immigration policy from 1607 until the early 1800s).
The term "network externality" seems to have been coined in Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424,
424 (1985) ("[T]he utility that a given user derives from [a] good depends upon the
number of other users who are in the same 'network' as is he or she. The scope of the
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attributes that makes a computer operating system like Windows 95 s6
valuable is the simple fact that many others use it (making skills trans-
ferable, software cheaper based on volume, etc.), so too, settlement
on the frontier became safer and more economically attractive as the
number of other settlers increased. The government not only needed
to coordinate behavior, it needed to overcome a natural inertia: no-
body wanted to be among the first on the frontier, bearing the greater
risks. The government was also in a unique position to supply settlers
with information about the safety and suitability for agriculture of
various regions.
Second, settlers produced a host of positive external effects. As
suggested in the previous paragraph and in Part II.D, the first settlers
in a region spread disease and thinned game, reducing the value of
neighboring lands to the Indians. This helped the nation purchase
land cheaply and raised the value of nearby lands significantly. A
Congressman expressed the western attitude by arguing that even
squatters performed a service by improving the lands and increasing
the value of neighboring tracts.36' The government's policy of reserv-
ing one section, "section 16," in the rectangular survey of each tract of
land stemmed from a belief that the land would become more valu-
able after the first wave of settlers established themselves.362
In addition to enhancing the value of land in their immediate
neighborhood, new settlers made land on the previous frontier less
dangerous and hence more valuable. Squatters argued this point ex-
plicitly, noting that "[t]hey had served as buffers in the recent war
against the Indians, and their sacrifices had assured the safety of the
towns and larger plantations [further east]."3
These and perhaps other external effects seem to explain the
"'opinion that the Improving and cultivating the Land in Pennsylvania
is a General Interest and Credit to the Province in Part as well as to the la-
network that gives rise to the consumption externalities will vary across markets."). For
recent applications of the concept to legal problems, see Michael Klausner, Corpora-
lions, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 763 (1995).
3W Windows 95 is a trademark of the Microsoft Corporation.
3 See Letter from Congressman John McLean to James Monroe, Secretary of State
(Jan. 19, 1816), reprinted in 8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS (1956), supra note 31, at 378-74
(1939) (arguing that a squatter "selects a valuable spot and renders it, (and the adjoin-
ing lands), more valuable by improvement").
3 The New England tradition of "the reservation of section 16 in every township
'for the maintenance of public schools within said township'" became part of Federal
landjolicy. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEvELOpmzNT 65 (1968).
ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 110 (emphasis added).
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boring man that gets his living upon the Improvements.'" 3" The
problem with these benefits is that they did not inure to those creat-
ing them. Inability to award positive external effects to the source of
the benefit leads to socially suboptimal outcomes: individuals will not
engage in the efficient level of an activity for which some of the bene-
fits end up in others' pockets.
If seller can somehow capture the positive external effects created
by buyers, then competition will drive the price they charge down in
order to internalize the benefits. In land sales, the recipients of the
settlers' "services" were a broad class of other Americans, from those
on the previous frontier who found themselves on safer and hence
more valuable land, to all citizens whose direct or indirect tax burden
would fall as western lands became more valuable and productive.
The United States, then, could encourage the efficient level of settle-
ment by discounting frontier lands below the market-clearing level.
By offering land at a discount to settlers, the government encouraged
more purchases by settlers. The taxpaying population, beneficiaries
of the settlers' activities, would pay for this subsidy.
There was a long tradition of land subsidy measures in colonial
times. American policy after the Revolution evolved from trying to
charge relatively high prices (to pay off Revolutionary War debt) to
offering land at lower prices, to including favorable financing terms,
to permitting preemption (squatters' rights), and finally to outright
giveaways (the Homestead Acts).
Before reaching these "discounting" policies, however, a number
of legal rules that solved the coordination problem and enhanced the
United States's natural advantages (disease and game-thinning) will
AMELIA CLmwLEY FORD, COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF OUR NATIONAL LAND
SYSTEM As IT EXIsTED IN 1800, at 133 (Univ. of Wis. Bull. No. 352, 1910) (quoting a
Pennsylvania surveyor writing in 1738) (emphasis added). Squatters in Maine invoked
similar logic, arguing that "the opening of Wilderness and turning the Desert Into
Wheatfields, while it Supports Individuals, is of great advantage to the publick." I& at
134-35.
For an interesting example, see IAN AYRES & STEVEN D. LEVITT, MEASURING
PosrnvE EXTERNALTIES FROM UNOBSERVABLE VICTIM PRECAUTION: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF LOJACK (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5928,
1997), available at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W5928> (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
(demonstrating that prevalence of hidden auto anti-theft devices in a given region de-
ters car theft in general, so that purchasers of such devices confer positive external ef-
fect on non-purchasers). Lojack, and services rendered by settlers, are examples of
"mixed" goods, for which there is both private and public demand. See RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-55
(5th ed. 1989) (discussing costs and benefits of goods that serve both individuals and
groups).
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be considered. Encouraging compact settlements served dual pur-
poses: it solved the coordination problem by channeling settlers to
those tracts the government surveyed and sold, and it concentrated,
via relatively quick mass migrations, the effects of disease and game-
thinning. Colonies and the United States had a long tradition of en-
hancing defenses by settling soldiers on the frontier. Requiring im-
provements, especially clearing of land, facilitated game-thinning.
Large-scale land speculation, like that undertaken by the United
Companies, undermined many of these advantages and hence laws
generally disallowed it.
b. Legal Rules to Attract and Reward Settlers
This Part explains how some of the most important statutes of the
early Republic, from the rectangular survey system to land sale financ-
ing, preemption acts, and homesteading, all played a role in efficiently
expropriating Indian lands.
i. Compactness and the Rectangular Survey System
Attempts to keep settlement compact, especially in New England,
date back almost to the beginning of colonization.
[T] o every person was given only one acre of land, to them and theirs, as
near the town as might be; and they had no more till the seven years
were expired. The reason was that'they might be kept close together,
both for more safety and defense, and the better improvement of the
general employments.366
This continued to be official policy for the next century, until the In-
dians had been all but eliminated from the region.
The necessity of "preserving a regular face to the frontiers" and of safe-
guarding sites for future towns caused the Massachusetts general court to
begin to insist on contiguity. In addition, the needs of defence brought
about the new plan of granting several townships simultaneously, to be
located on the frontier. In 1713 the [Massachusetts legislature] resolved
that it was for "Her Majesties Service [that] there be some Townships
regularly Planted and Setled in the most Defensible manner, in [various
outlying areas] .
Similar considerations motivated the British when they took over
western policy from the colonies. In drawing a line between the races
366 BRADFORD, supra note 254, at 145.
7 FoaD, supra note 364, at 30 (internal citations omitted).
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in the Proclamation of 1763, Sir William Johnson wanted to encour-
age "thick settlement of the Frontiers" and to "oblige the Proprietors
of large grants to get them Inhabited."' London rejected an earlier
scheme to set up a colony in Illinois because it "had determined on
the gradual expansion of the settlements westward," and Illinois was
then far from the frontier.369
Although the nation did not ultimately adopt the highly organized
approach of settling the frontier only in complete townships, the land
sales regime generally followed the contiguous approach, selecting
blocks of land for settlement and requiring surveys before sales.
The United States was concerned [all along the frontier] about the or-
derly advance of white settlement. It wanted to open lands adjacent to
the established settlements and to discourage wide scattering of the
whites to areas far distant, and the extinguishment of Indian titles by
treaty proceeded pretty much in this fashion.
370
The lynchpin of this orderly advance was the rectangular survey
system.37' By refusing to sell land, and later refusing to recognize pre-
emption (squatter) rights, before an area had been surveyed, the
United States government exercised significant control over when set-
tlers went to the frontier and where they went. Controlled, contigu-
ous, concentrated land rushes into predesignated areas conferred a
number of advantages in expropriating Indian lands at least cost.
They enhanced the spread of endemic diseases and thinned game
rapidly. Compact settlement made defending the frontier cheaper.
Finally, the rectangular survey system, by channeling settlers at a given
time to a few, select regions on the extensive frontier, solved their co-
ordination problem and provided them, at low cost, with valuable in-
formation.
To illustrate this last point, consider a family contemplating mi-
gration to one of two frontier locations; call the two possibilities Illi-
nois and Alabama. For all the reasons discussed above, they would
like to go where everyone else is going. Yet the costs of communicat-
ing among thousands of families and coordinating their decisions
s PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 14.
M9 ALVORD, supra note 312, at 322 (emphasis added).
370 PRUcHA, supra note 205, at 146 (emphasis added).
371 Bouquet, a British general, laid much of the foundation for the rectangular sur-
vey system in his design for a land system to help control the frontier. SeeFORD, supra
note 364, at 37-38, 53 ("[His plan] shows a British officer studying settlement under
frontier conditions, and reaching the same conclusion in theory as pioneers a decade
or so later, worked out in practice under the same conditions.").
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would be prohibitive. In the absence of effective communication,
each family faced the dilemma illustrated by Figure 3.
Every Other Family
Illinois Alabama
Illinois 10, 10 2, 2
Alabama 2, 2 10, 10
Payoffs: (Each Family, Every Other Family)
Figure 3
The payoffs in Figure 3 are somewhat arbitrary; they merely reflect
that the settlers are better off together than apart. Unable to com-
municate in advance, the families are effectively playing a guessing
game and have only a fifty percent chance of ending up in the same
area.3 If the total number of settlers wishing to migrate is sufficient
to defend effectively, spread disease, and thin game in only one re-
gion, having half the group migrate to Illinois and the other half to
Alabama is not an efficient way to extinguish Indian claims. The gov-
ernment can solve this problem by opening up settlement first in one
region, say Illinois, and then, after Illinois is sufficiently populated,
surveying and opening up Alabama.
Assume in addition that Illinois is safer than Alabama. This would
change the payoffs in the upper left comer to, say, (15, 15). One of
the cheapest ways for the government to communicate this to mi-
grants is simply to open up Illinois lands first. It need not attempt ac-
tually to notify potential settlers about the disadvantages of other re-
gions; it can simply refuse to sell land until the region is the most
advantageous place for settlement. These appear to have been the
motivations for the facets of the rectangular survey system and the
"orderly" advance of the frontier described above.
The United States rejected the competing system of "indiscrimi-
372 This scenario is often called a "coordination game," indicating that the only
thing the parties need to do in order to maximize their payoffs is to coordinate their
choices; there is no inherent conflict created by the payoffs. See ERIC RASMUSEN,
GAMES & INFORMATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1994), for a description of coordination games.
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nate location" prevalent in the South, where purchasers received the
right to select a given number of acres anywhere in a colony, as long
as there was no preexisting claim. The problem with indiscriminate
location was that "good lands, especially the river bottoms, were taken
up rapidly. Newcomers pushed farther and farther into the wilderness
in search of good lands without bothering about the nearer but sec-
ond-rate stretches. Thus, new regions quickly became dotted with
widely scattered and often unconnected settlements. "31 This created
four disadvantages relative to compact settlement in extinguishing In-
dian claims at low cost. First, scattered settlement thinned game and
spread disease less effectively in a given region than compact settle-
ment. Second, it left unsolved the coordination problem among set-
tlers who would benefit from migrating to the same area as other set-
tlers but would have a difficult time coordinating the joint migration
themselves. Third, dispersed settlers were less able to defend them-
selves and hence more reliant on the military services of the govern-
ment. 7 4 Finally, scattered settlement left the government with less
valuable reserved lands, making it more difficult to subsidize the ini-
tial settlers and recoup the positive externalities by selling neighbor-
ing lands later at a higher price.3s '
The government's belief that land prices would rise rapidly in the
aftermath of settlement explains in part the reservation of section 16
of each township from sale, a practice dating back to colonial times.37 6
S7 Rudolf Freund, Military Bounty Lands and the Origins of the Public Domain, 20
AGiRcuLTuRAL HJsT. 8, 12 (1946).
374 A contemporary commentator cataloged the military advantages of compact
settlement over indiscriminate surveys:
This method will push our settlements out in close columns, much less assail-
able by the enemy, and more easily defended, than extensive, thin popula-
tions; there will be people here for defense near the frontiers; they will have the
inducements of a near interest to animate them to the service; their course of
life and acquaintance with the country will render them much morefit for the
service, than people drawn from the interior parts of the country; and the
necessary force may be collected and put into action much quikei, and with
much less expense, than if the same was drawn from distant parts.
WEBSTER, supra note 297, at 493.
As a matter of economics, it might seem that a government selling under the indis-
criminate survey system could have accepted a lower price in return for requiring its
widely-scattered settlers to defend themselves. As discussed infra Part ll.E.2, however,
any government that wanted to sell frontier lands needed to foster a reputation for
protecting its settlers.
Such lures were efficient given the positive external effects of settlement.
376 The Penns, proprietors of Pennsylvania, "reserved [land] in order to secure the
unearned increment [from development]." VOLWI.ER, supra note 312, at 238. Maine
landowners reserved every third lot, also hoping to sell later when positive externalities
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Charging a higher price later for these reserved sections enabled the
government to charge lower prices to the first settlers. Offering a dis-
count to early settlers may have been necessary to counteract higher
costs incurred by those first settling a frontier. Consider the following
scenario:
Potential Early
Settlers
stay put o frontier
Potential Later Potential Later
Settlers Settlers
stay put move to frontier ta put \ move to frontier
( 0 , ) 0 
( 0 ,-1 0 ) ( 
-1 0 ,0 )
Payoffs: (early settlers, later settlers)
Figure 4
If nobody moves, there are no losses but also no gains, illustrated
by the (0, 0) payoff on the left. Those who move first to the frontier
face greater risks, more distant markets, and a host of other costs.
Early settlers will not recoup these costs if nobody follows them, as
shown by the (0, -10) and (-10, 0) payoffs in the middle two entries.
Finally, early settlers recoup only part of their losses if others follow,
while the later settlers reap a windfall by taking advantage of the pio-
neering done by their predecessors, demonstrated by the (-5, 25) en-
try on the right.
Facing these choices and making individualized self-interested de-
cisions, the parties would both stay put. The potential early settlers do
better if they stay put regardless of what potential later settlers might
decide. Once the early settlers decide to stay home, the potential later
settlers have no incentive to incur the costs of being the first ones on
the frontier. The problem is that the outcome reached, (0, 0), is
clearly suboptimal: the parties maximize their joint wealth by both
moving to the frontier.
made the unsold parcels more valuable. See FoRD, supra note 364, at 101 (discussing
this practice as used in Augusta, Maine). As discussed supra note 70, the expectations
must have been that land prices would rise faster than the risk-adjusted rate of interest.
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One obvious way to solve this dilemma, side-payments from later
to earlier settlers, seems to involve prohibitive transactions costs. The
government, however, as seller of all acreage to both groups, can
simulate such side-payments by charging higher prices to late arrivals.
This was precisely the effect of many federal land law rules: the reser-
vation of section 16, providing financing only to the first wave of set-
tiers, and the Homestead Acts.
Reserving some land from sale also inspired confidence in poten-
tial settlers. Even if leaders were not confident that prices would rise
rapidly enough to justify keeping some land off the market, retaining
title to a portion of the frontier made the rest of the nation in effect
co-adventurers with actual pioneers. Like an entrepreneur who re-
tains a stake in an enterprise even after going public, this fostered
confidence in potential settlers that the entity sponsoring the enter-
prise of expropriating Indian lands was confident of its success. In the
same vein, by taking a fixed section of effectively random quality in-
stead of the best lands, the United States looked less like a skittish se-
cured creditor and more like a confident equity investor.
ii. Special Programs for Special Abilities: Military Bounties
Not all settlers were equally suited to frontier life. Early American
colonists, following practice dating back at least as far as the Greeks,7
used "military bounties to promote compact settlement on the fron-
tier by men able to defend it, and in this way to secure protection
without the expense of a standing army."378 This process began in Vir-
ginia no later than 1679, when the government granted large tracts to
two militia officers on condition that they settle 250 men, at least fifty
armed and ready for war; similarly, a 1701 statute offered land to
groups that could maintain one armed soldier for each 500 acres
granted.3 ' These special programs for veterans were not, in the main,
s7 SeeJerry A. O'Callaghan, The War Veterans and the Public Land, in THE PUBUC
LANDS, supra note 100, at 109, 109 (citing Herodotus as mentioning the Greek practice
of settling veteran soldiers on new frontiers).
S78 FORD, supra note 364, at 103-04.
37 See 2 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 448-54 (granting tracts
of land to Laurence Smith and William Bird, and stating that other lands on the fron-
tier may be granted in the same manner); 3 id. at 204-06 (encouraging settlers by
granting land to groups fulfilling certain requirements, including size). According to
Ford, there were no takers at the time. See FORD, supra note 364, at 104 (discussing the
statutes and concluding that "[n]othing came of this project"). Such statutes sound
positively feudal, akin to requirements that lords of the manor maintain so many
armed knights and the like. The threats posed by Indians in America, just as by war-
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compensation for services rendered; "settlement rather than reward
was the object of [these] military bounties. 3
Governments wanted to subdue the frontier, and there were natu-
ral gains from trade there: land in return for expertise in fighting In-
dians. Building on this longstanding practice, President Washington
argued
that [western lands] could not "be so advantageously settled by any other
class of men as by the disbanded officers and soldiers of the army," for
this plan of colonization "would connect our government with the fron-
tiers, extend our settlements progressively, and plant a brave, a hardy
and respectable race of people as our advanced post, who would be al-
ways ready and willing (in case of hostility) to combat the savages and
check their incursions."
He further argued that the presence of military men "would be
the most likely means to enable us to purchase upon equitable terms of
the Aborigines their right of preoccupancy; and to induce them to re-
linquish our Territories";HI by "equitable" Washington undoubtedly
meant "cheap." He believed, then, that the presence of veterans on
the frontier would help tilt the terms of trade for Indian lands in the
nation's favor.
While the federal and state governments did award land bounties
to Revolutionary War veterans and set aside a number of large western
tracts to satisfy these claimsus few veterans actually settled on the
frontier. "The soldiers, in general, returned to their own homes and
accustomed habits and few of them took any interest in lands in the
wilderness except to assign their warrant, for a nominal consideration,
to some restless settler or visionary speculator."" Apparently the sol-
diers found the government's terms insufficiently attractive; if the na-
tion wished to benefit from the positive external effect of using them
as a buffer on the frontier, it needed to pay them more, for example,
in the form of larger land grants, and further couple the interest with
a settlement requirement.
Based on this experience, the government cooled on the idea of
ring princes, Vikings, and other marauders in medieval times, required both societies
to structure themselves around, and devote considerable resources to, defense.
380 FORD, supra note 364, at 104.
381 TREAT, supra note 88, at 21-22 (quoting George Washington, from WRITINGS OF
WASHINGTON, supra note 292, at 17).
382 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 292, at 17-18.
M See, e.g., GATES, supra note 64, at 249-84 (discussing American military bounty
land policies regarding Revolutionary War veterans).
TREAT, supra note 88, at 245.
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granting free land to veterans. Congress balked when veterans of Wil-
liam Henry Harrison's Tippecanoe campaign asked for land grants in
the territories that Harrison had purchased.3 The veterans noted
that "it would be of immen [s] e advantage to the security of the fron-
tiers as well as to the future settlement of this extensive region ....
[T]his plan of fortifying and securing the country from the hostility of
the savages... is not only the cheapest to Government but the most
beneficial to your Soldiers and citizens. "m6 Another petition for land
claimed that veterans could save the government $160,000 a year in
military outlays.3 7 Congress received over a dozen such petitions; all
appear to have been defeated." Legislators, learning from past fail-
ures, undoubtedly worried that most grantees would simply sell their
rights to other less martial settlers. Since the nation would not benefit
from the positive externalities of a more skilled frontier population,
there was no reason to grant land at a discount.
iii. Requiring Improvements
If and when the government granted lands on what it viewed as
favorable terms, it naturally wanted something in return. Far more
common than requests for military service were requirements that
purchasers clear land and make other improvements. Virginia im-
posed such requirements on early settlers;us its "ancient cultivation"
statutes even rewarded squatters with title, despite their lack of legal
right, as long as they cleared sufficient acreage.390 Massachusetts re-
quired settlers to clear at least five acres of land and build a house to
perfect title 91 The British government followed similar policies, void-
385 SeeJohn Arnold et al., Petition to Congress by John Arnold and Others, reprinted in 8
T)ERRrroRIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 219, 219-20 (1939) (asking Congress, as veter-
ans, for a land grant).
8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 220 (1939).
S7 Id. at 318 ("[Within Nine Months after a proclamation.. . the Ranging Busi-
ness might cease and thereby Save the Expence of upwards of one hundred and Sixty
thousand dollars perYear in this Territory....").
M See, e.g., 9 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES
304, 317, 397, 669-70, 743 (D.C., Gales & Seaton 1826). For descriptions of some of
these bills, see SAMUEL R. BROWN, VIEWS OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE NORTH-WESTERN
ARMY 122-26 (Burlington, Vt., Mills 1814).
= SeeW. STnT ROBINSON, MOTHER EARTH: LAND GRANTS IN VIRGINIA, 1607-1699,
at 31-32 (1957) (describing Virginia's land improvement requirements).
390 See 3 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 46, at 206-07 (exempting set-
tiers from specific duties upon fulfillment of certain conditions, including that they
protect and build on the land).
991 See FORD, supra note 364, at 103 (describing how Massachusetts homestead law
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ing patents if settlers did not occupy, improve, and cultivate land
within a reasonable time. 2 These colonial laws were precursors to the
two primary subsidized land distribution systems later employed by
the United States: preemption and homesteading.3 13 The technical
differences among these programs are dwarfed by a single similarity:
they rewarded only those who improved land, especially those who
cleared forests for agriculture. These laws created incentives for set-
tlers to destroy animal habitats and thus to thin the game relied on by
the Indians. This in turn reduced the value of the lands to the Indi-
ans, who would then be less likely to fight, and would more likely part
with their title of occupancy for a lower price. 3  Clearing land, then,
had positive external effects, and the government tailored land policy
to maximize this benefit to all colonists.
iv. Disfavoring Large-Scale Speculation
In a few early instances, the government sold land at a discount to
large entities that aimed to profit from marketing smaller parcels to
individual settlers. For instance, the Ohio Company bought an enor-
mous tract of land in eastern Ohio for ten cents an acre at a time
when the government was trying to sell to settlers at two dollars an395
acre. Yet as time went on the government rarely resorted to such
middlemen.396 As part of settling the frontier at least cost, it is surpris-
ing that the government did not make greater use of private enter-
prises like the Ohio Company or the earlier United Companies.
While the government needed to prevent competition in acquiring
Indian title, it is natural to presume that once it obtained title, private
enterprise would have had a cost advantage in undertaking the myriad
required settlers to take "actual possession and within three years, build[] a house of a
certain size, usually eighteen or twenty feet square, and clear[] five to eight acres fit for
mowing and tilling").
S2 SeeVoLWILER, supra note 312, at 243 ("They declared a grant null and void un-
less a certain proportion of the land was cultivated and settled within a reasonable pe-
riod of time.").
893 See infra notes 419-39 and accompanying text (discussing these two distribution
systems at length).
39 See supra Part II.D.2-.3 (discussing the game-thinning effects of settlement and
the resulting decrease in the value of the land to the Indians).
895 SeeROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 11 (describing Congress's sale of one million
acres to the Ohio Company as an indication of its willingness to "rid itself of the ex-
pense and difficulty of administering a large section of the public domain," and of the
need for immediate revenue).
39 See id. at 12, 23 (noting the drop in sales to middlemen and the rise in sales to
individuals at the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th).
EXPROPRTATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
steps necessary to distribute the land to settlers. Nothing about land
distribution leads one to believe it was a public good that private mar-
kets could not provide.
The positive external effects created by settlers, however, made
land purchases in part a public good, or what the literature dubs a
"mixed good": part private (benefits that accrued to settlers), and
part public (positive external effects on their neighbors, those on the
previous frontier, and others).397 The nation needed to subsidize the
price of land in order to encourage settlement and optimize positive
external effects. Accordingly, it offered settlers discounted land when
it sold directly to them.3 When it sold large tracts to speculating en-
terprises like the Ohio Company, the nation adopted the same strat-
egy.399
There are, however, two intertwined problems with trying to dis-
tribute privately a mixed good that creates positive external effects. At
first cut, larger entities appear more attractive: the bigger the tract of
land sold, the greater the positive external effects the seller can cap-
ture. A very large land distributor could, for instance, sell its first
tracts cheaply, and successively raise prices for late arrivals facing less
risk. This is precisely what the United Companies intended to do;
they planned to offer free land to the first 500 families, apparently be-
lieving that they could more than recoup this giveaway by selling re-
maining land at higher prices.09 As large landholders, they could af-
ford to subsidize early settlers since they captured a large share, if not
all, of their positive external effects in the form of rising value for
their unsold acres. This was common practice among large private
landowners trying to attract settlers, from Maine to New York to
Ohio.40 ' As long as the government offered the proper discount, large
397 SeeMUSGRAvE & MUsGRAvE, supra note 365, at 49 (explaining that there is not
such "a sharp distinction... between private goods... and others.... the benefits of
which are wholly external").
393 See supra Part ll.E.l.b (describing financing, preemption, and the Homestead
Acts).
39 See infra Part II.E.l.b.v (discussing such discounted offers).
400 See Minutes of the United Companies, supra note 66, at 24.
401 "[E]ntrepreneurs... attracted settlers and subsidized them, thus helping to
build up the back country . ... [G]reat landed proprietors... often supplied [buyers]
with credit and other necessities for beginning a new community.... [Some] con-
structed roads, mills, and other improvements," and offered food, instruction in agri-
culture, churches, schools, and physicians. SOSIN, supra note 225, at 40, 42. These
land marketers "furthered the expansion and population of the back country by pro-
viding the economic wherewithal and services for prospective settlers who lacked
means to establish themselves on the frontier." I&/ at 43.
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land distributors could pass on some of the discount to attract the op-
timal number of settlers, since they could capture the positive external
effects of the earlier settlers by charging more to latecomers.
In the limit, this calls for selecting only one very large land dis-
tributor. Such a monopolist, however, will not make decisions that
maximize social wealth, but rather will maximize its own profits. This
always creates deadweight loss, but the social loss is even greater in the
presence of positive external effects.
40 2
In addition to ignoring the positive external effects of settlers' ac-
tivities, monopolists reduce output below an efficient level to maxi-
mize their private profits. Thus, despite the sale of land to an entity
with lower distribution costs, the monopolistic nature of that entity
leads to an even greater divergence from the socially optimal level of
settlement.
One way to deal with monopolies is regulation. When the gov-
ernment sold large tracts of land to speculators, it tried to mandate
minimum requirements on the number of actual settlers. This is like
requiring a monopolist to produce a given quantity, or, equivalently,
to charge a given price. Thus, the British government conditioned
the title of the Ohio Company of Virginia (unrelated to the later Ohio
Company) on the settlement of 200 families; the United States im-
posed similar requirements on the Ohio Company.03 Monitoring
compliance with such restrictions and punishing violations, however,
was expensive.
The more natural solution to monopoly is competition: the gov-
ernment could have sold discounted land to a large number of specu-
lators. The discount would have solved the positive externality prob-
lem. Further, rivalry among the speculators would seem to solve the
monopoly problem since competition to attract settlers would cause
the groups to increase output, and simultaneously lower their price,
until they earned only enough to cover their costs of distribution. It
would seem, then, that the government could have the best of every-
thing: acquire the land cheaply itself, turn around and sell it at prices
calibrated to capture the positive externalities of settlement, and the
buying entities could distribute the land to settlers at lower cost than
the state.
These distribution companies, however, faced the network exter-
402 See supra Figure 4 (mapping out the choices faced by early and later settlers).
403 See SOSIN, supra note 225, at 33 ("In 1752 [the Ohio Company] received an ad-
ditional 300,000 acres conditional on settling 200 families.").
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nality problem:4°4 each would prefer owners of neighboring tracts to
market their lands first, allowing the later seller to reap the positive
external effects created by the earlier settlement. Pelatiah Webster
voiced precisely this concern in arguing for small tracts in compact
settlements instead of large sales to speculating companies. He wor-
ried about
large quantities of land lying unimproved in the hands of non-residents or absen-
tees, who neither dwell on the land, nor cause it to be cultivated at all,
but their land lies in its wild state, a refuge for bears, wolves, and other beasts
of prey, ready to devour the produce of the neighbouring farmers, bears
no part of the burden offirst cultivation, and keeps the settlers at an incon-
venient distance from each other, and obstructs the growth and riches of
the townships in which it lies; whilst the owner, by the rise of the land,
makes a fortune out of the labor and toils of the neighboring cultivators.
This is a most cruel way of enriching one man by the labor of another, and so
very hurtful to the cultivation of the country, that it ought to be re-
strained by the most decisive measures.405
Those making a "fortune" out of the "rise of the land [prices]"
due to the "labor and toils" of their neighbors are free riders captur-
ing the positive external effects created by earlier settlers. This exter-
nality problem and the network externality problem create more than
an issue of justice. As Webster emphasizes, these problems adversely
affected efficiency. They create inertia, as each Company or settler
waits for others to go first; to the extent actors foresee this problem
they may simply choose not to participate in the market.
Any attempt to pursue both governmental and private land sales
faced the same problem. The government, focusing on social welfare,
would subsidize prices sufficiently to lure settlers to its portions of the
frontier, while private distributors would wait until buyers from the
government generated positive external effects that raised the value of
the neighboring lands they owned. The private sellers could free-ride,
cutting into the government's ability to subsidize settlement. This ex-
plains why speculators often withheld land from the market. It also
undermined some of the positive external effects of compact settle-
ment.
The effects on settlement of the extensive purchase of land by specula-
tors were very great. Desirable tracts in the neighborhood of settlements
were held at prices too high for most of the immigrants to pay, and con-
sequently they were forced to go farther afield to take up less desirable land.
404 See supra Part H.E..a (exploring the network externality problem).
405 WEBSTER, supra note 297, at 494.
2000] 1167
1168 UNIVERSTY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1065
The result of this and of the uniform price of government land, regard-
less of quality, was a widespread scattering of the settlers over a vast extent of ter-
ritory instead of an orderly progression along a definitefrontier.
The United Companies explicitly recognized that many govern-
mental acts had enhanced the value of their claims, and stated their
willingness to cede a large portion of the land to the United States to
reflect the nation's contribution to its value.0 7 Thus, it was up to the
government to subsidize, in one way or another, land purchases by
early settlers who generated positive external effects.
Before examining the means by which the colonial and national
governments provided such subsidies, it is interesting to consider one
means the government did not employ: small-scale speculation. In-
stead of selling small tracts of land at a deeply discounted price to the
first wave of settlers, the government could have sold larger tracts at a
small discount. The settlers then could have resold the extra acreage
at a higher price, after their activities had rendered the area safer and
more economically viable. Many pioneers engaged in such small-scale
speculation themselves, buying up the claims of neighbors who either
decided not to move west or decided not to stay.
4 08
v. Discounts to Attract the Masses
Thus, those who wished to speculate had to buy neighboring lands
themselves; the government did not give out excess land as a means of
406 BucK, supra note 97, at 58 (emphasis added). There is a longstanding historical
debate on the role of speculators in settling the frontier. Traditional scholarship con-
demned them as parasites. However, more economically sophisticated analyses have
defended their role in efficiently distributing land. For a summary of this literature,
see Robert P. Swierenga, Land Speculation and Its Impact on American Economic Growth
and Welfare: A Historiographical Review, 8 W. HIST. Q. 283 (1977).
407 While formally maintaining a right to the entirety of the lands described in two
deeds, the Companies were "ready to admit, that the measures adopted by the Gov-
ernment for the defence and settlement of the neighboring country have greatly en-
hanced the value of this property," and hence were willing to yield a portion of their
lands. 1810 MEMORIAL, supra note 81, at 116.
408 See Stephen Aron, Pioneers & Profiteers: Land Speculation and the Homestead Ethic
in Frontier Kentucky, 23 W. HISr. Q. 179, 182 (1992) ("[B]ackcountry men ... were
[equally] susceptible to unrestrained acquisitiveness when it came to possessing
land."). Aron points out that such speculation was inconsistent with pioneer rhetoric
that denounced large-scale speculators for engrossing the best lands and charging ex-
cessive prices to hard-working settlers. The essence of the "homestead ethic" was that
nobody should be able to buy more land than they could farm themselves. Id. at 182,
193. While the settlers' land speculation may have contradicted the rhetoric of their
ethic, it was entirely consistent with efficient expropriation of Indian land, providing
one way for pioneers to capture the positive external effects they generated.
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encouraging settlement. The United States, however, following a long
line of colonial precedents, did subsidize frontier settlement in a
whole host of other ways. "At times provincial governments encour-
aged joint ventures by offering townships with free land, tax exemp-
tions, subsidies, agricultural implements, and supplies."'09 Grants of
land to encourage immigration were common, and appear to have
been motivated by the positive external effects of settlement.40 The
result was cheap land. "[D]ue to the desire of the royal and various
colonial governments to establish a bulwark of settlers in the back
country, by the middle of the eighteenth century even those with very
limited means could legally obtain tracts."' The granting govern-
ment usually apportioned subsidies based on the number of able-
bodied men who would settle on the frontier. For instance, colonial
Virginia's "headright" system awarded fifty acres for each immigrant
412
New settlers, beyond the positive external benefits they conferred on
existing settlers, were cheaper frontier defenders than soldiers.
"[B]uffers" had formed a protective shield on innumerable occasions
since the establishment of the English colonies. Various colonial gov-
ernments in periods of crisis had offered free land to men who would
settle in exposed places. The prosperous citizens of the General Court
in Massachusetts and the House of Burgesses in Virginia thought such
bounty cheaper than the cost of mercenary troops and perhaps even
. 413
more effective.
Selling land at market prices in the presence of positive external
benefits would have been suboptimal 4  Therefore, "[r] egardless of
409 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 40. Even with these subsidies, some so extensive that
they amounted to a negative price for land (paying settlers to occupy it), colonial gov-
ernments found it difficult to lure settlers to the remote and dangerous frontier. They
turned their attention to disfavored groups with lower opportunity costs. For instance,
Georgia transported Jewish and other religious refugees across the ocean and sup-
ported them during their first years in order to create a buffer zone on the frontier.
See PHZ SPALDING, OGLETHORPE IN AMERICA 4, 20 (1977) (describing the early
colonization of Georgia and the settlers' unusual acceptance ofJews into the commu-
nity). Georgia even banned importation of slaves at times, in an attempt to create a
labor market with wages sufficiently high to attract European settlers to the frontier.
See id. at 48-51, 60-61, 72 (explaining attempts "to keep Georgia a refuge for free,
white, ProtestantYeoman farmers").
410 See FORD, supra note 364, at 133 (quoting surveyor's observation that squatters
improve land, stimulate the market, and increase state revenue).
-411 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 25.
412 ROBINSON, supra note 389, at 32-33 (describing Virginia's "principal basis for
title to land in the seventeenth century").
413 ROHRBOUGH, supra note 96, at 61-62.
414 See supra Part II.E.l.a (arguing that "if sellers can somehow capture the positive
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the need for revenue from land sales, most states offered fairly gener-
ous terms to bona fide settlers or to squatters."4 5 The situation was
different for the federal government immediately after the Revolu-
tion. It alone bore responsibility for repaying the huge debt incurred
to fight the war, and hence felt great pressure to raise revenue to meet
its obligations. Thus, in the early years of the Republic, the federal
government offered few subsidies to purchasers of frontier lands.
This state of affairs, with the attendant sacrifice of all the positive
external effects of greater frontier settlement, did not last long. In
1791, a land commissioner in Indiana recommended gifting land to
French family heads even if they had no legal claim, arguing that they
41 6would prove useful in defending the region against Indians. Con-
gress agreed and liberalized the standard for granting land to French
inhabitants.
417
In the same year, Congress began to sell land on credit; it followed
with more generous terms in 1800.418 Private credit was apparently
hard to come by, at least at the rates the government offered, and
hence this was just another form of subsidy.
Under the Act of 1800 the land system became a real factor in the west-
ward movement, and it was the five-year credit period which rendered
the act effective. Without the credit little land could be sold for two dol-
lars an acre, but with it a man could pay fifty cents an acre and the bal-
ance within five years.419
Congress also began to reconsider its treatment of squatters who
made improvements on land without color of title, even those who
trespassed on tribal lands before the United States, per M'Intosh, had
extinguished Indian title. Squatters argued early and often that, at a
minimum, they should have preemption-a right of first refusal to
purchase, at a price determined by statute, the parcel of land that they
had improved. As the war debt became less pressing, Congress began
to listen.
external effects created by buyers, then competition will drive the price they charge
down in order to internalize the benefits").
415 SosiN, supra note 225, at 152.
416 See Report Regarding Land Claimants in tle Northwestern Tenitory (Dec. 23, 1790),
reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 1 PUBLIC LANDS 9-10 (1832) (pro-
vidin an account of the many methods of land disposal used by the various colonies).
SeeAct of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 221 (1791).
418 SeeAct of May 10, 1800, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 73 (1800) (establishing four land offices,
enjoining the surveyor general to transmit "general plats of the lands hereby directed
to be sold" to those offices, and establishing the system by which the lands in question
were to be divided).
419 TREAT, supra note 88, at 378-79.
EXPROPRTATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
The growth of the sentiment in favor of preemption, therefore, was par-
allel to the changing conception of the ultimate object of land legisla-
tion. So long as revenue was the end to be sought, preemption was un-
deniably bad. But if the furtherance of settlement was to be the desire of
Congress, then preemption was but a step toward the ultimate goal-the
granting of homesteads to settlers. So during the half century of land
legislation the squatter developed from a trespasser... to a public bene-
factor, a man whose bravery and whose sacrifices had opened great areas• 420
to peaceful settlement and who merited well of the nation.
What made a settler a "public benefactor" were the positive exter-
nal effects his settlement had on neighbors and the rest of the nation.
Selling frontier land at market prices inefficiently bypassed this public
benefit. "Gradually [Congress] began to adopt the point of view of
the pioneers, until by 1820 it had become the custom to grant pre-
emption for a limited period in every region where, for special rea-
sons, the land sales were delayed."421 One of the earliest and most im-
portant preemption acts was passed in 1813 for squatters in Illinois; it
served as "a prototype for later special preemption laws." 422 The War
of 1812 delayed government surveys and sales, yet the region was oth-
erwise ripe for a deluge of settlers. To attract them despite adminis-
trative delays, and perhaps to help weaken the Indian resistance re-
sponsible for the delays, the government unleashed squatters to help
reduce the value of the land to the tribes.
Preemption seems inconsistent with compact settlement since set-
tlers have incentives to seek out valuable tracts, such as riverfront
tracts, regardless of the location of other settlers. Douglas Allen, how-
ever, has noted that the preemption acts effectively prevented a return
to the southern system of indiscriminate surveys. "The most notable
feature [of the preemption acts] was that squatters only had preemp-
tive rights on surveyed land."4 By limiting preemption to surveyed
land, the government could solve the settlers' coordination problem
and channel them to areas where they could best serve the process of
efficiently expropriating Indian lands.
420 I at 386.
421 Id. at 383.
42 RoHRBoUGH, supra note 96, at 201. Many of the Illinois squatters who bene-
fited from this act undoubtedly resided on lands claimed by the United Companies.
423 Allen, supra note 17, at 19 (emphasis added). Allen notes that the government
did recognize squatters on unsurveyed lands at times. He argues that this was done
when hostile Indians made surveys impossible, as in Illinois around the time of the War
of 1812. See id. at 20-21 ("With no reliable survey, homesteading in very hostile areas
could not be carried out, and preemption may have been a viable alternative to mili-
tary action.").
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When the United States went one step further and gave away land
to improving occupiers, it similarly limited such gifts to the most dis-
tant frontier regions where Indians presented a real threat. In 1788,
for instance, the Confederation donated 400 acres to every head of a
household in Illinois and Indiana-a region over which hostile tribes
exercised significant control. T4 In 1802, Congress gave away land in
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas, which were states on a
contested border.42' Giveaways in Missouri and Michigan also oc-
curred before the government had cleared these areas of hostile
126tribes. In addition, the government channeled settlers to Florida as
part of its efforts to pacify the Seminole and other Florida tribes that
zealously resisted American incursions.
The Armed Occupation Act of 1842 is the most obvious case of home-
steading to induce settlement in the face of Indian problems. Spain had
tried several times to place settlements in Florida, but failed for the most
part because of the hostile Indians. The act of 1842 gave 160 acres to
any man capable of bearing arms who was willing to move south of
Gainesville and improve the land for five years. The policy was a success.
Of the 200,000 acres allotted, 1,048 permits for 167,680 acres were taken
427up within two years.
These limited programs were precursors to the most massive land
"giveaway" in history: the Homestead Act of 1862 and successor legis-
lation.428 The Homestead Acts vested title to anywhere from eighty to
640 acres to those who actually occupied and improved the land. The
government did not offer choice tracts to homesteaders. Instead, it
opened up only less desirable lands that were further from settlement.
Moreover, the government usually limited homesteading to a few ar-
eas. "By instigating homesteading, the U.S. government restricted the
choices of settlers by providing an incentive to rush one area.
"4
2
In the absence of positive external effects, homesteading (givea-
ways requiring occupation and improvement) creates a wasteful race
424 See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 221 (giving 400 acres to persons "who in
the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, were heads of families atVin-
cennes or in the Illinois country, on the Mississippi").
42 See Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 229 (disposing of land in the Mississippi
Territory).
426 SeAct of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 437 (regulating grants of land in Michi-
gan); Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 61, 2 Stat. 303 (regulating grants of land in Missouri).
427 Allen, supra note 17, at 12-13.
428 See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (vesting title to certain land in
those people who established that "they ha[d] resided upon or cultivated the same for
[a] term of five years").
429 Allen, supra note 17, at 5.
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for land: in order to establish title, settlers make investments in im-
provements before the market dictates that such expenditures are
warranted.40 Allen has persuasively argued, however, that enforcing
property rights against the Indians was the positive external effect that
justified preemption, homesteading, and other subsidies.
U.S. public land policies of the nineteenth century were appropriate in
light of the costs of enforcing property rights. Due to the Indian's simul-
taneous claim on public lands and the costs imposed by this dispute over
property rights, the land policies were efforts to "hire" settlers to reduce
the costs of enforcement. The state may have a comparative advantage
in enforcing property rights through violence; however, when disputes
occur, the state will use a least-cost strategy to secure ownership. In this
light, homesteading is a substitute for direct military force and acts to
mitigate the costs of violence.43
Preemption and homesteading established a large population on
a given piece of the frontier. Settlers presented the Indians with a
large local militia that made the odds of a victorious attack so low that,
realizing their weakness, the tribes sold out cheaply.
432
However opposed the common law tradition might be to squat-
ters, these settlers played an important role in expropriating Indian
lands at minimal cost.43 Even during colonial times, the usefulness of
squatters in helping to eliminate Indian land claims was too powerful
to ignore. Massachusetts, while eliminating Indian tribes from the
western part of the state, found ousting squatters difficult, inter alia,
"because of the usefulness of the squatters in this area as a buffer."4
The British government defended actual settlers against holders of
later-issued warrants for lands in New Hampshire grants because " [ i] t
430 SeeTerry L. Anderson & PeterJ. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33J.L. & ECON.
177, 191 (1990) (noting that "speculators... would hold [land] out of produc-
tion... with no apparent settlement activity, while squatters and homesteaders would
engage in premature development of the land," and that " [i] t was the speculators who
took socially efficient action by not doing anything on the land").
431 Allen, supra note 17, at 2. Allen seems to hint at the equally important effect of
spreading disease and thinning game: "[tihe sudden arrival of tens of thousands of
people into a given territory destroyed much of the Indian way of life." Id. at 5-6.
2 For an incredibly detailed account of the incessant pressure that early settlers
placed on the tribes along the Ohio River from 1768 until the national army dispersed
remaining resistance in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, see ALLAN W. ECEERT,
THAT DARKAND BLOODYRIVER, CHRONICLES OF THE OHIO RIVER VALLEY (1995).
43 Note that in relatively crowded England, squatting served no socially useful
purpose. The common law of trespass is presumably efficient under a well-developed
property regime, since it forces all interested parties to negotiate with owners to use
land, resulting in allocation to the highestvalue user.
4M KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at 68.
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was felt that the difficulties of early settlement on lands exposed to the
incursions of the savages and French made it imperative injustice and
equity that the original proprietors should be quieted in their posses-
sions.,
43
After the Revolutionary War, state and federal governments often
showed the same predisposition in favor of squatters. Tennessee's
original Bill of Rights, for instance, created a right of preemption
based on the dangers weathered, and services rendered, by the earliest
settlers.4 6 Local federal officials warned their superiors in Washing-
ton that the perceived injustice of ousting squatters was so strong that
soldiers simply would not obey orders to that effect.
At this time it is my opinion, justified by the statements of many, that five
militia men of this Territory would not march against the intruders on
public lands .... Much feeling has been excited on this subject, as those
who may be found on public lands are the persons who have borne the
storm of the Indian War, being on the frontier. 7
As discussed in the following section, the government made infre-
quent and largely ineffective attempts to remove squatters, especially
those on Indian lands.4 Roback contrasts this failure to enforce the
law with the zealous enforcement of the M'Intosh rule against private
purchases from the Indians: "The government indirectly subsidized
white intrusions onto Indian lands by enforcing the prohibition on
land sales more effectively than they enforced the prohibition on
squatting."
43
9
Not only did the government refuse to remove squatters from In-
dian land, but it also invariably protected them wherever they hap-
435 FORD, supra note 364, at 128.
436 REmiI, supra note 207, at 78 ("The Bill of Rights... stated that the people who
had pioneered this country ... were entitled to the right of preemption and occu-
pancy, [and that] because these settlers had lived in the region without benefit of land
and exposed to pillage, starvation, and massacre, it was felt that preemption was richly
deserved.").
437 RoHRBouGH, supra note 96, at 61-62 (quoting Letter from St. Louis Land Regis-
ter McNair to General Land Office Commissioner Tiffin) (foomote omitted). While
this and the preceding quotes speak of doing justice ex post by granting title to squat-
ters, the more important effect of legal rules is the incentives they create for future be-
havior.
438 See infra Part ll.E.2 (discussing negative externalities of lawless settlers, specula-
tors, and traders).
439 Roback, supra note 190, at 20. She goes on to note that this may have been true
in part because the cost of preventing squatting was quite high, while the cost of en-
forcing the M'Intosh rule was low. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (not-
ing how "the rule of M'Intosh solved a collective action problem and permitted the na-
tion to avoid expensive bidding wars for Indian lands").
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pened to settle. There is a nagging question here: why protect squat-
ters on Indian lands? As discussed at length in the next section, such
squatters provoked innumerable acts of retribution from Indians pro-
tecting their land, and these sometimes lethal retaliations often fell on
legal settlers, travelers, and others not guilty of any provocation.
The point here is that the seemingly obvious way to deal with squatters
on Indian lands would have been to leave them at the mercy of the
Indians.
The United States may have rejected such a hard line due to con-
cerns about its reputation. In order to attract settlers to drive the en-
gine of efficient expropriation, be they squatters or legal buyers, the
nation needed to establish a strong reputation as a protector of those
on the frontier. Although officials in a world of perfect information
could have treated illegal squatters differently than legal buyers, in an
environment of slow communication over great distances, from an
ever-evolving frontier, it may have been impossible to pursue such a
nuanced policy. If the United States wished to attract occupants to its
millions of western acres, it first and foremost needed to reassure po-
tential settlers that the government would always, and to the utmost of
its ability, protect them from Indian violence-even when they pro-
voked it.
2. Negative Externalities of Lawless Settlers, Speculators, and Traders
Unfortunately, egregious conduct by frontiersmen was frequent.
The most problematic practice was squatting on Indian lands, coupled
with acts of violence against tribe members. "The greatest menace to
the stability of the frontier was often the aggressive, undisciplined set-
tler himself. He regarded the Indian as an animal to be exterminated
.... "4 This was a longstanding problem; in the 1670s, the governor
of colonial Virginia worried that frontiersmen "might well provoke an
Amerindian war in order to secure land and slaves, thus drawing the
whole colony into the human and fiscal consequences
"
42
By provoking hostilities that bled over and affected neighbors and
those further from the frontier, frontiersmen whose activities created
positive external benefits also created negative external costs. When
440 See infra Part ll.E.2 (describing frequent conflicts between squatters and na-
tives).
441 SOSIN, supra note 225, at 82.
442 STEELE, supra note 204, at 53; see also ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 107 ("Tide-
water Virginians in general had little interest in Indian wars. They knew the cost to
them would much outweigh any immediate benefits.").
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settlers provoked Indians, the negative external effects of Indian re-
taliation were far-reaching, endangering Europeans for miles in every
direction. Since frontier squatting often enabled settlers to obtain
valuable land, it may have been rational from an individual settler's
point of view. However, Indian retaliation hurt others. Therefore, in
the social calculus, squatting on Indian lands and instigating blood-
shed often did more harm than good.44
Costs imposed on society by lawless squatters infuriated both gov-
ernment officials and citizens removed from the frontier. According
to one British general, "[a]ll the settlers on the frontier were not
worth what a campaign against the Indians would cost.""4 Thomas
Jefferson declared:
[Tihe U.S. [will] find an Indian war too serious a thing, to risk incurring
one merely to gratify a few intruders with settlements which are to cost
the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand times their value in taxes for
carrying on the war they produce. I am satisfied it will ever be preferred
to send[ing] armed forces and mak[ing] war against the intruders as be-
445ing more just & less expensive.
There was a "general Eastern conviction that the frontier was a
terrible place inhabited by terrible people whose main business in life
was stirring up Indian wars for which Easterners had to pay." 44 One
official argued that "he who preserves Peace with Indians thereby
serves the Indians[,] but it is equally true that by that act he in a much
greater degree serves his Fellow Citizens."
447
The federal government enacted a series of Trade and Inter-
course Acts to rein in frontiersmen engaging in provocative behav-
ior. 8 In addition to codifying and nationalizing the rule against pri-
443 SeeAnderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 50 (describing adherence to trea-
ties as a version of the prisoners' dilemma and noting that "[elven if the total benefits
from a treaty exceed its total costs for both sides, any particular individual may find it
in his interest to violate the treaty terms").
44 WHE, supra note 62, at 362 (footnote omitted).
45 PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 139 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David
Campbell (Mar. 27, 1792)).
ABERNETHY, supra note 67, at 73. As discussed in Part II.E.l.b, Easterners could
not refuse to help in fights provoked by squatting and violence if they hoped to main-
tain the protective reputation necessary to attract settlers to the nation's extensive
frontier lands.
447 Letter from Governor William Blount to Alexander Kelley and Littlepage Sims
(Dec. 1, 1795), e'printed in4 TERRiTORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 408, 410 (1936).
448 Congress enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act in 1790, see Trade and In-
tercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, and amended the law frequently through the
mid-1800s. See generally PRUC-A, supra note 205, at 100-04 (describing the U.S. gov-
EXPROPRTATION OFAMERICAN INDIAN LANDS
vate purchases of Indian lands, these acts regulated a number of sensi-
tive areas of conflict, including crime between Indians and Americans,
trade (particularly in liquor and fur), and removal of squatters from
Indian lands.4 49
Astute frontiersmen realized the government's concern and
promised to avoid creating negative external effects that would im-
pose costs on the rest of the nation. In petitioning the federal gov-
ernment for land grants, for instance, plaintiff William McIntosh and
others emphasized that they were intent on "preserving and securing
the Friendly Intercourse and Harmony which at present happily sub-
sists between them and those Indian Tribes" and carefully limited
their requests to "places within the limits of the Indian cessions.""5
The government took measures aimed at restraining the more se-
vere negative external effects created by lawless squatters. In the
words of Merriwether Lewis, "[t]he first principle of governing the
Indians is to govern the whites.""' Many colonial treaties paid dam-
ages to survivors of Indians wrongfully killed. These provisions were
"designed to forestall escalating violence between individuals, which
might result in war."452 Preventing a violent backlash due to squatting
was one of the primary motivations for the Proclamation of 1763 and
similar laws precursing the Mntosh decision.
4
13
Chief Justice Marshall adverted to such policies in M'Intosh, noting
efforts made so that the tribes' "friendship should be secured by quiet-
ing their alarms for their property. This was to be effected by restrain-
ing the encroachments of the whites."" Pelatiah Webster, otherwise
sympathetic to law-abiding frontiersmen, had little patience with those
squatting on Indian lands and provoking conflict: "For it is
un[r]easonable that the public tranquillity [sic] [s]hould be endan-
ernment's Indian policy as expressed in the Trade and Intercourse Acts).
49 See, e.g., Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, supra note 448 (requiring all citi-
zens who trade with Indians to carry a federal license and codifying treatment of citi-
zens who commit crimes on Indian lands).
450 Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of Knox, St. Clair, and Randolph Counties [Indiana
Territory] (Oct. 22, 1803), reprinted in7TERRITORIALPAPERS, supra note 31, at 125, 127
(1939).
4I PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 75 (quoting 7 ORIGINAL JOURNALS OF THE LIWVIS
AND CLARK EXPEDITION, 1804-1806, at 378, 387-88 (Reuben Gold Thwaites ed., Anti-
quarian Press Ltd. 1959) (1904-05).
452 LARRYC. SKOGEN, INDIAN DEPREDATION CLAIMS, 1796-1920, at 19 (1996).
4M The desire to ensure good relations with the Indians motivated a 1779 Virginia
ban on settlement north of the Ohio River. See GATES, supra note 64, at 39 (explaining
the Virginia Legislature's dual concerns of protecting the rights of squatters and main-
taining good relations with the Indians).
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 597 (1823).
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gered for the [s]ake of the convenience of a few people, who, without
the lea[sit pretence of right, have fixed them[s]elves down on lands not
their own.'45
The government made sporadic efforts to remove squatters forci-
bly from Indian land in order to minimize retaliatory attacks.4
6 Wil-
liam Murray, the driving force behind the Illinois and Wabash land
Companies, may have participated in such an effort while serving in
the King's army at Pittsburgh in 1766.57 Removal, however, was ex-
pensive and ineffective. Neither the colonies nor the United States
was willing to maintain enough troops to monitor a frontier hundreds
of miles long.4 In the absence of a permanent police force, settlers
returned a few days after the troops left. If their crops were destroyed
and their homes demolished, they simply replanted and rebuilt.5 9
Potentially effective alternatives existed. Andrew Jackson, for in-
stance, proposed that troops seize the squatters' cattle, horses, and
other valuable animals. Because animals were the predominant form
of personal wealth, such a policy might well have deterred squatters.
The War Department, however, would not adopt such a harsh pol-
icy.' 6e As discussed in the previous Part, the government seemed to
45 WEBEsrE, supra note 297, at 495.
In 1745, Pennsylvania ejected settlers, destroyed their improvements, and even
bought land for some "in order to quiet the Indians," but "[i]n defiance of this, men
persisted in occupying the ground as boldly as they had always done." FORD, supra
note 364, at 115. Pennsylvania and Virginia took similar measures in the 1760s. See
VOLWILER, supra note 312, at 218-19 (detailing Pennsylvania's repeated attempts to
oust squatters from Fort Pitt);Jack M. Sosin, Britain and the Ohio Valley 1760-1775: The
Search for Alternatives in a Revolutionay Era, in CONTEST FOR EMPIRE, supra note 287, at
61, 63-64 (discussing failed efforts by the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia to
remove squatters). General Harmar removed Ohio Valley squatters in 1785; some re-
turned even after the army destroyed their improvements three times. The general
told George Washington the effort was hopeless. Despite this abysmal record, the
United States repeatedly tried to remove squatters from Cherokee lands in 1809. See
PRUG-A, supra note 6, at 159-60 (describing removal of squatters in response to
Chickasaws' threat to burn their houses and squatters' subsequent resettlement, neces-
sitating further action).
45 See Marks, supra note 50, at 191 (describing orders Murray received to remove
homesteaders at Red Stone Creek).
458 See PRUCHA, supra note 6, at 165 ("A serious weakness in the protection of the
Indian Country was the peacetime shortage of troops to enforce the removal of in-
truders.").
45 See id. at 164 (noting that destruction of settlers' improvements and removal of
cattle failed to prevent squatters from returning several days later).
6 SeeLetter from George Graham, Acting Secretary of War, to Major General An-
drew Jackson (Aug. 14, 1817), reprinted in 18 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 81, at
135-36 (1952) (asserting that the federal government had no jurisdiction to seize stock
belonging to the squatters).
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have been concerned with preserving its reputation as a reliable
guardian. After all, the nation could not hope to attract wave after
wave of land purchasers without a reputation for protecting all fron-
tier settlers. This also explains why, despite the great cost of Indian
wars, colonists in less exposed regions had little choice but to finish
the conflagrations begun by their frontier cousins.
Instead of punishing rogue settlers, the government borrowed a
colonial practice of paying damages to aggrieved Indians in order to
limit the external effects of lawless settlers. This approach made eco-
nomic sense and maintained the government's reputation for protect-
ing its citizens. As Prucha noted:
[The United States] frequently resorted to compensating the families of
murdered Indians by payment of a fixed sum of money or goods.... A
sum of one to two hundred dollars for each Indian murdered by whites
was suggested by the secretary of war in 1803, and this amount was regu-
larly given.
By providing machinery for recovery of losses by peaceful means,
it eliminated any justification for private retaliation and was largely suc-
cessful in removing this friction ....
461
Paying damages was an ex post remedy, made necessary by the na-
tion's difficulty controlling trespasses on Indian land and the inevita-
ble violence that followed.
Even though the United States had tried to bring some order into the
western advance by organizing repeated cessions and creating boundary
lines which for the time being were supposed to be inviolate, the gov-
ernment was never able to stem the illegal advance. Settlers crossed the
boundary line to obtain choice lands, and the government never mus-
tered sufficient military force to prevent the intrusions.
462
Roback notes:
[H]ow little sovereignty the 'Sovereign' actually had over his subjects.
The English colonists were themselves sovereign individuals .... The
English Americans made choices subject to the constraints placed on
them by their own rulers and by the Indians. In many cases, the laws
were so costly to enforce that they amounted to only a minimal con-
straint on the behavior of individual settlers.4s
461 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 106-07. The government also compensated whites
for thefts by Indians, to discourage 'self-help' private retaliation that might have en-
gendered retaliatory Indian violence.
462 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 160.
46 Roback, supra note 190, at 13-14.
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Mocking George Washington's laments about the difficulty of
controlling frontiersmen, Limerick archly noted that "[riather than
the government controlling the people, the people-or at least those
on the far fringes of settlement-had the power to control the gov-
ernment, which is what, after all, democracy is supposed to mean. '
Democracy, however, is a bit more complicated. As discussed
above, the nation was dealing with a collective action problem: while
it was in an individual settler's interest to trespass on Indian lands and
perhaps commit acts of violence, every American would benefit if offi-
cials could restrain settlers.4* This would allow the nation to rely on
the more orderly and less expensive tools of disease, game-thinning,
and negotiating advantages to combat Indians, rather than the expen-
sive tool of violence.
In addition, American democracy was capable of solving, at least
in part, this collective action problem. It is easy to overstate the pow-
erlessness of the United States to control activity on the frontier.
Moreover, the positive externalities created by squatters diluted the
government's desire to control them.
The federal government was sincerely interested in preventing settle-
ment on Indian lands only up to a point .... The basic policy of the
United States intended that white settlement should advance and the
Indians withdraw. Its interest was primarily that this process should be as
free of disorder and injustice as possible.... It supported Indian claims
as far as it could out ofjustice and humanity to the Indians and above all
as far as it was necessay to keep a semblance of peace and to maintain Indian
good will so that continuing cessions of land could be evoked from the
tribes.4"
Summing up the effects of the Trade & Intercourse Acts, Prucha
finds that "if the goal was an orderly advance, it was nevertheless ad-
vance of the frontier. The United States, by using both the carrot
(for example, granting title only to those on lands purchased by the
nation) and the stick (for example, occasionally removing settlers
from Indian land, at least temporarily) was able to mitigate some of
the squatters' negative external effects that most threatened the pub-
lic interest.
The relative effectiveness of American regulation of frontiersmen
464 .,ERIc K, supra note 345, at 192.
465 See supra text accompanying note 443 (describing the prisoner's dilemma fron-
tier settlers faced).
4W PRUcHA, supra note 6, at 186-87 (emphasis added).
467 I& at 3.
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contrasts sharply with the tribes' complete inability to police their
members, especially young warriors bent on punishing the trespasses
and murders committed by settlersee Roback argues that the tribes,
long unsuccessful in regulating citizens in a forest environment, did
not really try to control members by fiat (majority or otherwise), but
relied instead on unanimous consent 6 9 Roback's theory again high-
lights the Indians' significant bureaucratic disadvantage. The reper-
cussions for the tribes of young warriors' aggression were much more
severe than for the Americans, yet the Indians could not police their
own members at all. In contrast, although the United States could not
control the forested, sparsely-populated frontier as well as it could
control life in Boston or Philadelphia, its extensive bureaucracy could
limit activities imposing costs on the rest of the nation.
The history of the Mntosh rule as applied against private pur-
chases shows that European governments, based on a developed bu-
reaucratic legal system, could effectively regulate at least some socially
undesirable behavior effectively. Land speculators, like squatters, of-
ten fomented Indian hostilities. "An avaricious disposition in some of
our people to acquire large tracts of land and often by unfair means,
appears to be the principle source of difficulties with the Indians. ',47
South Carolina's colonial legislature cited Indian policy as the motiva-
tion for passing legislation banning private purchases:
[T]he practice of purchasing lands from the Indians may prove of very
dangerous consequence to the peace and safety of this Province, such
purchases being generally obtained from Indians by unfair representa-
tions, fraud and circumvention, or by making them gifts or presents of
little value, by which practices, great resentments and animosities have
been created amongst the Indians towards the inhabitants of this Prov-
ince.
4 71
When Great Britain took over all Indian affairs in the Proclama-
tion of 1768, it echoed these concerns about speculators' purchases
from the tribes: "[G]reat frauds and abuses have been committed in
the purchasing lands of the Indians, to the great prejudice of our in-
463 See SKOGEN, supra note 452, at 20 ("One of the seemingly omnipresent features
of Indian-white councils has been the repeated admission by Indian leaders that they
could not control their young men.").
469 See Roback, supra note 190, at 14-16 (examining political organization of the
Iroquois at both the village and tribal levels).
70 HoRSMAN, supra note 90, at 40 (quoting 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 454, 457 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936)).
473 Tm STATUrM AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 46, at 525, 525.
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terest, and to the great dissatisfaction of the said Indians."47 2 When
William Murray purchased the Illinois Company's lands in 1773, Brit-
ish officials "feared that settlements which were rumored to be made
in the spring by emigrants from the East would irritate the Indians"
and disrupt the peace. 47 3 These concerns led to a proclamation in
1774 reaffirming the policy against private purchases of Indian
lands.474 Other large prerevolutionary land speculation schemes
raised the same concerns. 475 The New York Constitution of 1777justi-
fied its ban on private purchases on the "great importance of this
state, that peace and amity with the Indians within the same, be at all
times supported and maintained; and that the frauds too often prac-
tised towards the Indians, in contracts made for their lands, had, in
divers[e] instances, been productive of dangerous discontents and
animosities. 
"476
The same divergence between individual and societal costs that
drove squatter activity also drove speculators to buy land despite prob-
able adverse consequences to others.
Land speculators were unconcerned that their actions aroused the tribes
and could lead to another bloody Indian war.... Since the lands be-
tween the mountains and the Ohio were said to be so extremely fertile,
"people will run all risques [sic] whether from Governments or from In-
dians" to settle there "without the least plea of Right."
4
7
As Roback observes, "a fraudulent transaction with the Indians
could have substantial spillover effects on other colonists if the Indi-
47 GATES, supra note 64, at 34 (citation omitted).
473 Marks, supra note 50, at 202 (summarizing a letter from General Haldimand to
Dartmouth, Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 1773)); see a!oJACK M. SOsIN, WHrrEHALL &
THE WILDERNESS: THE MIDDLE WEST IN BRTSH COLONIAL POLICY, 1760-1775, at 233
(1961).
474 On March 10, 1774, General Haldimand issued a proclamation prohibiting the
private purchase of land from the Indians. See SOSIN, supra note 473, at 233 (describ-
ing the aftermath of Murray's land purchases).
In explaining the delay in approving the Vandalia scheme (founded on an In-
dian deed to a large tract of land in Ohio, West Virginia, and Indiana) officials de-
clared that "[t]he government was also much concerned over the unlicensed emigra-
tions into the interior parts of America. It was feared that this movement westward
would likely lead to an Indian war, which would prove detrimental to the older colo-
nies and expensive to the crown." LEWIS, supra note 65, at 126 (citing extracts from
PA. GHRONICLE,June 7, 1773).
476 N.Y. CoNsT. of 1777, art. 37 ("[N]o purchases or contracts for the sale of lands,
made with, or of the said Indians, shall be binding on them, or deemed valid, unless
made under the authority and with the consent of the legislature.").
477 SosrN, supra note 473, at 122-23 (quoting Letter from Virginia Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Fauquier to Shelburne, Head of British Board of Trade (Dec. 18, 1766)).
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ans chose to make reprisals more or less at random. ',4s Speculators
were much less likely than even squatters to suffer at the hands of In-
dians who felt cheated or betrayed by their leaders. How likely was it
that a merchant member of the United Illinois and Wabash Compa-
nies, sitting in a Philadelphia counting house, would suffer at the
hands of angry young warriors?
The long line of statutes, proclamations, and court decisions bar-
ring private purchases, culminating in M'Intosh, eventually curbed
such purchases. There were few, if any, attempts by private groups to
purchase Indian lands after the Revolution. This policy both reduced
Europeans' actions that provoked Indians to violence, and helped
maintain a united front in the purchase of Indian lands.479 The Indian
tribes, on the other hand, lacked the governmental structure to regu-
late their members' activities. Their closest equivalents to speculators
were perhaps the tribal chiefs who sold them land, claiming to repre-
sent entire tribes. Members found it difficult to regulate chiefs who,
acting as disloyal agents, took bribes in return for selling tribal lands
at fire-sale pricesee
3. Positive Externalities of Trade
In addition to small-scale squatters and large-scale land specula-
tors, Europeans trading in personal property defrauded the Indians
and provoked violent reprisals against others.
Fraud and illegal practices on the part of traders stirred up Indian in-
dignation and anger and thus led to frequent retaliations against the
white community. In an attempt to prevent abuses, multifarious legisla-
tion regulating the conditions of the trade was enacted.... Because the
Indian trade had such close bearing on the public welfare, the colonial
governments insisted on strict measures of control.
4
8
478 Roback, supra note 190, at 12.
47 See supra Part lI.B (describing the governing of European-Indian relations and
the creation of a united front among European sovereigns).
480 See supra Part I.B.2.c.
481 PRUCHA, supra note 261, at 18-19. Europeans feared negative external effects of
trading arms and liquor with the Indians. Guns made the Indians much more formi-
dable military foes; drunkenness often resulted in random acts of violence. "At times
the Massachusetts government, like those in other colonies, prohibited the sale of cer-
tain articles to the natives to ensure colonial security and peace.... Conspicuous
among such commodities were firearms and alcohol." KAWASHIMA, supra note 33, at
79. The United States enacted similar provisions in the Trade and Intercourse Acts.
See PRUcHA, supra note 261, at 19 (describing restrictions on sales of arms and rum to
Indians).
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These problems in part motivated the Trade and Intercourse Acts.
Fair trade, however, had significant positive externalities. Tribes de-
pendent upon European settlers for a host of necessities (such as guns
for tribes that had lost the art of making and using bows, or metal pots
and pans for tribes that had lost the art of making pottery) were much
less likely to resist European pressure for land. This explains, for in-
stance, why Massachusetts subsidized the Indian trade long after it had
become unprofitable: "The Indians were no longer valuable custom-
ers, and truck trading cost the colony large sums of money, although
not nearly so much as was expended in Indian wars."4 2 United States
officials took a similar view and advocated trade as a way "to conciliate
the affections of a distressed and unhappy people, and as it might
prevent the expense of a war with them .... It was clear as a sun-
beam, one representative remarked, that the establishment of a trade
must be the foundation of amity."4
President Jefferson defended federally financed trading houses,
despite the losses they generated, because trade was "the cheapest &
most effectual instrument we can use for preserving the friendship of
the Indians."4s  A decade later, an official counseled the Senate
against worrying about financial problems in the Indian trade "facto-
ries" run by the federal government. The justification for the system,
he said, "must be found in the influence which it gives the Govern-
ment over the Indian tribes within our limits .... The most obvious
effect of that influence is the preservation of peace with them, and
among themselves."
485
F. Putting the Pieces Together: The Algoithm
of Efficient Expropriation
By a repeated process of drawing on natural allies and providing
These laws, however, did not work. Indians obtained arms and liquor from settlers
willing to risk breaking the law to earn high profits, or from agents of other nations
competing for the Indians' trade and military assistance. See KAWASHIMA, supra note
33, at 82 (noting that "[a]s long as the colonists wanted fur from them... the Indians
had no difficulty in securing liquor and firearms, with or without legal permission");
Anderson & McChesney, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that "Indians usually were able to
obtain new weapons ... almost as soon as they were available to whites"). The high
costs of enforcing even a limited trade embargo meant that this collective action prob-
lem was unsolvable.
482 KAWAS-IMA, supra note 33, at 90-91 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
483 PRUcHA, supra note 261, at 116 (quotations and citation omitted).
484 Letter from PresidentJefferson to Secretary of War Dearborn (Aug. 12, 1802),
reprinted in 7 TRRTORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 68 (1939).
45 PgucHA, supra note 261, at 127 (quotations and citation omitted).
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them with legal rules to encourage socially useful acts (those with
positive external effects) and to discourage socially harmful acts
(those with negative external effects), the Europeans managed to ex-
propriate Indian lands very cheaply.
The process, broken down into components of a repeated "loop,"
looks almost like a computer program:
Step (1): exploiting its more united front, its military superiority, its
negotiating advantages, its superior ability to rein in troublemak-
ers, and the trade dependency of the tribes, the United States buys
Indian borderlands for pennies on the dollar;
Step (2): the nation then moves settlements into the lands purchased
from the Indians, and spurs migration with subsidized land trans-
fers;
Step (3): these settlers kill Indians by spreading diseases and thin
game by clearing land and hunting-both making land less valu-
able to the Indians;
Step (4): go to Step (1) and repeat the process.
G. AnalogizingEfficient Conquest to Eminent Domain
This Article posits that, more than anything else, cost minimiza-
tion explains the laws and policies employed by the United States to
expropriate Indian lands. This expropriation was a gargantuan proj-
ect, so it is not surprising that the United States employed a wide vari-
ety of means to achieve this end. Before concluding, it is interesting
and enlightening to consider how the United States would have
achieved the same ends if its citizens owned the coveted acreage.
Assume that, instead of Indians, a relatively small group of moun-
tain men owned "the west" and wished to maintain their pre-
agricultural way of life in the face of encroaching civilization. There is
no question that the United States could, and likely would, have em-
ployed the power of eminent domain to take frontier lands, paying
the constitutionally required just compensation. In computing this
just compensation, moreover, the courts would not weigh any senti-
mental (subjective) value that the frontier population attached to
their way of life.486 They would instead pay the value of the land in its
48 See S NIcHOLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.07 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed.
1999) (discussing the just compensation to which an owner is entitled in terms of eco-
nomic loss sustained by the owner). But cf Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas E. Borcherding,
Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO LJ. 237
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highest and best use, excluding the increment in value due to the
governmentally supervised project of bringing the land under cultiva-
tion and intense settlement.487 The frontiersmen would no doubt find
such compensation incomplete, yet to award them more would
amount to forcing society to share the gains from the land's higher-
value use with the frontiersman. Governments have the power of
eminent domain precisely in order to avoid such windfalls to owners
of assets of significant public value.ee
Now substitute the Indians for the frontiersmen. In the eyes of
the European colonizers, the Indians were underutilizing a continent.
By converting the economy from hunting and gathering to agriculture
and industry, the United States and its predecessors knew that they
could create much more wealth-as they defined the term.4sa Thus,
the same thinking that justifies eminent domain may also have made
Americans comfortable with all the devices employed to obtain Indian
lands cheaply. They saw no reason to share the gains, due to intro-
ducing agriculture and a more technologically advanced society, with
the relatively few existing owners unable to put the land to such
higher-value uses.
There is no doubt that, from the Americans' perspective, expro-
priating land and selling it to settlers was a very profitable enterprise.
The United States usually paid less than two cents an acre for land east
of the Mississippi. 4'0 This fell far below the value of the land to the na-
(1979) (noting the possible inefficiency of failing to pay owners for their subjective
(above-market) valuation of their property).
487When considering just compensation where property is taken by eminent do-
main,
[t]he general rule forbids consideration of the effect of the proposed project
upon the value of the property taken. If, however, the present adaptability of
such property for the projected use is a determinative factor in creating a spe-
cial demand for such property.... it does have a real and substantial effect
upon its market value ....
3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 486, § 8.07.
4S See Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings "Accidents": A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28
U. RIcH. L. REv. 1235, 1254 (1994) (discussing how the government's power of emi-
nenet domain stops a land owner from holding out for the additional land value cre-
ated by the planned government project).
489 See supra Part L.A (summarizing colonists' assertions that agricultural societies
had rights to land superior to those of hunter-gatherer groups). Thomas Flanagan
interprets the colonists' argument as a form of eminent domain, as long as transferring
the land from Indians to Europeans was Pareto efficient. See Thomas Flanagan, The
Agricultural Argument and Original Appropriation: Indian Lands and Political Philosophy, 22
CAN.J. POL. Sca. 589, 596-99 (1989).
490 See PRUCHA, supra note 205, at 122-25 (citing instances when land was pur-
chased for less than two cents per acre); 7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 256-
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tion and its land-hungry settlers. Lewis Cass advised the Secretary of
War in 1817 not to quibble too much about the details of land ces-
sions from the Indians, since "[u]nder any circumstances, [the con-
sideration we pay] will fall infinitely short of the pecuniary and politi-
cal value of the country obtained."49'
All the time that "the United States had been refusing to pay the
Indians more than two cents an acre for even the best land.., the
government charged its own western settlers two dollars an acre.'
92
While the record is spotty, there is strong evidence that administrative
and transaction costs consumed only a small portion of this $1.98
spread.
Expenses incurred by the national government till the War of 1812 for
surveying, officials' salaries, and boards of commissioners [in Indiana]
were about $90,000. This amount was approximately equal to the sales
during the first five months at the Vincennes land office alone. In fact,
sales at either of the two Indiana offices for five years beginning in 1812
were greater than all governmental expenditures made for preparing
and offering lands from 1789 to the middle of the [War of 1812].
4
9
Recasting expropriation as an analog of eminent domain rein-
forces one of the rationales for the MIntosh decision: preventing
speculators from reaping part of the gains from expropriation that
came about in large part because of the combined power of all Ameri-
cans, organized by their government. Just as the M'Intosh decision
57, 301-03 (1939) (providing letters indicating the same); Letter from Secretary of
War Dearborn to CharlesJouett (1805), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 81, 1 INDIAN AFFAMS 702-03 (1832) (stating that "[tihe price usually given for In-
dian cessions... has not exceeded one cent per acre"); Smith, supra note 37, at 230
(recounting how between two and three million acres of land were sold for less than
two cents per acre).
491 Letter from Governor Cass to Acting Secretary of War Graham (Apr. 17, 1817),
reprinted inAMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2 INDIANAFFAIRS 136, 136.
49 HORSMAN, supra note 90, at 130-31 (discussing the American purchase of
Creeks lands around 1805). While the United States did not always obtain the statu-
tory reservation price of two dollars an acre, for many choice tracts it obtained consid-
erably more. On average, two dollars an acre is a lower bound on the price the United
States received for acres sold to settlers. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY, WTrH STATISTICS 203 tbl., 520-21 fold-out tbl., 522-23 fold-out
tbl. (1884) (providing statistics on Indian land sales that indicate prices of at least two
dollars per acre); GATES, supra note 64, at 132 tbl., 133 tbl. (providing data regarding
collections and average prices on sold lands).
193 Bayard, supra note 220, at 266 (citing 8 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at
362 (1939)); see also ADAM SEYBERT, STATISTICAL ANNALS 367-68 (Ben Franklin Press
1969) (1818) (providing summary statements regarding sales of land from 1812 to
1817); Expense of Surveying and Selling the Public Lands, and of Ascertaining Tides
to Private Claims (Feb. 26, 1813), reprinted in. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 81, 2
PUBLIC LANDs 739.
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denied speculators the value derived from the efforts of others in a
society-wide project, in eminent domain law, landowners receive no
portion of the higher value that will result from the government's
planned use.14
The nation did not invoke eminent domain against the Indians
because it could not: they did not recognize the power of the United
States unilaterally to oust them and decide the fair value of their land.
This subsection argues that all the techniques used to expropriate In-
dian lands, taken together, were an alternative process to effectively
condemn Indian lands in exchange for compensation deemed fair by
the United States. The Indians, in the end, were treated no differ-
ently than landowners who refuse to leave their property despite the
promise or actual payment of just compensation; they were forcibly
removed if necessary and payment was still made.
Ultimately, as their ability to resist dissipated, payments to Indians
for their land came to look almost exactly like just compensation.
While later judicial decisions permitted the government to take land
without paying compensation,45 but by statute or executive decision,
the United States continued to pay for expropriated Indian lands.
496
494 See supra notes 486-88 and accompanying text (providing sources that support
and explain this principle of eminent domain law).
495 SeeLone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that the United States
may unilaterally abrogate treaties with tribes, and thus take away property rights guar-
anteed to the tribes under treaty); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 965
(1955) (holding that tribes had no constitutional right to just compensation for ex-
propriation of their title of occupancy). As noted, Tee-Hit-Ton, along with Lone Wolf,
seem inconsistent with M'Intosh, which defended Indian title against outright seizure
except in the case of ajust (defensive) war. If, as this Article argues, the basis for the
holding in M'Intosh is custom, there is no reason that later cases cannot modify the
rule to account for changed circumstances. Where a weaker nation prior to 1823 sacri-
ficed nothing by conceding that it was legally required to pay for what it could not take
cheaply, a more developed, powerful nation (especially after the Civil War) could seize
land more cheaply and found no value in the portion of the M'Intosh rule that forbade
outright seizure. Moreover, despite the rule enunciated in Lone Wolf, the United States
continued to pay for Indian land in almost every case (even after wars of conquest).
See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (describing instances where the U.S. gov-
ernment purchased land, even after Lone WolJ). The United States did so for the same
reason it always had before: fighting involves deadweight loss and negotiated settle-
ments offer gains from trade for both sides. See supra Part I.0 (discussing the advan-
tages of negotiated settlement over fighting).
49 "Starting with the Rosebud Act in February 1904, individual statutes opened
reservations to taking at congressionally set prices, rather than prices negotiated with
the Indian owners." Fred S. McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian
Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 313 n.57
(1990) (citing FREDERICKE. HOxIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE
INDIANS, 1880-1920, at 157 (1984)). While determining just compensation is tradi-
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Expropriation long resembled eminent domain in substance; formal
similarities followed.
CONCLUSION
The breadth and complexity of the legal rules used to simulate
condemnation seem daunting, yet expropriating an entire continent
was, in effect, a business enterprise of massive proportions. Adam
Smith marveled at the division of labor in an 18th-century pin fac-
tory. 7 It is unsurprising that the much larger task of taking over an
entire continent required an even greater division of labor.
The government coordinated this division of labor. With its cus-
tomary rule against private purchases of Indian land, reaffirmed in
M'Intosh, the state prevented competitive bidding for Indian lands. It
drew on a special cadre of career Indian negotiators to buy land
cheaply. The government further passed laws to channel the flow of
settlers and to regulate their antisocial acts.
In all of these laws, as in Adam Smith's pin factory, the bottom
line was the bottom line: acquiring Indian lands at least cost. In this
complex enterprise, the means of minimizing cost were not simple.
Threats against a formidable foe, while of some use, were often not
credible, and so the United States pursued all the negotiating tricks
discussed in Part II.B.2 of this Article. Moreover, the nation, whether
intentionally or not, benefited from the biological and dietary differ-
ences between Indians and settlers, which weakened Indian resistance
by spreading disease and thinning game.
The historical record provides strong support for the positive the-
sis that the desire for cheap land shaped America's Indian policy.
That is not to say that it is impossible to make a normative case one
way or the other. It is clear, however, that both the benevolent and
malevolent schools must craft more sophisticated arguments. Charges
of intentional genocide are simply inconsistent with most legal rules
governing Indian relations. Conversely, attempts to whitewash every-
thing from the M'Intosh monopsony, to fraud and threats, to seem-
ingly intentional reliance on game-thinning, cannot paint over these
dark facts.
tionally a judicial function beyond the legislative power, congressionally determined
prices for Indian land are much more akin to a taking than to the negotiated pur-
chases typical in the MIntosh era.
497 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE & CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONs 5 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) ("[T]en persons [working in a pin factory],
therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day.").
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Whatever the ultimate normative conclusion, the entire process of
expropriating America is a stunning example of Hirschleifer's muscu-
lar economics-the "dark side" of efficiency. History is replete with
the more obvious forms of expropriation: war and plunder. This Ar-
ticle has shown the wide variety of subtler, yet potent, and certainly
cheaper means by which the United States obtained Indian lands
"tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and
without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the
world.
, 498
498 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 355.
